Perceptions and constructions of cholera in the Eastern Province Herald and Daily Dispatch, 1980-2003 by Van Zyl, Kylie
Perceptions and Constructions of Cholera in the Eastern Province Herald and 
Daily Dispatch, 1980-2003 
 
A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the  
requirements for the degree of 
 
MASTER OF ARTS 
of 
RHODES UNIVERSITY 
 
by 
 
KYLIE VAN ZYL 
 
March 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
While the growing literature on South Africa’s healthcare and epidemics has often 
mentioned cholera in passing, there is as yet little academic work dedicated to it. 
This thesis addresses that deficit by examining the causes, spread and extent of 
cholera in South Africa between 1980 and 2003. Furthermore, it examines cholera-
related coverage in two newspapers, the Daily Dispatch and the Eastern Province 
Herald to determine how cholera and people with cholera were represented, and 
show how changes in the coverage of two major epidemics between 1980 and 2003 
exemplify the political transition in South Africa, reflect changing political ideologies 
and reveal the shifting role of media within this period. 
 
The thesis argues three main points. Firstly, that representations of cholera and 
those who were sick with cholera were based on long-standing tropes connecting 
disease, class and ‘race’. Secondly, that policy-making based on these tropes 
influenced the unfair distribution and quality of health resources along racial lines, 
resulting in cholera outbreaks during the apartheid era. Failure to address these 
inequities post-apartheid, and the replacement of racial bias with discrimination on 
the grounds of socioeconomic development, resulted in further cholera outbreaks. 
Thirdly, using Alan Bell’s newspaper-discourse analysis framework to examine 
cholera-related articles the thesis compares and contrasts apartheid and post-
apartheid coverage in the two newspapers. 
 
This analysis reveals that during the 1980s the coverage was uncritical of the 
government’s handling of the epidemic or of its racially-discriminatory healthcare 
iii 
system. The newspapers uncritically accepted government-employed medical 
professionals as the final authorities on the epidemic, excluding alternative 
viewpoints. The coverage also “blamed the victim”, constructing affected “black” 
groups as potential threats to healthy “white” communities. 
 
Conversely, post–1994 coverage was criticised the government’s handling of the 
epidemic and the state of the public healthcare system. Government-employed 
medical professionals or spokespeople were not accepted as incontestable 
authorities and a range of sources were included. The coverage also shifted blame 
for the outbreaks to the government and its failure to address public health service 
delivery and rural development problems. The thesis shows the historical threat to 
the health of communities posed by uncaring governments.   
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The study of epidemics is a more unusual field of historical study than it ought to be. 
Humankind’s difficulty with eliminating existing diseases and dealing with emerging 
ones makes it clear that one of the only remaining options in terms of overcoming 
the challenges posed to society by disease is improving our understanding of past 
epidemics. In this way, historical examination of disease could make a great 
contribution. This is because, as the historian Joseph Strayer has noted:  
 
History has the ability to help in meeting new situations, not because it 
provides a basis for prediction, but because a full understanding of human 
behaviour in the past makes it possible to find familiar elements in present 
problems, and thus makes it possible to solve them more intelligently.1 
 
This is especially significant in terms of the historical study of disease. The study of 
history necessarily involves examination of the ways in which humans perceive, 
explain and react to events happening to and around them. It may not be 
unreasonable to suggest that only about two thirds of any given event is happening 
where everyone can see it: the remaining third takes place in the minds of the people 
affected. 
 
In the particular case of epidemics, the actual infection of hosts by a pathogen is only 
the first event of the epidemic. Understanding the mechanisms of infection and cure 
may be important in terms of restoring individual health, but to understand an 
epidemic in its entirety it is necessary to examine the uneasiness it may cause. That 
is, to look into the ways in which affected communities react towards infected 
individuals, regions or groups; how they explain the appearance of the disease in 
their midst, and to whom the responsibility of containing the epidemic is given.  
 
This study of how the Daily Dispatch and Eastern Province Herald newspapers 
constructed the South African cholera epidemics within their pages is intended in 
some way to answer these questions for the outbreaks of 1980-1982 and 2000-
2003.  
 
                                            
1
    Joseph Strayer, quoted in Arthur Marwick, The Nature of History (London, 1970), pg. 18 
2 
The body of writing on the history of disease and dis-ease in South Africa is not 
particularly comprehensive, and has tended to focus more on epizootics such as 
rinderpest and lungsickness2 rather than on human disease. The work done on any 
particular human disease has either focused on South Africa as a whole without 
much regional detail,3 or has confined itself to the large urban areas of the Cape and 
Witwatersrand.4 The Eastern Cape region tends to enter this work only tangentially, 
usually because the region has, since the late 19th century, functioned as a labour 
reserve for urban industries and mining. A much larger body of work exists on the 
broader health trends existing in South Africa, particularly on the health implications 
of the racial discrimination during the apartheid era, and the healthcare shortfalls of 
the South African government both pre- and post-1994.5 Also increasing is a body of 
work on the HIV and AIDS pandemic, probably the most severe health challenge 
South Africa (or indeed the world) has ever faced. While cholera has been a 
recurring medical challenge in South Africa, no academic work dedicated exclusively 
to cholera has yet appeared (although texts with broader focuses occasionally make 
mention of it).6 There is likewise a gap in South African media historiography, 
particularly regarding the print media of the Eastern Cape. No texts dedicated to 
news coverage produced by the Daily Dispatch or the Eastern Province Herald exist, 
                                            
2
    Howard Phillips, “AIDS in the Context of South Africa’s Epidemic History: Preliminary Historical 
Thoughts”, South African Historical Journal, 45, 2001, pg. 11. 
3
  Karen Jochelson, The Colour of Disease: Syphilis and Racism in South Africa, 1880 – 1950 
(Basingstoke, 2001). 
4
  Randall M. Packard, White Plague, Black Labour: Tuberculosis and the Political Economy of 
Health and Disease in South Africa (Pitermaritzburg, 1990). 
5
 See, for example: H.C.J. van Rensburg, A .Fourie and E. Pretorius, Health Care in South Africa: 
Structure and Dynamics (Pretoria, 1992); Merle de Haan, The Health of Southern Africa (Kenwyn, 
1991); The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, Changing Health in South Africa: Towards New 
Perspectives in Research (Menlo Park, 1991); Shula Marks and Neils Andersson, “The Health 
Implications of Racial Discrimination and Social Inequality: An Analytical Report to the Conference” 
in World Health Organisation, Report of an International Conference Held at Brazzaville, People's 
Republic of the Congo, 19 – 20 November 1981 (Geneva, 1982); Neils Andersson and Shula 
Marks, “The State, Class and the Allocation of Health Resources in Southern Africa”, in Social 
Science and Medicine, 28, 5, 1989; Cedric de Beer, The South African Disease: Apartheid Health 
and Health Services (Johannesburg, 1984); Shula Marks and Neill Andersson, “Apartheid and 
Health in the 1980s”,in Social Science and Medicine, 27, 7, 1989; Shula Marks and Neill 
Andersson, “Issues in the Political Economy of Health in Southern Africa”, in Journal of Southern 
African Studies, 13, 2, 1987.  
6
 An exception to this is Mandisa Mbali, “’A Bit of Soap and Water and Some Jik’: Historical and 
Feminist Critiques of an Exclusively Individualising of Cholera Prevention in Discourse Around 
Neoliberal Water Policy”, a paper prepared for the Health Equity and Municipal Sources section of 
the Municipal Services Project Conference, 17 May, 2002, accessed online at 
http://www.ukzn.ac.za/ccs/files/cholera_msp3.pdf.  
3 
although they are occasionally mentioned in passing by texts dealing more broadly 
with the South African media, particularly pre-1994.7  
 
The research undertaken for this thesis hopes to fill in some of these gaps, firstly, by 
providing an extended study of cholera in the Eastern Cape and secondly, by 
examining how the disease was presented in a particular segment of the Eastern 
Cape press. This examination is intended to provide an understanding of how the 
relationship between the South African government and the South African press, in 
particular the English-language daily newspapers of the Eastern Cape, changed over 
the long period of transition between 1980 and 2003. 
 
Researching two topics under-represented in the existing academic canon presented 
some methodological challenges. Newspaper reports of cholera carried in the 
Eastern Province Herald and Daily Dispatch between 1980 and 1983 were accessed 
via bound hard-copy volumes of the publications kept in the Cory Library at Rhodes 
University. Coverage from 2000-2003 was accessed from the online archive of South 
African newspapers (at www.sabinet.co.za). The articles included for publication in 
the newspapers were intended to be easily read and understood by a variety of 
readers and are thus neither very long nor particularly complex. Articles excluded 
from publication, and earlier drafts of published articles, were unavailable because of 
the high turnover of information and newspaper editions, and also because of the 
amount of time that elapsed between the publication of cholera-related coverage and 
the beginning of this research.  
 
Once the newspaper articles had been accessed, they were divided into four sets: 
the Daily Dispatch 1980-1983, the Eastern Province Herald 1980-1983, the Daily 
Dispatch 2000-2003, and the Eastern Province Herald, 2000-2003. Once thus 
arranged, they were examined using the ‘lens’ for print media analysis developed by 
                                            
7
 See, for example: Richard Pollak, Up Against Apartheid: the Role and Plight of the Press in South 
Africa (New York, 1981); Keyan Tomaselli, Ruth Tomaselli and Johan Muller (eds.), Narrating the 
Crisis: Hegemony and the South African Press (Johannesburg, 1987); Herman Wasserman and 
Arnold de Beer, “Which Public? Whose Interest? The South African Media and Its Role During the 
First Ten Years of Democracy”, in Critical Arts, 19, 1 and 2, 2005; Gordon S. Jackson, Breaking 
Story: The South African Press (Boulder, 1993). 
 
   
 
4 
Allan Bell in the seminal The Language of News Media, first published in 1991.8 
Bell’s methods of analysing news sources, news values, and article structure were 
applied to the articles – that is, the articles were examined in terms of word choice, 
subject matter, salient points and information sources to determine the nature of the 
attitudes underlying the reportage. Also examined in each set of articles was the 
level of geographical and numerical precision with which they mapped the epidemic. 
Although Bell did not provide guidelines for doing this in particular, the method with 
which the analysis was carried out was derived from what appeared to be his “rule of 
thumb” for examining place in news articles: that is, determine which places are 
given the most prominence and why they are made significant. In this way the 
articles were examined on an individual basis. The trends that became visible 
formed the basis of the analysis chapters of this thesis.  
 
The first part of the thesis provides the first comprehensive chronology and 
explanation of cholera in South Africa during the 20th and 21st centuries. It first 
contextualises cholera in South Africa in relation to existing tropes around the health 
of Africa; the relation between “race” and health; and, the relationship between 
“status” and health. It goes on to look at the relationship between the forms of 
healthcare provision in South Africa, both before and after the advent of democracy 
in the country. This context serves to explain in detail why South Africa was, and 
remains, extremely vulnerable to the kind of poverty-related diseases which are 
typified by cholera. The chronology that follows, therefore, demonstrates the damage 
done by long-standing social stereotypes and the political failings of the various 
South African governments in power between 1980 and 2003. 
 
The second half of the thesis examines the changing relationship between the press 
and the government in terms of how the disease’s advent was explained and who 
was said to be responsible for dealing with it. To set the stage for this, a brief history 
of South African print media, particularly English-language print media in the Eastern 
Cape, is given, accompanied by a brief examination of the changing focus of news 
reports between 1980 and 2003. The periods 1980-1983 and 2000-2003 exhibit 
deep differences resulting from their different political and social contexts and are 
                                            
8
    Allan Bell, The Language of News Media (Oxford, 1991). 
5 
therefore presented separately. An analysis of power relations and assumptions of 
culpability evident in the cholera-related coverage of each period is provided. 
 
Cholera in South Africa - in the apartheid-ridden 1980s as well as in the democratic 
2000s - was not the result of any innate quality on the part of the communities 
affected, but rather resulted from government negligence and accompanying failure 
to admit the extent of infrastructural underdevelopment in the country. In both 
epidemics, the people affected were resident in areas cut off from urban 
infrastructure, socially and politically disempowered and effectively at the mercy of 
governmental caprice. They were opposed – in the sense of being opposite, rather 
than of being an opponent – to the groups controlling their lives and wellbeing.  
 
In the 1980s, this opposition was between the numerically dominant “black” and 
politically and financially dominant “white” population. The newspapers constructed 
these groups as binaries, ascribing artificial properties to each – especially 
“sickness” in the case of the “black” population, which was then placed opposite the 
“white” population’s inherent “wellness”. In the 2000s, with the race-based binaries of 
apartheid officially banished, the binary became “developed” versus 
“underdeveloped”, a class-based rather than race-based division.  
 
Explanation of Terms 
The population group designated as “white” by the Population Registration Act of 
1950 (repealed 1991) was made up of those South Africans considered to be of 
European origin or descent. To be designated as “white”, an individual had to have 
parents likewise designated; to be assigned to the “white” population group, an 
individual’s language, deportment, demeanour, speech and education were also 
evaluated.9  In this thesis, the term “white” is used rather than “European” because – 
as with “black” – it expresses the grouping’s artificiality. “White”, therefore, indicates 
not only the population group designated under the Population Registration Act, but 
also the characteristics they claimed for themselves.  Though not particularly subtle, 
these terms do express the stereotypes active in the apartheid-era mindset, and are 
hopefully indicative of the lack of subtlety inherent in the artificial division of races. 
                                            
9
 SA History,  “Apartheid Legislation”, accessed at http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/governance-
projects/liberation-struggle/legislation_1950s.htm, on 2 July 2009, and again 17 November 2009. 
6 
 
According to the Population Registration Act, “blacks” were defined as members of 
any African race or “tribe”.10 This restricted the definition of “black” to people who 
were considered to be ethnically and phenotypically African. For the purposes of this 
thesis, the term “black” refers to that sector of the South African population 
designated as “black” under the Population Registration Act of 1950, as well as to 
the concept of “black”, described more fully in Chapter One. In brief, this concept of 
“blackness” was constructed by Western Europeans, and adopted by the “white”-
dominated pre-apartheid government. It grew from distinctions made by Western 
Europeans between themselves and the Africans they encountered in the process of 
invading and colonising the African continent.11 These artificial divisions led to 
Africans being constructed as the “other”, the antitheses of Europeans.  
 
The term “black” is used instead of “African” because of its more flexible application. 
“African” is a narrow term which is arguably geographical rather than cultural, ethnic, 
or historical. The term “black”, on the other hand, expresses the artificiality of the 
racially-based labels used by the apartheid government, especially when 
encapsulated in quotation marks. For the purposes of this thesis, the term “black” 
indicates not only the population group as designated under the Registration of 
Population Act, but also the characteristics ascribed to that group by the “white” 
inhabitants of South Africa. These characteristics are explained more fully in Chapter 
One. 
 
While the racial divisions defined above act as binaries, the definition of “developed” 
is necessarily twinned with “underdeveloped” for the purposes of this thesis. That is, 
they are often defined in relation to each other, there being no concrete means of 
measuring a group or region’s level of “development” or “underdevelopment”. A 
region or group described as “developed” is more economically, educationally and 
infrastructurally advanced than a region or group described as “underdeveloped”. 
Factors influencing the status of a group or region as “developed” or 
“underdeveloped” include its access to civil infrastructure, its economic strength, and 
its political power. It is not a given that a rural settlement - that is, one that is small in 
                                            
10
 SA History, “Apartheid Legislation”. 
11
 Megan Vaughan, Curing Their Ills: Colonial Power and African Illness (Cambridge, 1991), pg. 2 
7 
size, reliant on one source of income and situated in the countryside12 – is 
“underdeveloped”, although this is often the case. Nor is it a given that an urban area 
- that is, a built-up area supporting industries such as manufacturing, mining, and 
tertiary-sector services including finance and legal services13 – would be 
“developed”, although this, too, is often the case.  
 
It is because of this lack of total congruence that “developed” and “underdeveloped” 
are used to designate the two regions described here. For the purposes of this 
thesis, “developed” designates an area and group that has access to good 
infrastructure, capital and power, while “underdeveloped” indicates a group and 
region that do not have access to these things.  It should be noted that these groups 
are discrete, if not necessarily geographically separate – one geographical region 
may be inhabited by both “developed” groups and “underdeveloped” groups.  
 
Furthermore, “underdeveloped” can also indicate that the area under discussion is 
inhabited by members of an underclass, which is defined as a group made up of the 
chronically unemployed,14 many of whom subsist on government welfare payments 
or charity.15 The underclass is typified by female-headed households and low literacy 
and education levels. Members of the underclass do not, obviously, have much 
status in society at large. Note that status differs from class in that it is determined by 
the power and prestige a group or individual possesses, rather than economic worth, 
and is a measure of their social standing in a community. Status is affected by origin, 
ethnicity, age and level of recognition. Although status and class are often contingent 
on one another, particularly in capitalist societies, they are not the same thing.16  
 
While an individual belonging to the underclass may have status within the 
underclass, it is unlikely that they would have status in society at large.  Conversely, 
residents or members of a “developed” area or group may have considerable status 
                                            
12
     ITS Tutorial School, “Geography Dictionary and Glossary”, accessed online at   
http://www.tuition.com.hk/geography/, on 17 November 2009 
13
 Ibid. 
14
     Athabasca University and the International Consortium for the Advancement of Academic      
Publication, “Online Dictionary of Social Sciences”, accessed at http://bitbucket.icaap.org/dict/pl, on 
17 November 2009. 
15
     Craig Calhoun, Oxford Dictionary of the Social Sciences (Oxford, 2002), accessed online at 
http://www.encyclopaedia.com on 17 November 2009. 
16
     Athabasca and ICAAP, “Social Sciences”. 
8 
in society, often commensurate with their class, and may therefore be members of an 
elite group – that is, a minority possessing resources or power disproportionate to its 
size.17  
 
For the purposes of this thesis, it is reasonable to state that the people constructed 
as “developed” belonged, for the most part, to an elite group. In the period before the 
installation of democracy in 1994, it is reasonable to say that all  
“white” South Africans, and a small privileged class of “black” South Africans, made 
up the “elite”. After 1994, government employees, particularly those in high-powered 
posts, joined this “elite”. In both eras, the “elite” was made up of groups and 
individuals with high societal status. The most profound difference between the two 
eras lies in the post-1994 primacy of “class” as grounds for discrimination, while 
discrimination pre-1994 was “race”-based. The group designated as 
“underdeveloped”, conversely, belonged (and belongs) to the underclass. That the 
Eastern Cape was (and remains) “underdeveloped” is plentifully documented, and 
results from the region’s historical deprivation at the hands of the apartheid-era 
government. The province is badly lacking in civil infrastructure, educational facilities 
and healthcare provision. The bulk of its population lives in conditions of poverty and 
is economically and politically disempowered. One set of discriminatory 
governmental policies has been replaced by another, equally exclusive but based on 
different criteria.  
 
This thesis aims to investigate and elucidate the conditions which allowed for the 
appearance and spread of cholera within South Africa in the pre-democratic era as 
well as the so-called “new South Africa”, despite their nominal social and political 
differences. In doing this, it questions the truth of the construction of cholera as a 
disease for which infected groups themselves are to blame. Furthermore, it 
examines the changing relationship between the South African government and the 
country’s press by investigating the form and content of cholera-related coverage 
carried in the Eastern Province Herald and the Daily Dispatch between 1980-1983 
and 2000-2003. This investigation focuses on the change from the largely 
unquestioning concord between newspaper and government viewpoints in the 1980s 
                                            
17
 Calhoun, Social Sciences 
9 
to the split between the “official” and “unofficial” narratives surrounding the 2000-
2003 epidemic.  
 
The cholera epidemics of 1980-1983 and 2000-2003 brought into the foreground a 
myriad of issues around the complicity of South African citizens – including the press 
- in maintaining apartheid and contributing to the misery it caused. The epidemics 
also revealed, however, a number of problems affecting post-apartheid South Africa.  
Disease is inherently political, extending beyond individual illness caused by 
pathogens into societal changes, moral judgements, and inter-personal and inter-
group tension.18 By improving our historical understanding of how disease operates 
within communities on a social and political level, we increase our understanding of 
how disease affects society and of how society deals with disease and with itself.  
                                            
18
  For example: the English phrase for someone who has fallen ill is “he/she got sick”, as opposed 
to “sick got him/her”, implying the ill individual is culpable for his/her own illness.  
10 
Chapter 1: CONTEXTUALISING CHOLERA IN SOUTH AFRICA: RACE, 
CLASS, HEALTH AND CHOLERA GLOBALLY 
 
Cholera is not unique to Africa as a disease, and nor is Africa’s experience of 
cholera as an epidemic particularly unusual. In fact, the perceptions of and 
reactions to cholera in South Africa in the late 20th and early 21st centuries 
largely adhered to existing understandings of sickness and patterns of reaction. 
As the historian Howard Phillips has noted, epidemics pose an “elemental” 
threat to the societies in which they appear.1 This threat is not only to individual 
wellbeing, but also to the power relations and stability of the affected society; 
thus epidemics attract numerous attempts to explain, distribute blame and in 
some way or other understand why or how the epidemic came into being.2 
When cholera appeared in South Africa in 1980, and throughout the sporadic 
outbreaks that occurred until 2003,3 a number of attempts to explain it were 
made. Most of these were consistent with the images of the “sick other” that had 
been in play since the beginning of the colonial era. 
  
Africa as a “Sick” Continent 
The socio-politically dominant “white” population believed that affected 
communities or groups brought cholera upon themselves due to some inchoate 
deficiency and that those unaffected owed their health to their innate superiority. 
Nevertheless, “whites” felt threatened by the affected groups. It should be said 
that cholera in South Africa did not originate the “othering” of affected groups; it 
merely reinforced it by appearing to support existing ideas around racial 
inferiority and the contamination of one group by another. The same can be 
said for the Venezuelan epidemic chronicled by Charles L. Briggs and Clara 
Mantini-Briggs.4 
 
                                            
1
    Howard Phillips, “AIDS in the Context of South Africa’s Epidemic History: Preliminary 
Historical Thoughts”, South African Historical Journal, 45, 2001, pg. 17.  
2
 Ibid.  
3
 Most recently, cholera reappeared in late 2008.  
4
    Charles L. Briggs and Clara Mantini-Briggs, Stories in a Time of Cholera: Racial Profiling 
During a Medical Nightmare (Los Angeles, 2004). 
11 
North-western European society, particularly since the Renaissance, had long 
taken its physical appearance and lifestyle to be the epitome of what it meant to 
be human.5 By the 19th century, western Europe was firmly convinced of the 
superiority of its culture and its science, an important part of which was its 
medical system.6 Western medical discourse on Africa, supported by the 
anthropological beliefs of the time (as well as by military reports on colonisation 
efforts), constructed Africa and Africans as the antithesis of the European self 
image: that is, Africans were constructed as diseased and degenerate7 and 
placed in opposition to Europeans as models of health and civilisation. The 
same oversimplified division was applied to Africa and Europe, with the 
continents being constructed as “black”/”white”, “bad”/”good” and “sick”/”well” 
respectively.8  
 
These artificial binaries influenced the shape of colonial rule, particularly the 
style of indirect rule practised by the British: assimilation was discarded in 
favour of subjugation, which relied on maintaining and reinforcing the divisions 
between the rulers and the ruled.9 This constant reiteration of “otherness” led to 
an obsession in European medical discourse on Africa with delineating and 
explaining the difference between the two groups.10 Most of these differences 
were forcibly located in the African body, which was said to be significantly 
different to the European body. Because the European body was believed to be 
the pinnacle of human evolution, the supposed differences in the African body 
became pathologised: distance from the established European norm was seen 
as deeply negative and possibly damaging.11 Who was believed to be at risk of 
being “damaged” by the “difference” of the African body is not clear.  
 
Dividing the human body into “good” European and “bad” African bodies led to 
the entrenchment of stereotypes of “Africans” as universally inferior to 
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“Europeans”, possessed of pathological bodies and therefore inherently sick 
and threatening. This stereotyping, once established in the European 
consciousness, elided the European need to perceive and thus treat Africans as 
equals12 or indeed even individuals. 
 
The extreme “othering” of Africans did, however, lead to anxiety among 
European colonising powers: Europe, in believing itself to be the epitome of 
modernity and order, constructed Africa as its polar opposite with Africa 
therefore epitomising primitiveness and disorder.13 The resulting European 
anxiety was completely of Europe’s own making: they had invested Africa with 
the very qualities they now felt threatened by, qualities which had no real 
bearing on actual realities.14  
 
Stereotypes may have little basis in reality but do translate into consequences 
for real, living individuals. The idea of Africa as a savage and diseased 
continent justified imperialism because it could be seen as a civilising and 
healing mission rather than an economic enterprise.15 The great human misery 
arising from imperial conquest could be elided by stereotyping Africans as 
inferior, inhuman and therefore to blame for their own living conditions. African 
living conditions resulting from colonial rule led to high levels of poverty-related 
disease among Africans; this in turn led to African bodies becoming associated 
with sickness, reinforcing the existing perception of Africa as a diseased, 
primitive continent.16 It should be noted that this perception was based on 
reality; the stereotype of a diseased continent, however, exceeded the reality.  
 
Disease was seen as an integral – though unwanted – part of the tropical and 
subtropical African regions colonised in the 19th century.17 Much of the disease 
found in new colonies, however, was the result of the process of colonisation: 
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newly-arrived colonists imported diseases from Europe into populations with 
little or no previous experience of those diseases. Military operations and trade 
likewise carried diseases between groups which had previously had no contact 
with each other.18 Forced migration of populations, forcible villagisation policies 
and migrant labour also contributed to the spread of disease. Increased speed 
of travel, the result of road, river and railway networks constructed by colonists, 
increased the likelihood of an infected person reaching their destination and 
infecting others before becoming too sick to travel. Furthermore, colonial rule 
usually imposed by force certain changes in settlement and agriculture patterns, 
leading to problems such as overcrowding and malnutrition among displaced 
communities as well as opening up new habitats for insect and rodent disease 
vectors.19  
 
The resulting high levels of sickness among colonised Africans confirmed 
existing stereotypes among colonial Europeans who, fearing contagion, 
removed themselves to small enclaves situated some distance from African 
settlements.20 The apparent inability of Africans to avoid disease led to colonial 
public health bodies becoming concerned with the construction of barriers and 
boundaries between “diseased natives” and “vulnerable Europeans”.21 This 
segregation, enacted on grounds of hygiene and disease-prevention (for 
Europeans rather than African populations who were believed to be beyond 
help), was also de facto racial segregation.     
 
The African body itself was perceived by Europeans to be the greatest threat to 
the hygiene of its surroundings.22 That these surroundings might be the cause 
rather than the effect of the perceived “sickness” of the African body was not 
widely believed by Europeans. Hence, segregation to preserve the health of 
colonial European communities hinged on keeping the African body as far away 
as possible from the European body, lest European surroundings become 
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contaminated. Segregation was therefore a conscious effort to maintain a “safe” 
distance between Europeans and a group they considered inferior but 
nevertheless dangerous.23 These measures were justified by fears around 
disease combined with European conceptions of African inhumanity.24 
Furthermore, blaming a particular group for its own illness and then restricting it 
to a certain area clearly established who was in control, and, in the case of 
African segregation, reinforced the self-image of the dominant, usually 
European, group.25 This assisted in entrenching segregation between Africans 
and European populations and also emphasized European dominance in the 
area.  
 
In South Africa in the early 20th century, as in other British colonies, segregation 
resulted from fear that cholera, bubonic plague and smallpox present among 
the African and “Indian” populations might infect the European population.26 The 
appearance of bubonic plague in the port cities of Durban and Cape Town was 
put down to the “scattered nests of filth”27 in which African dockworkers lived. 
This is interesting because it evidences exactly how automatic it was to blame 
Africans for disease – the mode of transmission for bubonic plague was well-
known by 1900. It was exponentially more likely that the outbreak had been 
caused by ill sailors or infected rats on recently-arrived ships from Asia (where 
plague was endemic) than by African dockworkers. It is undeniable that African 
dockworkers were affected by the epidemic, being quite likely to come into 
contact with an infected rat-flea or sailor. However, they were unlikely to spread 
the disease to the white population of professionals, merchants, artisans, 
labourers and servants28 due to the fact that there was not much close contact 
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between the two groups. Furthermore, African dockworkers had a relatively low 
rate of infection.29  
 
Despite this, the African population of Cape Town was forcibly removed to a 
location some distance outside the town's limits. The subsequent end of the 
epidemic was believed to be the result of this segregation, with the contingent 
belief that ending segregation would re-start the epidemic.30 The Locations Act 
of 1903 was a direct result of this, and mandated that African populations of all 
cities and town in the Cape Colony be moved into designated locations situated 
well outside the “white”-dominated areas.31 By removing Africans, it was 
believed, Europeans would be protected from disease as well as benefit from a 
newly purified environment. Likewise the belief that squalor was an innate 
African quality, combined with the removal of that squalor to some place out of 
sight, allowed Europeans to ignore the possibility that the conditions they 
associated with “race” were in fact the result of discriminatory socio-economic 
practices.32  Although these segregationist measures were certainly intended to 
prevent “sick” Africans from infecting “well” Europeans, they had the convenient 
secondary effect of also removing a population believed to be a threat to 
European safety as well as health.33  
 
Segregation in South Africa, though initially only in the Cape, involved 
compressing populations that were formerly somewhat scattered into one 
space, and usually not the most suitable space at that. Overcrowding and 
associated infrastructural problems arose (assuming that infrastructure existed 
in the first place). The resulting high rates of poverty-related diseases such as 
malnutrition, tuberculosis, diarrhoeal diseases, and pneumonia34 among 
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segregated Africans merely acted to reinforce existing ideas of African 
susceptibility to disease.  
 
The entrenchment of perceptions of Africans as diseased no matter what further 
intensified the European intention to keep Africans as far away from Europeans 
as possible. In South Africa, this segregation on health grounds coincided 
neatly with the labour needs of the growing mining-based economy, and as a 
result segregationist laws were developed, namely the Land Act of 1913 and 
the Group Areas Act of 1950. These laws had the effect of making it almost 
impossible for the African population to improve its living conditions by ensuring 
that economic and educational development in that population was blocked. A 
cycle developed, as health conditions worsened because of increasingly 
repressive segregationist laws.  
 
The perceived African susceptibility to disease tied into the idea that Africa and 
Africans were pathological in nature, which suggested that there was something 
innate in Africans that made them sick. This led to the idea that Africans were to 
blame for their own sickness and therefore their own deaths. Unjust as this was, 
it is hardly an unusual response to sickness which has always had a moral 
dimension attached to it.  
 
Cholera, Africa and the Social Perception of Disease 
Epidemics almost always give rise to fear among the infected and uninfected. 
Infectious diseases (that is, those passed from person to person, such as HIV 
and AIDS, cholera and influenza)35 are perceived as much more of a threat to 
individual and societal survival than chronic, non-infectious diseases (those 
affecting only one individual at a time, such as ischaemic heart disease or 
cancer).36 People affected by infectious diseases37 are often seen to be carriers 
of contagion, threats to the health and security of unaffected people and thus 
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come to be feared and quite often hated.38 The same does not apply to 
individuals affected by non-infectious diseases.39  
 
The degree of threat is related to the extent of the infection: the more obvious a 
disease, the more negativity is likely to be attached to it. Likewise, the more 
people are infected, the more likely it is that a disease will be seen as a threat to 
society as a whole rather than just a few “risk groups”.40 The severity of 
negative reactions increases if a disease is lethal, appears suddenly and is of 
unknown origin.41 Negative reactions are also much more likely to occur when 
an outbreak affects a group already considered to be on the margins of 
“mainstream” society: groups on which outbreaks are blamed are almost certain 
to be groups already believed to cause or harbour disease.42  
 
Societal explanations of an outbreak often influence how it is handled much 
more significantly than scientific explanations. An epidemic, it can be said, 
exists partly in the pathogen and partly in the society that pathogen enters. 
Cholera in Europe, as is well documented, was explained as a judgement on 
the moral failings of the urban poor.43 In Africa, it is explained as the result of 
the inherent inferiority of the African. Attaching a moral judgement to an 
epidemic can severely hinder its treatment, as the perceptions surrounding 
those affected by the disease influence how they are treated.  
 
The schema put forward in Susan Sontag's 1978 Illness as Metaphor, and 
developed further in her 1989 AIDS and Its Metaphors, suggests that any 
disease without a clear origin – which is to say practically any disease at all – 
will attract moral judgements because it is surrounded by fear and uncertainty. 
Affected individuals of such diseases will be thought to have brought the 
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sickness upon themselves.44 Furthermore, certain illnesses are more obviously 
negative and damaging than others, particularly “degrading” diseases such as 
terminal AIDS-related complexes, cholera and cancer, and often attract 
stigmas.45 Their sufferers, by extension, become stigmatised. This is partly a 
function of the visible effects of the disease on the body. The physical 
symptoms of cholera, for example, make the distinction between the affected 
and unaffected quite obvious.46 The amount of stigma attached to a disease 
appears to be directly related to how “obvious” that sickness is. The “corruption, 
weakness and decay”47 which the illness makes visible alarms observers to the  
degree to which the affected person ceases to be an individual. That is, the host 
becomes merely an extension of the disease, having been entirely 
overwhelmed by it.48  
 
Cholera is a bacterial disease caused by vibrio cholerae, an organism thought 
to be endemic to the Ganges Delta.49 It affects only humans and has no animal 
reservoir. The bacterium thrives in water50 and can thus contaminate fish, 
shellfish, and vegetables (as well as clothes washed in infected water, as long 
as they remain wet).51 Most infections result from the consumption of infected 
water or contact with the excreta of an infected person. Once ingested, cholera 
multiplies rapidly in the intestine, releasing a strong toxin which prevents the 
intestinal wall from absorbing water, resulting in severe diarrhoea and vomiting. 
If left untreated, severe dehydration results, causing muscle spasms, shock, 
and heart failure.52  
 
The fatality rate among untreated cholera victims varies according to which 
strain of the bacterium caused the infection, but it is usually between 20% and 
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50%, with death occurring in as little as six hours.53 While treatment is relatively 
simple, involving rehydration and antibiotics,54 sick and convalescing cholera 
patients excrete huge numbers of bacteria which may spread the infection to 
others.55 Furthermore, many cholera victims are asymptomatic and therefore 
unknowingly spread the disease.56 Quarantine is thus immensely difficult and 
usually futile.  
 
The most efficient way to prevent cholera is to ensure that water supplies are 
uncontaminated by the bacterium, necessitating water-treatment and sanitation 
facilities. Installing such facilities is costly and time-consuming and so they are 
often restricted to areas which can afford the large outlays of capital this 
requires. As a result, cholera is usually restricted to areas without adequate 
water purification and sanitation infrastructure. Although vibrio cholerae may be 
an equal-opportunity pathogen, as it were, cholera is not an equal-opportunity 
disease. Although proximity to an infected water supply is not limited to 
communities with less access to resources, it is certainly more likely.57  
 
Cholera is known to have spread outwards from India in the early 19th century 
as a result of trade and military movements in Asia and Europe.58 The 
expansion and consolidation of British rule in India in the 1810s involved the 
expansion of trade and transport routes inside India, with the result that 
population movement spread cholera from outlying areas to Calcutta, where an 
epidemic occurred in 1817. From Calcutta, an important trade port, cholera 
spread to China and Japan, as well as the Middle East and East Africa.59 
Military operations spread it to Russia via Afghanistan and Iran in the 1820s.60 
The Moscow epidemic of 1830 caused such panic that the Russian Army was 
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ordered to lay siege to cholera-infected towns and shoot any person trying to 
escape them.61 These quarantine measures were unsuccessful as cholera 
continued to spread to Poland and Germany, carried by waves of refugees.62  
 
Although Britain enforced a 15-day quarantine on trade ships coming from 
infected ports in Russia, Germany or the Baltic, cholera entered England at 
Sunderland in 1831.63 From there it spread quickly to Newcastle and thence to 
London, where the epidemic killed at least 8 500 people (although some 
estimates are as high as 18 000)64 before petering out in late 1832.65 The 
disease returned to England in 1839.66 Given that trade with Africa, Asia and 
the Middle East fuelled the Industrial Revolution, which was then beginning to 
gather speed, England, specifically London, was at risk of further cholera 
outbreaks.  
 
In the 1830s and early-to-mid 1840s, cholera spread from India, through 
Afghanistan, Iraq and the Near East as far north as Germany. It re-entered 
England at London via a ship from Hamburg in 1848.67 As in the 1830-1833 
outbreak, cholera bacteria infected the River Thames, the city's main water 
supply, sewer, and transport route.68 Between January and August 1849, 24 
000 people died of cholera.69 By November 1849, however, the epidemic had 
abated.  
 
To date, there have been seven global cholera pandemics, with an eighth 
beginning in 2007.70 Cholera was at its most prevalent in the 19th century, with 
six of the eight global pandemics occurring during that century.71  
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19th-century cholera outside of India was restricted to the working-class poor of 
Europe, Britain and North America. Reasons for this include inferior living 
conditions; de facto (if not actively legislated) segregation between the rich and 
poor; and, lack of access to purified water. In 19th-century London, where 
massive discrepancies in quality of life existed between the emerging middle 
class and the city's poor, cholera spread easily among the poor but did not 
affect the rich.72 This was because those groups did not make use of the same 
water sources. Economic growth had led to a sizeable increase in population in 
the early 19th century, particularly in the city's southern and eastern precincts, 
which were consequently badly overcrowded, and where the population lived in 
insanitary conditions.73 Population increase strained the city's already 
inadequate sanitation systems,74 putting clean drinking water at a premium. 
Water companies provided clean water but at a price generally out of reach of 
the city's poorer residents.75 Consequently, the death rate from cholera in 
relatively poor South London was three times that of the wealthier North 
London76 as poorer residents, unable to access clean water, made use of the 
highly contaminated Thames.  
 
The epidemic was consequently seen by the city's wealthier residents to be a 
judgement on the poor,77 who were viewed as moral and physical degenerates 
who had brought the disease upon themselves.78 Similarly, the rich took their 
apparent immunity to be the result of inherent moral and physical superiority, 
rather than of their physical and social distance from the poor. (Conversely, the 
affected poor often saw cholera as a deliberate plot by the rich to wipe them 
out).79 Similar perceptions can be seen in the Venezuelan epidemic of 1992-
1993. 
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Technological and medical advances in Europe and North America in the early 
part of the 20th century, along with improved living conditions, caused cholera to 
decline sharply in those regions. The spread of these advances resulted in only 
scattered cases occurring in India, the Middle East, South-East Asia and 
northern Africa in the early to mid-20th century.  
 
The seventh pandemic originated in 1961 in Indonesia, rather than India, and 
progressed slowly westward, reaching Africa in 1971 and South America in 
1991,80 where a severe epidemic affected Peru and eastern Venezuela in 1992 
and 1993.81 Although cholera was recorded as present in sub-Saharan Africa 
from 1971 onwards, it did not enter South Africa until late 1980. Subsequent 
South African epidemics occurred in 1999, 2000-2003, and 2008-2009. The 
most severe African outbreak of the 20th century occurred in 1994, in Goma 
Refugee Camp in the Congo, where an unspecified number of Rwandan 
refugees died. The death toll is thought to be in the tens of thousands.82 
Zimbabwe and north-eastern South Africa experienced an epidemic in late 
2008, which is still ongoing although significantly abated. Unrelated outbreaks 
of cholera occurred in Kenya, Tanzania, Nigeria, and Cameroon83 throughout 
late 2009.  
 
Obviously the cholera bacterium cannot itself tell one human being from 
another; it is merely a parasitic organism seeking a host. That some individuals 
rather than others become hosts is a result of differences in living conditions 
experienced by those individuals rather than any intrinsic biological differences. 
The cholera bacterium thrives in warm water; it is most likely to survive in open 
water sources which are situated in tropical or subtropical regions. Furthermore, 
cholera is easily killed by basic water-purification measures such as chlorination 
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or boiling. Therefore it is more likely to strike a community without water-
purification systems than it is one with such facilities. This at least partially 
explains why the most severe 20th and 21st century outbreaks have occurred in 
Asia, Africa and South America.  
 
The Venezuelan epidemic of 1992-1993 need not have been as severe as it 
was. Charles L. Briggs argues that inadequacies in the country's public health 
services combined with institutionalised racism created a sluggish and 
insufficiently effective approach to the outbreak.84 The group most affected were 
the Warao people, a Native American group marginalised by mainstream 
Venezuelan society and resident in a remote and underdeveloped area on the 
country's east coast.85  
 
The Warao people were believed to be backward and unhygienic in lifestyle, 
and, like the poor of London, were therefore believed to have brought cholera 
upon themselves.86 This allowed mainstream and “elite” Venezuelan society to 
ignore the possibility that their societal structure could be held accountable for 
the Warao outbreak. By placing the blame for the disease squarely on the 
affected community's ethnicity and culture, they removed the obligation to admit 
that socio-economic marginalisation and underdevelopment in the region was to 
blame. Briggs argues that on the scale of the Americas as a whole, blame took 
on the form of concentric rings: Venezuelans were wary of the Warao; South 
America as a whole became wary of Venezuela; and, North America became 
wary of South America.87 
 
It is clear that poorer communities are more in danger of cholera outbreaks than 
wealthier ones. This is common to almost every cholera outbreak. The 
conditions giving rise to the outbreaks are universally similar. Affected 
communities everywhere share certain characteristics, the major one being lack 
of access to water and sanitation as a result of socioeconomic marginalisation 
                                            
84
 Briggs, “Racialising Death”, pg. 666. 
85
 Ibid., pg. 671. 
86
 Ibid., pg. 671. 
87
 Ibid., pg. 680. 
24 
or systematic denial of such access. Cholera is a disease that never strikes 
anywhere it would not be expected to strike. Historically, reactions to cholera 
are all broadly alike – in 19th-century England, 20th-century Venezuela, and 20th- 
and 21st-century South Africa, “elite” populations came to perceive the infected 
“non-elite” populations as both threatening to the health of “elite” populations 
and to blame for their own infection. 
 
In any given epidemic, the groups affected are by and large poorer and more 
alienated from their society's power-structures than groups that remain 
unaffected. Perceptions of cholera that become dominant among economic and 
political elites (in the 19th, 20th and 21st centuries), therefore, tend to be those 
developed by unaffected groups, giving rise to narratives designed to entrench 
the differences between affected and unaffected groups. As a result, 
communities affected by cholera are “othered” by the society of which they are 
part, if indeed they were not already considered to be the “other” because of 
race, ethnicity, economic status, class or religion. 
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Chapter 2: KEEPING OUT THE WELCOME MAT - CHOLERA-CONDUCIVE 
CONDITIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1942-2003 
 
A cholera bacterium does not know anything about its host. It cannot determine that 
host’s economic status, state of mind, religion, location, race or gender. There is 
furthermore no way for it to choose between hosts: one host is much like another 
insofar as providing a comfortable environment for the bacterium. That one individual 
rather than another should be infected must consequently be the result of differences 
in the circumstances in which those individuals live rather than of any inherent 
physical differences between them.  
 
In the South African cholera outbreaks of the 1980s and 2000s, only rural1 and peri-
urban2 “black” communities were affected. The bulk of these communities were 
resident in areas lacking in health and civil infrastructure,3 leading to high child and 
infant mortality, low life expectancy and a high prevalence of poverty-related 
diseases. These dire health circumstances were not the result of any inchoate 
predisposition to illness on the part of the populations living in these parts, but rather 
of governmentally-sanctioned racial discrimination that from the late 19th century 
onwards systematically deprived particularly “black” populations of adequate 
facilities. These populations were also deprived of the economic and political 
wherewithal to achieve or maintain adequate health. Put bluntly, institutionalised 
physical and economic segregation made it nearly impossible for the bulk of the 
“black” population of South Africa to maintain good basic health. In addition to this, 
the South African and “homeland” public sector health services for the period 1919 to 
1994 (and beyond) were not comprehensive, efficient or coherent enough to ensure 
the implementation of adequate health measures. 
 
It is not overstating the case to say that for much of the history of South Africa, the 
bulk of the population was denied the resources necessary for the creation and 
maintenance of health. Among the most basic of these necessities was adequate 
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nutrition, sanitation and clean water4 – the absence of which was tantamount to 
putting out a welcome mat for water-borne disease. Other prerequisites for 
maintaining health are facilities at which individuals can be immunised against 
disease or, once infected, access treatment.5 Furthermore, the government has a 
responsibility towards its citizens; the creation and maintenance of health relies, in 
part, on governmental action and particularly on co-operation between local, 
provincial and national levels of administration. Local authorities should, in a tiered 
governmental structure, be concerned with the supply and maintenance of a safe 
water supply, sanitation, refuse removal and the implementation of disease-
prevention projects in the area for which they are responsible.6 Provincial 
administrations should likewise provide healthcare facilities (hospitals and 
community clinics, for example) as well as community-based primary healthcare and 
facilities for the treatment of disease.7 National governments should liaise with 
subsidiaries to devise and implement policy.  
 
For most of its history South African health services were divided along racial lines, 
leading to extreme fragmentation and unequal distribution of services. Today, this 
fragmentation continues in the shape of lack of accountability, ineptitude and 
problematic interdepartmental communication. All of these factors hinder the 
establishment of an efficient and effective set of health services. In both cases, the 
provision of resources necessary to maintain good health – such as water and 
sanitation, healthcare facilities and appropriate policies has been sporadic and, when 
supplied, has usually been inadequate. The net result is that for over a century the 
bulk of the South African population has been forced to make use of inadequate 
health services which exacerbates the health challenges caused by social and 
economic inequalities. In the face of this, outbreak of cholera in South Africa was, 
and remains, inevitable. 
 
Historically, South African health services were developed haphazardly, beginning 
with the first Contagious Diseases Act of 18688 and urban segregation of the late 
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19th century9 and continuing until concerted efforts at creating a unified health 
service were made in the 1980s. The South African Health Act of 1909 instead of 
imposing coherence on the fragmented colonial health system, merely transferred 
the responsibilities of the dissolved colonial health authorities onto the newly-
appointed provincial authorities.10  
 
The 1909 Health Act did not establish a Department of Health, but shifted disease-
prevention responsibilities, formerly administered by the local authorities, to the 
Department of Internal Affairs.11 The Spanish Flu epidemic of 1918, however, made 
it clear that some kind of unified effort was necessary, which led to the 1919 Public 
Health Act.12 This Act established a National Department of Health, intended to 
provide public health services alongside those provided by the local authorities. 
Local authorities were charged with supervising environmental health in communities 
under their jurisdiction, while provincial authorities were mainly concerned with 
hospitals.13 The local authorities’ environmental health programs were nominally 
supervised by the Department of Public Health; however, the Department had no 
real power to control the actions of local authorities. As a result, the changes were 
mainly administrative and did not improve the quality of care available.  
 
Unsurprisingly, the Gluckman Commission of 1942, appointed by the South African 
National Department of Health to review health services in the country, criticised the 
health services of the pre-apartheid era as being inadequate, misdirected and unco-
ordinated.14 The Commission’s recommendation was that curative medicine be 
replaced by preventive medicine as a priority. Although this recommendation was 
applauded, it was not implemented.15 Supporters of the Gluckman commission 
blamed this failure to implement what seemed to be a reasonable plan on the 
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ascension to power of the National Party in 1948, and the subsequent wholesale 
development and implementation of apartheid.16 It should be noted, however, that 
racial segregation existed in medical and health-provision services long before the 
formal advent of apartheid.17  
 
The major complication that apartheid introduced to the already somewhat byzantine 
South African health system was the creation of “homelands”, which necessitated 
the formation of 10 new Departments of Health separate from the South African 
National Department of Health.18 All “black” South Africans had to be affiliated with 
the “homeland” designated by the government as the one related to their apparently 
specific ethnic group. When assigned citizenship of a “homeland”, “blacks” were 
forcibly deprived of their South African citizenship. This neatly divested South African 
authorities of the responsibility of maintaining the health of “black” communities. At 
the same time it was believed to have removed the threat “black” communities posed 
to “white” communities by placing those “black” communities at physically distant 
locations (much like the urban segregation implemented by the 1919 Public Health 
Act but on a larger scale).19  
 
The creation of “homelands” divided the “black” population into a small, relatively 
well-resourced urban working class (which nevertheless had no South African 
citizenship) and a much larger, poorer and almost entirely disenfranchised rural 
population.20 For example, KaNgwane, the Swazi “homeland” where cholera first 
broke out in 1981, lacked schools, clinics and even running water when it was 
established in 1980.21 Although “homelands” were intended to be agriculture-based 
economies, massive population densities (around four times the South African 
average of 25 people/km2) made agriculture impossible: QwaQwa, barely 655km2, 
suffered a population increase from 24 000 in 1975 (a tightly packed 36.7 
people/km2) to approximately 250 000 in 1980, leading to a population density of 
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381.7 people/km2.22 This population density was very similar to that of the 
Netherlands, which was 341 people/km2 in 1980 and higher than that of  Japan in 
1980 (309 people/km2).23 The Netherlands and Japan, however, were relatively 
wealthy, well-resourced countries with viable infrastructure. Neither QwaQwa nor 
any of the other “homelands” were any of these things. Obviously, regions with 
adequate infrastructure can support much higher populations than regions without, 
and present better opportunities for subsistence and employment.24 
 
As a result of this reshuffling of the South African population, “homeland” areas 
became vast sinks of ill health, owing to the high population density and the strain it 
placed on areas already severely lacking in infrastructure. Furthermore most 
“homeland” residents were economically inactive, being “blacks” that were not 
employed elsewhere (i.e., not migrant workers). Homelands were usually made up of 
the elderly, disabled or underage.25 Furthermore, as technological advances reduced 
the amount of labour needed in the industrial and mining industries, fewer and fewer 
“homeland” residents were able to find jobs which reduced the “homelands” already 
minimal income.26  
 
The lack of economic opportunity for “homeland” residents, combined with the 
environmental degradation that resulted from overcrowding, led to widespread rural 
poverty.27 The creation of “homelands” transferred the costs of supporting these 
people to non-viable “homeland” governments.28 This had the doubly damaging 
effect of placing high strain on “homeland” finances and pushed ever more people 
into a migrant labour system, which sustained the South African economy at the 
expense of the “homelands”.29 As a result, the “homelands” were severely affected 
by poverty-related diseases, as well as malnutrition and low life expectancy.  
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However, according to Shula Marks and Neils Andersson, these health problems 
were blamed not on the extreme impoverishment of the “homeland” populations, but 
rather on their inability or unwillingness to adhere to “white” medicine and standards 
of “hygiene”.30 The “white” population was affected mainly by degenerative diseases 
(which were mostly untreatable) and conditions that could be treated with surgery, 
differences which only reinforced the idea among “whites” that high “black” mortality 
was the result of innate backwardness and sickness on the part of “black” 
populations. Poverty-related vulnerability to disease combined with apartheid-era 
segregation made disease a highly racialised concept. As a result, outbreaks of 
communicable diseases in rural areas and “homelands” were usually first ignored as 
inevitable manifestations of the inherent “sickness” of “black” populations. If the 
infection showed signs of spreading, fears arose that “whites” might be infected by 
“blacks”.31  
 
In 1977, the Health Act was passed. It did not, unsurprisingly, deal with the health 
problems faced by the “homelands” – they were not considered to be part of South 
Africa and were therefore outside the Act’s ambit. Instead, the 1977 Act focused on 
alleviating problems relating to the provision of comprehensive preventive care within 
“white” South Africa.32 Furthermore, it established foundations for a National 
Department of Health that would co-ordinate local and provincial health authorities 
and provide whichever services were not already supplied by its subsidiaries (for 
example medico-legal and research facilities).33 The Act did not, however, address 
the South African healthcare services’ most severe problem, fragmentation, which 
had bedevilled the provision of adequate health services since the 19th century.  
 
The Browne Commission of 1980 was a government-appointed body charged with 
identifying problems in the South African health services and recommending 
improvements.34 Like the Gluckman Report of the 1940s, the Browne Commission 
identified fragmentation as the major stumbling-block affecting the provision of 
adequate health services. Furthermore, it suggested that the lack of a central policy-
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making body to co-ordinate the 13 health departments operating within South African 
borders casued excessive duplication and misallocation of resources, as well as 
slowing down effective interdepartmental co-ordination. It recommended that a 
national health policy be formulated, with priority granted to preventive medicine and 
primary healthcare services, environmental health, and community health services.35 
These recommendations were not new. Unfortunately, they were, once again, not 
effectively implemented. 
 
The late 1980s, however, brought about significant changes in the social and political 
climate of South Africa.36 A new Health Act passed in 1990 was concerned mainly 
with changes in policy-making rather than changes in practice. It emphasized 
individual responsibility for health (although what this entailed was not elucidated) 
and the provision of a comprehensive health service by national and local 
authorities. At the same time, however, the 1990 Health Act encouraged the growth 
of the private healthcare sector and the recovery of state medical costs by taxation.37 
Furthermore, it established three main policy-making bodies, namely the Health 
Matters Council, the Administrator’s Health Council (responsible for healthcare and 
hospital services in each province), and the Health Policy Council.38  
 
In 1991, the National Health Service Delivery Plan was devised; it was intended to 
establish a comprehensive health service and ensure that this was put in place 
between 1990 and 1995.39 This meant that it would take place at the same time as 
South Africa’s transition from apartheid to democracy. Accordingly, the Plan was 
intended to make all South African health services accessible to the whole 
population by rendering them accessible, effective, affordable and equitable. Most of 
these changes were, however, cosmetic: the fragmentation that hampered the 
creation of a usable health service in the past remained unchanged. Furthermore, 
the plan encouraged the development of privatised healthcare, which diverted 
medical professionals - as well as income in the shape of potential clients - away 
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from the comparatively underpaid and under-resourced public sector.40 It also 
favoured high-technology healthcare over more basic, and more necessary, primary 
healthcare.  
 
Although the Plan had been intended to improve the healthcare delivery in South 
Africa, it involved the introduction of yet more administrative bodies while 
simultaneously significantly restructuring on a national scale. Moreover, the Act’s 
encouragement of high-technology healthcare and the development of the private 
sector did not foster the development of accessible, affordable and effective 
healthcare services.  
 
Changes to this ineffective system became possible with the introduction of the 
Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP) by the newly-elected African National 
Congress (ANC) government in 1994. This plan was intended to harness South 
African resources in order to create sustainable systems of governance that included 
and empowered the South African people as a whole, rather than just a “white” 
elite.41 However, when the RDP’s effectiveness in transforming the health system 
was reviewed by the Health Systems Trust several years later, it was discovered that 
the RDP had set unrealistic goals and was therefore failing. This failure was a 
symptom of the ANC’s wider inability to deliver on election promises as an ANC-led 
government.  
 
The replacement of the RDP by the Growth, Employment and Redistribution 
programme (GEAR) in 1996 resulted in decreased health expenditure. These 
decreases are typical of changes to market-driven economic policies, which shift 
emphasis from democratising state facilities and services to allowing the state to 
become more powerful by creating a “leaner and meaner”, more money-oriented 
state.42 By shifting the expense of providing services to the profit-driven private 
sector, services are made even less accessible to those unable to pay for private-
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sector healthcare.43 This occurred despite the provision of health and educational 
services being enshrined as constitutional rights.44 The effect of GEAR and its 
successor, Accelerated Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA),45 on 
South African healthcare was negative. For example, infant mortality increased from 
45.4 per 1000 births in 1996 to 59.0 per 1000 in 2002.46 At the same time, the 
promised inclusion of the South African people in decision-making and policy 
formation failed to materialise.47  
 
South African health policies post-1994 were intended to provide universal access to 
health services, especially the poor, the aged and children.48 This was to be 
achieved by implementing simultaneous devolution (the strengthening of sub-
national governmental levels) and deconcentration (giving administrative but not 
political power to sub-national departments). This was intended to give provincial 
governments considerable autonomy while retaining the national government’s 
responsibility for overall co-ordination and the formulation of policy.49 Local 
governments became responsible for the provision of primary healthcare, while 
provincial governments became responsible for hospital services and broader 
primary health care.50 Furthermore, local and provincial treasuries were given the 
power to make most decisions regarding the allocation of funds within their regions.51  
 
However, despite the handing over of much administrative and financial 
responsibility to sub-national organs, most major decisions in health services 
remained the responsibility of the National Department of Health. Although local and 
provincial levels were meant to be involved in decision-making and be consulted 
about policy changes (thereby fostering greater co-operation between the various 
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levels of government), their recommendations were not always taken into 
consideration on a national level.52 This led to confusion among staff across the 
various levels, as they did not always share an idea of what was necessary or 
unnecessary in any given context, leading to inappropriate distribution of funds and a 
deeply problematic lack of accountability.53  
 
Although the structural changes made to the South African health services may have 
theoretically increased efficiency and thus boosted service delivery, the focus on 
restructuring, in practice, detracted from the quality of service delivery.54 It is difficult, 
and inadvisable, to attempt to make major changes at the same time as maintaining 
service delivery – it is rather like attempting to hold a dinner party at the same time 
as moving house. The confusion that resulted from implementing changes before the 
basic framework was established led to considerable confusion and low staff morale. 
To exacerbate this problem, most new civil servants, in health as in other 
departments, lacked experience.55  
 
That the enormity of the challenges facing South African healthcare after 1994 was 
well-understood by the new National Health Department is clear. The 1996 White 
Paper for the Transformation of the Health System in South Africa, published by the 
National Health Department, notes that 55% of South Africans lived in poverty, with 
75% of the poor living in rural areas.56 It is tacitly understood in the White Paper that 
the majority of impoverished South Africans were “blacks” resident in former 
“homelands”. Consequently, one of the Department’s major goals was to increase 
access to comprehensive healthcare services with a special focus on the rural and 
peri-urban poor, a goal which was to be accomplished, according to the White 
Paper, by promoting equitably distribution of health professionals and resources.57 
This equitable distribution of health facilities and resources was to accompany the 
re-organisation of South African healthcare into a primary healthcare based system.  
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The reconfiguration aimed to increase available resources and facilities and promote 
environmental health, the prevention of communicable diseases and the 
development of appropriate human resources for healthcare.58 As with the 1980s 
and early 1990s, all of these areas were to prove highly problematic in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, especially once the economic strictures of GEAR and ASGISA 
came into play. In 1996 when the White Paper was composed, however, the RDP 
programme was still nominally informed by national policy. Consequently, the 
modifications suggested by the White Paper were centred on replacing the curative-
care focus of pre-1994 with a primary healthcare-based system.  
 
The post-1994 South African Health Department was divided into three tiers: the 
National Department of Health, provincial Departments of Health, and health districts 
within provinces (which after 2000 became coterminous with municipal 
boundaries).59 The National Health Department was to be concerned with the 
formulation of health policy, legislation, norms and standards, the creation and 
maintenance of equitable resource allocation, and the increasing of provincial and 
municipal capacity.60 As mentioned above, the main responsibility for providing 
healthcare fell to health districts, with the provincial authorities monitoring them, 
rather than being in control. The major problem with this system, which otherwise 
seemed most sensible, is that given the vast variations in South African conditions, it 
was impossible to enforce any standardised system of staff and resource 
distribution.61  
 
This was especially problematic in former “homeland” areas, which experienced 
massive problems in acquiring and retaining staff and resources.62 The health district 
system was intended to make healthcare efficient and effective as well as 
accessible, sustainable and comprehensive.63 The priorities of health districts were 
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to promote health awareness and community involvement.64 At the same time, they 
were responsible for the environmental health of their district – specifically, the 
provision of safe sanitation and water – as well as the prevention and control of 
communicable diseases within it.65  
 
The Health Department in handing these responsibilities over to local authorities 
ensured that it was in fact the communities under the care of those authorities that 
would carry most of the disease-prevention burden. The White Paper states that 
“communities should be involved in communicable disease-control activities”66 and 
that “ultimately communities are responsible for their own maintenance of a healthy 
environment”.67  
 
With this in mind, following the death of the RDP, the National Department of Health 
devised a five-year strategic plan to be implemented between 1999 and 2004, the 
purpose of which was to “consolidate and build on achievements relating to care 
access and inequality reduction [and to] give special attention to preventive and 
promotive health programmes”.68 The National Department of Health’s Annual 
Report 2000-1 admits, however, that the provision of equitable healthcare was as yet 
unsatisfactory. Nevertheless, it stated its objectives for 2001-2002 as decreasing 
mortality, improving quality of care and resource management and strengthening 
international co-operation.69  
 
In the same Annual Report, however, the Health Department admitted that while 
58% of South Africans believed that South African healthcare was satisfactory, 34% 
believed that it had worsened since 1994, and only 47% of “black” South Africans 
could easily access care. It should be added that the bulk of the “white” population 
was thought to be accessing healthcare in the private sector through membership of 
medical aid schemes.70 Notably, this survey was done while KwaZulu Natal and the 
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Eastern Cape were experiencing outbreaks of cholera that the Department of Health 
in all its forms seemed unable to stop.  
 
Although 47% of the “black” populace was now within reach of healthcare - an 
improvement given pre-1994 percentages - it still amounted to less than half of that 
population. Furthermore the quality of care was often diminished by inadequate 
diagnosis, treatment, drug stocks and record-keeping.71 An independent Health 
Systems Trust survey confirmed what the Annual Report suggested: while 
healthcare had improved in terms of outward appearances (especially in staff-to-
patient ratios and the physical condition of facilities) the quality of the care provided 
had decreased. They pointed out that clinics often lacked basic equipment, reliable 
water and electricity, telephones and adequate referral systems.72 The South African 
Health Review 2001, moreover, notes that care quality was further diminished by 
structural problems within the Health Department, particularly inadequate 
management skills, difficulties in setting priorities, huge demands and lack of 
rewards or sanctions for performance.73 These inadequacies lay mostly within the 
local healthcare authorities, many of which lacked the capacity to provide adequate 
services,74 especially in areas which incorporated former “homelands”. 
 
In a country with a large rural population and low resource density, as well as many 
differences in local conditions, it is most sensible to have responsibility devolve to 
the level of authority closest to the people it is intended to serve. However, the 
massive social, political and economic changes occurring between 1994 and 2004 
caused problems, only some of which were the result of weaknesses in the primary 
healthcare-based approach outlined in the 1996 White Paper.  
 
Alongside problems of human resource allocation, funding and resource distribution, 
there were problems in understanding the extent of challenges, personality clashes 
between the authorities and their communities, and simply getting the new system to 
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work. These problems were mostly to do with consolidating and implementing the 
processes and policies of the post-1994 Department of Health.  However, these 
problems hampered the ability of the Department and its subsidiaries to deliver 
adequate healthcare. 
 
This was apparent in the Eastern Cape, a large province which incorporated the 
former “homelands” of Transkei and Ciskei as well as “white” areas formerly 
controlled by the Cape Provincial Administration.75 In addition to widespread poverty 
and inequalities of distribution of resources and services, the Eastern Cape had 
infrastructural problems from its inception. For example, in 2003 only 62.4% of 
Eastern Cape residents, most of whom reside in rural areas, had access to piped 
water in 2003; at the time the national average was 84.5%.76 Furthermore, on a 
national level, in 2003, only 13.6% of South Africans were without access to 
adequate sanitation facilities; in the Eastern Cape this figure was 30%. Infant 
mortality in the region was 72 per 1000 births, while the rate for mortality for children 
under the age of five was 112 per 1000 births.77 Life expectancy in the province is 54 
years of age. The province has extremely high rates of HIV infection, tuberculosis 
(TB), malnutrition and diarrhoea-related deaths.78  
 
The Eastern Cape provincial Department of Health (ECDOH) and its subsidiary 
districts would, even if they had started out with optimal staffing and resources, have 
had great difficulty in bringing the health status of that province up to an acceptable 
level. Given that they in fact began with a massive deficit in staffing, funding and 
management skills, it is unsurprising that the province’s health status should have 
remained generally poor.  
 
Between 1994 and 1999, primary healthcare was made available to over one million 
Eastern Cape residents who did not previously have any access to it.79 The 
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percentage of the health budget spent on the province’s most impoverished region, 
the former Transkei, increased from 35% to 54%, but healthcare in the province 
remained in a state of collapse; the money was spent without any visible changes 
being apparent.80 Furthermore, the quality of care made available was dubious: 
serious problems with drug supplies to clinics existed, with only 75% of clinics having 
supplies of even three-quarters of the drugs deemed essential. The province’s 
tuberculosis rate of 556 infections per 10 000 was not a significant improvement on 
pre-1994 levels, and evidenced some failure to adequately address the region’s 
health challenges.81 In a province with over 80% of its residents depending on the 
public sector for healthcare,82 this indicates some failure on the part of the ECDOH 
and its subsidiaries to adequately treat individuals already infected with TB, as well 
as to deal with new infections. At the same time, water-borne diseases posed a vast 
(and avoidable) threat to the province, where 70% of the residents of rural areas 
were without even basic sanitation.83  
 
By late 2000, the situation had not greatly improved. In addition to the general 
complaints listed in the 2001 South African Health Review, it was noted that in late 
2000, 226 of the province’s 710 clinics had no adequate water supply, 167 were not 
electrified and 194 were inaccessible except on foot.84 Although 107 of the 
unelectrified clinics were connected to a reliable power supply by mid-2001,85 more 
clinics had meanwhile been constructed that were not adequately equipped. 
Furthermore, some clinics were constructed before it was ensured that staff would 
be available to operate them.86 Staffing problems and budgetary problems bedevilled 
the ECDOH constantly throughout the first decade of the ANC government’s rule, 
leading to persistent problems with both staff morale which only further eroded the 
ECDOH’s ability to provide adequate healthcare for the province’s population.  
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This is made clear in a February 2002 newspaper article in which acting MEC for 
Health, Max Mamase, is quoted calling his departmental managers “weak 
supervisors…with moral-fibre decay”.87 Compounding these issues was what can 
most kindly be called ineptitude on the part of the department, which resulted in 
problems such as delays in budget allocations,88 underspending and most 
worryingly, complete failure to budget adequately.89 In a system where much of the 
onus to provide healthcare rests on local authorities funded by provincial authorities, 
the failure of provincial authorities to competently handle finances clearly has serious 
ramifications. This is especially so in areas where local authorities are still in the 
process of building their capacity to provide sufficient services, as was and remains 
the case in the Eastern Cape.  
 
Cholera occurs only in communities where safe water supply and adequate 
sanitation are not in evidence – and in most cases they are not in evidence because 
they have not been supplied in the first place. This lack of supply arises from a 
number of factors, primary among which is the fact that the communities so affected 
do not appear to be important enough in the eyes of the authorities.90 In pre-1994 
South Africa, this was a fairly straightforward supposition: “black” communities were 
systematically and deliberately deprived, via actual legislations and government 
policies, of the conditions necessary for health (as outlined at the beginning of this 
chapter). Of these conditions required for health, it is environmental health – 
encompassing the provision and maintenance of sanitation and clean water – that 
has the most wide-reaching effect, as it is its absence which gives rise to the bulk of 
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communicable diseases and other long-term health problems, especially water-
borne infections such as typhoid and cholera.  
 
Given that this deprivation was systematic, it is reasonable to suppose that when 
apartheid was dismantled in the early 1990s and removed entirely in 1994 these 
conditions would improve. In practice they did not. In fact, the situation remained so 
obviously unchanged that as late as 2003, Dr Daniel Ncayinana, editor of the South 
African Medical Journal, was moved to remark that, 
 
…almost immediately [after the first democratic elections in 1994, the 
former Transkei] was catapulted into a wilderness of political 
misgovernance of such magnitude that its citizens might be forgiven for 
looking back to the bad old days with longing and nostalgia.91 
 
While this is a rather emotive stating of the case, it is not an overstatement.  
 
Management of funding is perhaps the ECDOH’s most persistent woe, particularly in 
the forms of under-spending and the making of incorrect payments. From its 
establishment onward, the ECDOH seemed unable to correctly calculate its 
expenditures. In 1995, Eastern Cape Health MEC Trudy Thomas admitted that the 
health system in the province was “chaotic”.92 Consistent under-funding from 1997 
onward led to overspending by R255 million in the 1999/2000 financial year, and the 
MEC suggested that vital services might have to be curtailed if more funding was not 
secured.93 At the same time, the MEC stated that a further R22 million would be 
needed between October 1999 and June 2000 to fill critical supervisory, 
management and administrative posts within the department.94  
 
Making provision for staff posts was, and remains, a major drain on the departmental 
budget, with over 33% of the R3,3 billion Eastern Cape health budget (in 2000) being 
taken up with staffing costs. At the same time, R1,8 billion was allocated to primary 
health care services at clinics and district hospitals. The fact that the same amount 
                                            
91
  Daniel J Ncayinana, “Longing for Egypt – The Transkei Dilemma”, South African Medical Journal, 
93, 2, 2003, pg. 1. 
92
  “Eastern Cape Health Service Chaos”, Eastern Province Herald, 3 June 1995, pg. 2. 
93
  “Health Services in Crisis – MEC”, Eastern Province Herald, 14 October 1999, pg. 3. 
94
  Ibid. 
42 
was being spent on staff as on the facilities for which the staff were needed is telling: 
service delivery was clearly struggling for parity with skills development and 
deployment. In October 2000, Health MEC Bevan Goqwana admitted that “our 
department considers all financial savings to be a priority”.95 This cast doubt on the 
status of health as a human right;96 most of the time the ECDOH seemed to treat it 
as a financial issue, concentrating more on saving money than on providing 
adequate healthcare to the residents of the province.  
 
In April 2002, many hospital patients went without treatment or food due to delays in 
payments to hospitals from the ECDOH.97 This was the result of delays in loading 
the new budget into the Department’s new financial software;98 further delays were 
caused by the Provincial Department of Health’s sluggishness in releasing the 
2002/2003 funds, which were in any case R500 million less than those budgeted for 
for 2001/2002.99 Another problem with the 2002/2003 budget was that it made no 
provision for hospital maintenance, which was desperately needed in a province in 
which hospital and clinic buildings were either old or poorly constructed.100  
 
This was especially alarming in light of the Department’s underspending by R700 
000 in 2000/2001. In 2003, the Department claimed that it had budgeted R29 billion 
for rural incentives and R80 million in Mount Frere and Tsolo (both of which were 
areas at risk for cholera),101 as well as R150 million to fill “critical health posts”.102 
Nevertheless, Departmental expenditures in 2003 left over R121 million unspent, 
most of which was intended for medical equipment for new clinics, as well as 
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renovations for existing clinics.103 This was alarming because there was a cholera 
epidemic in progress, which was placed strain on resources; the equipment for which 
the money was allocated was sorely needed. The cholera epidemic of 2000-2003 
was made all the more severe by the ECDOH’s lack of equipment and facilities for 
treatment. All that is needed to treat cholera is rehydration solution, purified water, 
intravenous drip feeds, and beds; long-term treatment and prevention consists only 
of supplying purified water that is not in contact with the sanitation system. It was in 
the latter respect that the most severe problems occurred in the Eastern Cape.  
 
Another exacerbating factor in the 2000-2003 cholera epidemic was the lack of staff, 
particularly nursing staff, in the province. The majority of cholera victims were 
resident in rural areas serviced by clinics and, in some cases, district hospitals. 
These were the very facilities most unlikely to be adequately staffed. Because many 
of them were under-equipped, lacked electricity and water and were situated very far 
from major population centres, nursing staff were understandably unwilling to 
volunteer for work at rural clinics.104 This reluctance was only made worse by the 
ECDOH’s seeming inability to improve working conditions. As a result, “incentives” 
were offered to nurses in the early 2000s to encourage them to move to and remain 
at rural clinics. These did not seem to have a noticeable effect, as the problem 
persisted between 1995 and 2003.  
 
The 2000-2003 epidemic was not inevitable in its advent; although all the conditions 
were present, the epidemic nevertheless required the presence of the bacterium to 
begin. That the bacterium would at some point arrive was likely; that it would spread 
once it arrived was inevitable given the woeful state of rural sanitation and water 
infrastructure, a holdover from the apartheid era that was not adequately dealt with 
by the ANC-led government. 105  The persistence of the epidemic, however, was 
arguably the sole result of the failure of the ECDOH to get to grips with budgeting 
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correctly, providing services, and correcting staffing problems, all of which hobbled 
the delivery of the few services provided. A well-organised and well-supplied 
healthcare authority may have been able to deal with a cholera epidemic even in the 
face of problematic water supplies. A “limping”106 health department, understaffed, 
under-equipped and under-skilled, proved unable to deal with the epidemic. 
 
As argued earlier, in the 1980s, the institutionalised racism of the apartheid regime 
deprived all “black” communities, particularly rural “black” communities, of the 
wherewithal to create the conditions necessary for them to maintain health. This 
deprivation made these communities extremely vulnerable to cholera, which was 
furthermore left untreated when it struck – at least until it threatened to affect “white” 
communities. The fragmentation of the health system of that era also had a role in 
that it obviated any attempts to provide adequate healthcare to rural areas by 
diffusing monetary, human and medical resources in such a way that “black” 
healthcare facilities were left floundering. The apartheid regime created conditions 
conducive to the outbreak of cholera and furthermore made its treatment nigh on 
impossible.  
 
One would not expect such a statement to remain true of the post-1994 healthcare 
authorities in South Africa. In fairness, the conditions that made rural South African 
communities vulnerable to cholera were mostly holdovers from the systematic 
deprivation of the apartheid era. It should be said, however, that that new regime did 
not excel itself in combating these conditions. Furthermore, the new healthcare 
authorities’ focus was divided as it attempted to simultaneously improve skills and 
facilitate delivery, as well as overcome the problems of fragmentation. It attempted to 
deal with fragmentation through devolution of authority to local bodies, but because 
of their lack of co-ordination this tended to increase rather than decrease 
fragmentation. This did not decrease the risk of cholera to the country, and certainly 
did not visibly improve on the ability of the ECDOH to deal with the province’s myriad 
health challenges, let alone a widespread epidemic.  
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It is undeniable that the ECDOH was, and continues to be, faced with a myriad of 
problems including resourcing, the province’s health backlog, and newly-arising 
health problems. Rather than making a concerted attempt to organise itself 
sufficiently to deal with these problems, however, the ECDOH, tended to dissolve 
into a welter of ineffective actions and excuses. In dealing with the cholera epidemic, 
which required the co-operation and skill of a vast number of Health Department 
employees as well as representatives of the various municipalities involved, this 
approach was potentially damaging. Apart from this, internal disagreements 
obviously lowered the Department’s ability to adequately combat the cholera 
outbreak that began in 2000.  
 
Beginning as early as 1995, very soon after the ascension of the ANC-led first 
democratic government, the provincial Health Department began to experience 
difficulty in, firstly, attracting staff to the region and, secondly, paying those staff 
adequately and correctly. These problems would persist throughout the late 1990s 
and into the early 2000s. In July 2000, the Department’s main problems were said to 
be “suspicion, mistrust, corruption and a lack of middle-management capacity”.107 
While the MEC, Dr Bevan Goqwana, and the Chief of Human Resources, Mr Chauke 
Ngoma, cited “resistance to transformation” and “malicious compliance by hospital 
managers”,108 hospital managers countered that the provincial health authority was 
“incompetent and idle”.109  
 
More concretely, investigation carried out by a South African Medical Journal team 
discovered that severe operational problems also existed, in particular shortages of 
basic equipment, including stethoscopes and blood-pressure cuffs; a transport 
system so dysfunctional as to be non-existent;110 and, a falling staff complement. 
However, “nuts and bolts” issues such as these did not receive as much attention as 
the problems around staff relationships. This focus was not unreasonable: while 
procuring new equipment would be fairly straightforward (if budgeting is done 
appropriately), it was far more difficult to improve staff morale and performance and 
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accordingly to reverse the damage it did to the quality of healthcare provision in the 
province. Furthermore, internal conflict within the Health Department, especially in its 
satellite facilities, became a problem hindering the provision of adequate healthcare. 
 
That Goqwana had a unique view of the causes for the problems the ECDOH faced 
is undeniable. One focussed article in the Eastern Province Herald made this clear 
by quoting at length his views on what would constitute a “caring society”, although 
the occasion at which these views were expressed is not known.111 Lamenting the 
lack of caring in South African society, Goqwana wished for 
 
...a situation where the district nurse is not only qualified to assist a 
mother with a child who has colic and educate people on basic health 
requirements, but also is able to tell people what they can do on their 
ground and what can be grown. 
And [I want] local taxi owners to become part of the caring society and 
help if a child gets ill and the clinic wants it taken to hospital urgently.... 
....I would like a society where you feel so free wherever you are and you 
feel that people will actually help you when you are in a predicament. 
That is the type of society that I am looking for – but I know that it is 
unachievable.112 
 
The rampant underdevelopment of the Eastern Cape was hardly unknown to its 
citizens. Throughout 2001, Goqwana continued to attribute many Departmental 
problems to lack of “transformation” among employees within the ECDOH113 who 
displayed a pessimistic attitude that had to be “managed” to prevent them 
sabotaging “certain things that are actually happening”.114 His apparent reaction to 
these detractors was a “carry-on-regardless” leadership style, as exhibited by the 
following quote from a 2001 newspaper article: 
 
If something is good for the community it will happen whether 
people like it or not...it just depends on the vision of the person 
in authority and how determined he is that it is going to happen. 
[People do not understand democracy]: [t]hey think that if 
something is going to favour them then let it be done 
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irrespective....You cannot get 100% but if you can get more 
than 50% you can go ahead.115 
 
From the attitude exhibited in this quote – one not vastly different from the carry-on-
regardless mindsets of pre-1994 leaders – it is unclear whether Goqwana saw 
pessimists as threatening to the ECDOH or himself. That Goqwana was widely seen 
as in fact helping to destroy the health service he headed was apparently unclear to 
him. The Member of the Provincial Legislature (MPL) for the Democratic Party (DP), 
Athol Trollip called him “an inept political appointee”,116 while former MEC Trudy 
Thomas credited him with causing “a mindless, rudderless decaying and a ridiculous 
scenario”117 and suggested that “the real agenda of the present political 
bosses...was the advancement of their individual political careers”.118  
 
At this point it becomes possible to see a clear split between the Health 
Department's version of the Eastern Cape healthcare situation and the apparent 
reality. While Thomas pointed out the multiple failures of the ECDOH in its attempts 
to improve the Eastern Cape's health situation, an ANC health spokesperson, 
Phakamisa Hobongwana, responded by saying that “her logic is very naïve. You 
spend money for things that are budgeted for. There are no reasons for her to resign 
[from the ANC].We are developing the Transkei.”119  
 
On the subject of hospital cutbacks (seemingly designed to save money without 
much reference to the realities of patient care)120 Goqwana admitted that “[t]here had 
been a lot of resistance from previously advantaged people...But it has to happen. I 
am definitely going to do it”.121 While on the subject of increasing the rural incentives 
paid to nurses, Goqwana stated that all he had to do to have such payments put into 
the budget is “discuss it with Enoch Godongwana [then-MEC for Finance] to see if 
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we can afford it, and then it put it in the budget”.122 Neither of these statements 
suggest a great deal of democratic process inbetween Goqwana making the 
decision and its implementation, and give a worrying picture of the budgeting 
process. Shortly after this, in early 2002, Goqwana was suspended (with full pay) 
while under investigation on over a thousand counts of fraud.123  
 
In February 2002, a case of maladministration was brought against the Eastern 
Cape Permanent Secretary for Health, Simphiwe Stamper, when a National 
Standing Committee on Health rejected an ECDOH annual report on the grounds 
that it had not provided proper answers to the committee's questions.124 The Eastern 
Cape Department of Health's Acting Head, Mamisa Chabula, contradicted many of 
the report's conclusions and admitted that she did not know who had written the 
report.125  
 
Funding proved the major problem of 2002-2003. Max Mamase, Goqwana’s 
temporary replacement,126 at a budget hearing in April 2002, admitted that the 
ECDOH would have to achieve substantially more on a smaller budget, in which 
inadequate provision had been made for food and maintenance.127 Budget cuts in 
2002 led to some hospitals being unable to purchase supplies.128 The failure to pay 
suppliers ascribed to a changeover in accounting programmes was rejected by the 
Public Service Accountability Monitor as no excuse (the same body called on 
Mamase to “stop evading responsibility” for the ineffective planning in the 
ECDOH).129 In May 2002, Max Mamase, when asked to account for the problems in 
his Department, stated that they were the result of “an element of sabotage by 
people who are destroying the hard work”,130 and furthermore blamed Trudy Thomas 
for the problems, for which he was called to order.131  
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The then National Minister of Health, Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, openly criticised 
the Eastern Cape Department of Health's lack of performance, though she also 
admitted that “to appreciate progress we need to take a long-range view”.132 The 
Eastern Cape Premier, Makhenkesi Stofile, however, was less inclined to believe 
that the ECDOH was its own victim, criticising the press for exaggerating the 
problems and claiming that: “[t]here [would] be little point basing critique purely on 
that source”.133  
 
A full page open letter from the United Democratic Movement printed in the Daily 
Dispatch in September 2002, imputed the Eastern Cape's failures to the ANC's own 
ineptitude, arguing “[t]he law of agency prescribes that the act of an agent is 
imputable to the principle. Any failures that have taken place are thus ANC policy 
failures.”134  Likewise, Costa Gazi, Head of Public Health at East London's Cecilia 
Makiwane Hospital, questioned the commitment of the ECDOH to anything but 
itself.135 He called for more intensive investigations against wrongdoers inside the 
Department, citing the murder of an Alice doctor who threatened to expose 
corruption;136 the Eastern ECDOH’s failure to take action against a nurse caught 
pilfering drugs and the reinstatement of Goqwana and Stamper after they were tried 
for fraud. Stating that “inertia [is] a typical example of protection by corrupt 
syndicates”,137 Gazi concluded that corruption, rather than solely poor management 
(or, presumably, sabotage) was to blame for the Department's poor performance. 
Following yet another year of under-spending (with the usual lament about 
underfunding), Athol Trollip remarked that all complaints about deteriorating services 
had “fallen on deaf ears”.138  
 
Throughout the 20th century, South Africa has failed to provide adequate healthcare 
for the bulk of its population, which is reliant on publicly-provided clinics, hospitals, 
and public-health initiatives. During the apartheid era, this failure to provide was both 
                                            
132
 Patrick Cull, “Minister Critical of Eastern Cape”, Eastern Province Herald, 13 June 2002, pg. 1  
133
 Patrick Cull, “Inefficiency of EC Health Service”, Eastern Province Herald, 17 June 2002, pg. 4  
134
 United Democratic Movement, “Stofile and ANC Must Go”, Daily Dispatch, 11 September 2002, pg. 
7  
135
 Costa Gazi, “Health Service Feeling the Sting”, Daily Dispatch, 7 March 2003. Pg. 5  
136
 Ibid. 
137
 Ibid.  
138
 Zuzile, “DA Blames Underspending”  
50 
the result of “homeland” policies and the under-resourcing of “homeland” health-
services departments,139 as well as an overly complicated governmental health 
system that battled to co-ordinate itself. In these circumstances, it is not surprising 
that cholera broke out and spread throughout the eastern half of the country; poor 
“homeland” infrastructure ensured that the disease spread fast, while the existence 
of a number of separate health authorities hampered its containment. The spread of 
cholera drew the newspapers’ attention and held it. The post-apartheid provision of 
healthcare services was marginally better, in that it acknowledged the existence of 
problems and made an effort to address the gaps left by apartheid healthcare. 
However, difficulties in implementing measures to address these gaps, combined 
with transformational issues and intra-regional disagreements that had political 
rather than medical roots, hindered the effective delivery of adequate healthcare in 
the region, leaving it as vulnerable to cholera as it ever was.  
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Chapter 3: THE SPREAD AND EXTENT OF TWO CHOLERA OUTBREAKS 
IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
The South African Cholera Outbreak of 1980-1982 
Cholera was made a notifiable condition in South Africa in 1965,1 although at 
that time there was no evidence of cholera in South Africa or in any 
neighbouring countries. The disease reappeared in Sub-Saharan Africa in 1971, 
affecting several countries in West Africa.2 By June 1971, the disease had 
spread eastward into Chad’s southeastern Hajder-Lamis region (formerly 
Massakory Province),3 where it caused 1 500 deaths, before it spread to 
Kenya’s Turkana region.4 Angola experienced several outbreaks throughout 
1972. Travel between Angola and Mozambique, both Portuguese colonies, led 
to anti-cholera surveillance being implemented at Mozambican harbours, 
hospitals and airports.5 After 1972, the incidence of cholera in Southern and 
Central Africa declined sharply, only rising again in 1979 when a small outbreak 
occurred in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo).6 Despite this 
decline, however, five cases of cholera were reported in South Africa between 
1971 and 1980, although all of these were subsequently proven to have been 
contracted outside South Africa.7 
 
Early 1980 saw cholera occurring nearer to South Africa, in Zambia8 and south-
west Mozambique.9 It is likely that the disease entered South Africa from 
Mozambique at this time. The first South African cases were confirmed at 
Shongwe Hospital in the “homeland” of KaNgwane on 2 October 1980.10 By 12 
October, 23 clinically-diagnosed cases of cholera had been recorded;11 an 
irrigation canal connected to the Crocodile River, from which all the ill 
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individuals had taken water, was discovered to be contaminated with cholera 
bacteria. Further victims were found in Malelane, twenty-six kilometres east of 
Matsulu, also in KaNgwane (see Appendix B, Map 1, locations 1 and 2).12 The 
national Department of Health launched a “full-scale plan of action” on 13 
October.13 This was not reported in the Daily Dispatch or the Eastern Province 
Herald.  
 
The outbreak of cholera in South Africa in 1980 did not find the country 
completely unprepared. The Superintendent of Themba Hospital (near 
Matsulu), quoted in the Eastern Province Herald, said that cholera-surveillance 
had been in place in the region since 1979,14 while contingency plans had been 
devised by the Department of Health.15 Putting the contingency plans into place, 
however, was made complicated by the number of local authorities involved, 
which sometimes made it difficult to establish exactly who was responsible for 
what.16  
 
By the end of November 1980, 390 proven17 cases of cholera had been 
recorded in South Africa, including six deaths.18 During that month, cholera had 
been found west of its original epicentre at KaNgwane, infecting 25 people at 
Eikenhof on the east Witwatersrand.19 Although the Department of Health’s 
Epidemiological Comments for that for that month do not mention it, the 
coverage contained in the Eastern Province Herald stated that 14 of the people 
infected with cholera were “whites”.20 This is the first and only time the specific 
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racial grouping of infected individuals is mentioned in the newspaper coverage 
of the epidemic. 
 
Cholera also spread north of KaNgwane to Allandale, in the “homeland” of 
Gazankulu,21 and from Gazankulu north to the Maandagshoek in the 
“homeland” Lebowa (see Appendix A, Figure 3, for a map of South African 
“homelands” circa 1982).22 At this point, the Department of Health suggested in 
its monthly Epidemiological Comments that between 40 000 and 80 000 people 
may have been infected, many of these cases were ‘mild’ (where people did not 
seek medical attention) or asymptomatic cases.23 The Department stated that 
spread was likely. This statement was repeated in a November radio broadcast 
by Dr Margaretha Isaacson, head of Tropical Pathology at the South African 
Institute of Medical Research, who further stated that a vaccine-based anti-
cholera programme would not stop the epidemic.24 
 
The Department of Health released a revised anti-cholera policy on 2 December 
1980, aimed at containing the epidemic to as small an area as possible by 
supplying adequate amounts of clean water, providing large-scale health 
education in affected communities (particularly around matters of personal 
hygiene and the improvement of sanitary conditions) and treating the infected 
individual and any “contacts”25 they may have had.26  No mention of this was 
made in the Daily Dispatch or the Eastern Province Herald.  
 
By the end of May 1981, 3 561 proven cases of cholera had occurred in South 
Africa, mainly in KaNgwane, the Northern Transvaal, and Lebowa.27 The mid-
February 1981 total was 1 592,28 indicating that the number of infections had 
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more than doubled since February. It was discovered that twice as many males 
than females had died and that death was more likely to occur if the infected 
individual was over 40 years of age.29 Because of the correlation between 
maximum temperature, rainfall and the incidence of cholera, it was believed that 
cholera would decline in the winter season between June and August 1981.30 
The most severely affected regions in June 1981 were KaNgwane, the Northern 
Transvaal and Lebowa.31 Natal had shown only three infections thus far, which 
was described as a “very low” incidence rate.32 Males over the age of 40 were 
still the group most likely to become affected,33 although no explanation for this 
was put forward.  
 
In September 1981, the Department of Health declared the 1980-1981 cholera 
outbreak to have ended, with a total of 3 786 proven cases of cholera, including 
42 deaths.34 However, in October 1981, the Star newspaper reported cases in 
Bophuthatswana; considered to be “independent” from South Africa the region 
was therefore not within the Department of Health’s jurisdiction.35 At the same 
time seven cases were reported at Hammanskraal in the Northern Transvaal, 
and one was reported in Lebowa.36 By November 1981, over 220 cases of 
cholera had been confirmed in Lebowa, KwaZulu and Bophuthatswana.37 By 
December, the disease had spread in the “homeland” of KwaZulu and Natal, 
with 321 and 13 infections in each of those regions respectively.38  
 
KwaZulu reported 1 357 proven cases of cholera by January 1982, while Natal 
reported 847.39 At this time, the Department of Health stated in the 
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Epidemiological Comments that it had identified the mode of transmission of the 
newest cholera outbreaks: the consumption of untreated water from open water 
sources such as rivers, dams and canals.40 Anti-cholera efforts accordingly 
began to focus on the provision of health education on the importance of clean 
water.  
 
Most cholera cases diagnosed in Natal originated in Stanger (see Appendix B, 
Map 2, location 3), with 591 of the province’s 847 cases occurring there.41 It 
was admitted, however, that it was not always possible to differentiate between 
cases originating in Natal and cases originating in KwaZulu because of the 
“intimate geographic relationship” between the two regions (see Appendix B, 
Figure 3).42 Perhaps because Stanger’s proximity to Durban made it likely that 
reports of cholera would start a panic, the infection was at first said to be 
something very like cholera but not cholera itself.43 This statement was made by 
the South African Department of Health, based in Pretoria, despite the protests 
of the Stanger Medical Officer of Health, Dr E.C. Bhorat.44 Bhorat, an Indian-
trained medical doctor who had dealt with cholera in India and Pakistan, blamed 
the outbreak on the slum conditions in which the affected population lived. The 
Pretoria-based Department of Health, represented by Head Epidemiologist Dr 
H.G. Küstner, persisted in denying that the infection was cholera. Nevertheless, 
Küstner noted that the strain of cholera in South Africa was extremely difficult to 
contain,45 thereby neatly denying the existence of an epidemic while 
simultaneously excusing his department’s inability to contain it. However, shortly 
after this pronouncement, it was admitted that cholera – rather than a 
mysterious unidentified infection closely resembling cholera – had reached 
“epidemic proportions” in Maphumulo, an area of the so-called homeland of 
KwaZulu, 42 kilometres west of Stanger (Appendix B, Map 2, location 4).46 The 
                                                                                                                                
Comments, 9, 1, 1982, pg. 2 
40
  Department of Health, Welfare and Pensions, “The Mode of Transmission of Cholera in 
Lebowa, 1981,” Epidemiological Comments, 9, 1, 1982, pg. 11 
41
  DHWP, “Cholera Up-Date”, 9 ,1, 1982, pg. 17-18 
42
  Ibid. pg 17 
43
  “Stanger Gastric Infection Not Cholera, Says Health Official,” Eastern Province Herald, 7 
December 1981, pg. 3 
44
 “Stanger Gastric Infection”. 
45
  Ibid. 
46
  “Cholera at Epidemic Stage in KwaZulu”, Eastern Province Herald, 24 December 1981, pg. 
56 
infected people were believed to have been drawing water from the Mboti River 
(Stanger lies on the same river),47 leading to on average 55 new cases a day.48 
Health Department officials brought chlorine tablets into the area, along with 
warnings to local residents to boil water before use.49 This was the first time any 
physical countermeasures against cholera have been mentioned in the 
Dispatch or the Herald. Until then, anti-cholera measures in the press had been 
limited to injunctions to observe hygiene and to boil drinking water. 
 
In January 1982, the Eastern Province Herald reported that the Cape regional 
Department of Health, Welfare and Pensions was taking precautions against 
serious outbreaks. The Port Elizabeth Medical Officer of Health reported that a 
cholera outbreak in the area was quite possible but could be easily controlled.50 
At this point, the epidemic was still more than 800km east of East London, the 
easternmost of the two major Eastern Cape cities. However, the speed at which 
the epidemic had spread, and the difficulty Natal authorities were having in 
containing it, caused the Cape authorities to begin to make contingency plans, 
including increasing activity at long-established monitoring points within Port 
Elizabeth.51  
 
In February 1982, a “slight decline” in cases was reported for Natal and 
KwaZulu, although the “cholera activity” in KwaZulu and Natal was still severe.52  
The total number of proven cases in South Africa at that time was 5809, 
including 73 deaths.53 The actual number of cases treated, but not clinically 
diagnosed, as cholera was estimated to be closer to 30 000. Also in February, 
cholera entered the Transkei, with 40 proven cases and three deaths reported 
in the Department of Health’s Epidemiological Comments.54 It should be noted, 
however, that Transkei was considered by South Africa to be an independent 
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state, and therefore its cholera-related statistics were not automatically included 
in the Epidemiological Comments.  
 
In late January 1982, the Eastern Province Herald reported the first fatality in 
the “homeland” of Transkei: a young man that had contracted the disease while 
working in Natal died at Mount Ayliff hospital, 20 kilometres from the Natal 
border (see Appendix B, Map 3, location 10).55 To prevent an outbreak, 20 000 
people in the Mount Ayliff area were given emergency preventive treatment.56 
Transkei Health Department officials were expected to work in tandem with the 
State Health Department in Durban to distribute information on anti-cholera 
measures, while all people entering the region were required to pass through 
medical checkpoints.57 At the same time, chlorinated water was stockpiled for 
distribution.  
 
Ten cholera-related deaths occurred in the Transkei between the end of January 
and 10 February.58 On the 12th of that month the Transkei Deputy Secretary of 
Health, Dr R.F. Ingle stated that cholera had spread from Mount Ayliff to Port St 
Johns (see Appendix B, Map 4, location 8), some distance to the south-west, as 
well as towards Nqeleni, to the south-east (Appendix B, Map 4, location 9).59 
Another death occurred at Mqanduli, thirty kilometres east of Umtata, near 
Nqeleni (see Appendix B, Map 4, location 11).60 A week later, 22 cholera cases 
were confirmed in the Transkei, with two deaths.61 By late February 1982, 48 
suspected cholera cases had been recorded in the Mount Ayliff and Port St 
Johns areas of the north-eastern Transkei,62 although the disease had not yet 
spread further west or south towards East London, Port Elizabeth and Ciskei. 
The fourth and last reported cholera-related death in Transkei occurred in late 
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April 1982, in the Transkei capital of Umtata (see Appendix B, Map 4, location 
12).  
 
The Department of Health stated that the 1981-1983 phase of the cholera 
outbreak had been halted by July 1982.63 Although the epidemic continued until 
1987, it was never again as severe or as widespread as in the period October 
1980-July 1982.  
 
Table 2: Chronology of 1980-1993 South African Cholera Outbreak. 
DATE LOCATION INCIDENT 
PRE-1980 
January 1971 Sub-Saharan Africa Unspecified number ill 
June 1971 Massokory, Chad Unspecified number ill 
June 1971 Turkana, Kenya Unspecified number ill 
January 1972 Angola Unspecified number ill 
1973 East London, Port 
Elizabeth, Eastern Cape 
Surveillance of water supplies 
implemented. 
August 1979 Zaire Unspecified number ill 
 
1980 
January  1980 North-East Zambia Unspecified number ill 
May 1980 South-west Mozambique Unspecified number ill 
30 September to 
6 October  1980 
KaNgwane and Eastern 
Transvaal 
Two dead, six ill 
1 October 1980-
31 May 1981 
 Unspecified Location 3561 proven cases of cholera 
in South Africa, 36 deaths 
2 October Shongwe, KaNgwane First Clinical Diagnosis of 
Cholera in South Africa 
7 to 13 October KaNgwane 23 asymptomatic cases, 33 ill, 
2 dead 
7 October    KaNgwane 6 confirmed cases at Shongwe 
Hospital, 16 suspected cases 
at Themba Hospital. 
11 October  Matsulu, Malelane, 
KaNgwane 
4 dead, 31 ill – according to 
Eastern Province Herald 
12 October KaNgwane 23 instances of cholera in 
South Africa 
13 October  South Africa Full-scale anti-cholera plan of 
action launched by DHWP 
14 – 20 October KaNgwane and Eastern 
Transvaal 
50 asymptomatic cases, 39 ill 
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DATE LOCATION INCIDENT 
21-27 October  KaNgwane and Eastern 
Transvaal 
55 asymptomatic, 37 ill 
28 October to  3 
November 
 KaNgwane and Eastern 
Transvaal 
1 asymptomatic, 30 ill 
30 October KaNgwane and Eastern 
Transvaal 
250 confirmed cholera 
infections, of which 127 were 
asymptomatic carriers. 
4-10 November KaNgwane and Eastern 
Transvaal 
15 ill 
11-17 November  Unspecified Location 18 asymptomatic, 36 ill, 2 dead 
11 November Eikenhof (Transvaal) First of eventual 32 infections 
reported 
17 November Eikenhof (Transvaal) 9 ill 
18-24 November Unspecified Location 5 ill 
19 November Katlehong, Germiston 
(Transvaal) 
First of 7 eventual infections 
reported 
20 November Eikenhof (Transvaal) 1 dead, 14 ill 
21 November South Africa 6 dead, 390 ill 
24-30 November Unspecified Location 117 cases confirmed 
26 November Maandagshoek (Lebowa) Cases reported 
28 November Eastern Transvaal  47 ill 
1-7 December Unspecified Location 52 cases confirmed 
1 December Lebowa 4 ill 
1 December Eastern Transvaal 11 ill 
8-14 December Unspecified Location 58 cases confirmed 
15-21 December Unspecified Location 100 cases confirmed 
22-28 December South Africa  161 cases confirmed 
29 December 
1980 - 4 January 
1981 
Unspecified Location 206 cases confirmed 
30 December Bergville (Natal) Cases reported 
1981 
5-11 January    Unspecified Location 193 confirmed cases 
7 January Edenville (Orange Free 
State) 
Case reported 
9 January South Africa Reported that 125 ill, 
nationwide 
12-18 January  Unspecified Location 270 cases confirmed 
15 January  KaNgwane Unspecified number ill 
15 January  Northern Transvaal Unspecified number ill 
15 January  South Transvaal Unspecified number ill 
21 January  Unspecified Location 1600 proven cases of cholera 
in South Africa 
End September 
1981 
 South Africa Cholera epidemic declared 
closed, with 3590 proven 
cases of cholera. 
October - 
December 1981 
Johannesburg (Transvaal) Cholera bacteria found in city’s 
water supply. 
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DATE LOCATION INCIDENT 
13 October 1981 Hammanskraal (Transvaal) DHWP Epidemiological 
Comments reports that The 
Star newspaper reports 100+ 
new cases of cholera. 
End November  Odi (Bophutatswana); 
Ingwavuma (KwaZulu); 
Thabamoopo (Lebowa). 
“New upsurge” in cholera 
reported in these places, with 
220 proven cholera cases, 10 
deaths. 
7 December South Africa  616 proven cases of cholera – 
216 in Lebowa, 321 in 
KwaZulu, 13 in Natal, 1 in 
QwaQwa, 62 in South 
Transvaal, 3 in North 
Transvaal. 
7 December Stanger (Natal) 8 dead; unspecified number ill. 
29 December Maphumulo, Ndwedwe 
(KwaZulu) 
Rehydration stations set up 
End 1981 South Africa Reported 1199 confirmed 
cases 
1982 
2 January South Africa 3675 confirmed cases 
nationwide 
4 January Empangeni, Melmoth 
(Natal) 
Disease said to be 
“approaching” here 
16 January Bloemfontein (Orange Free 
State) 
“black” resident of PE 
diagnosed with cholera 
19 January  South Africa  2872 proven cases of cholera 
in SA  
19 January Stanger (Natal) 
 
591 proven cases; 
Osindisweni, 119; Clairwood, 
70; Eshowe, 18; KwaDabeka, 
14; Mariaanhill, 8. 
19 January  Maphumulo (KwaZulu)  1235 cases from Ingwavuma, 
Ubombo, Hlabisa. Lower 
Umfolozi in KwaZulu; 122 from 
Maphumulo in adjacent Natal 
30 January Mount Ayliff (Transkei) 1 dead 
25 Febraury  South Africa 5809 proven cases of cholera; 
73 deaths 
25 February Lusikisiki, Ngqeleni, Port St 
Johns (Transkei) 
40 proven cases, 3 deaths 
12 February Port St Johns Ngqeleni,  Unspecified number ill 
23 February Mqanduli (Transkei) 1 dead 
24 February Port St Johns, Ngqeleni, 
(Transkei) 
48 suspected cases 
1 March  Natal Collection of shellfish banned 
6 March Umtata, (Transkei) 1 dead 
8 March Estcourt Weenen (Natal) Unspecified number ill 
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DATE LOCATION INCIDENT 
1 June Groutville (KwaZulu) 80 possible infections 
End July  DHWP states that “the second major cholera outbreak has 
ended.” 
 
Underdevelopment and Cholera Risk: The Eastern Cape after 1994 
In the case of the Eastern Cape, a new province comprised partly of the 
“homelands” of Ciskei and Transkei, the provincial government faced massive 
problems in dealing with the backlog of service delivery and infrastructure. The 
region was – and remains – one of the most underdeveloped64 provinces in the 
country. The Eastern Cape, with a total population of 8 323 786,65 makes up 
13,6% of South Africa’s total surface area, is the second largest province and 
has the third-largest population.66 The former “homelands” of Ciskei and 
Transkei make up 4,7% and 25,6% of the Eastern Cape’s area respectively.67 In 
1996, the province’s population was 89,1% “black”, 4,9% “white”, 5,8% 
“Coloured” and 0,2% “Asian”.68 Women make up 53,1% of the population, and 
outnumber men in rural areas – that is, where economic prospects are 
poorest.69 This is a result of the migrant labour system that formerly 
predominated in the region, and which to a lesser extent still does; the result 
was a high proportion of female-headed households.70 Only 43,3% of the 
population is officially urbanised – that is, was resident in a town controlled by 
some kind of local authority.71 84,7% of the “white” and 98,8% of the “Asian” 
population was officially urbanised; in contrast, only 37,8% of the “black” 
population was urbanised.72 This imbalance is the result of the predominantly 
rural nature of the former Transkei and Ciskei.  
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The province’s most heavily-populated rural regions in 1998 were Mthatha (total 
population 294 473), Ngqeleni (117 940) and Mqanduli.73 Population density in 
these regions was, in 1998, 164/km2 in Umtata district, 84/km2 in Ngqeleni and 
113/km2 in Mqanduli.74 Informal housing predominates in these areas: in 
Umtata 70% of the population lived in housing described as “traditional houses 
and shacks”,75 while the number was higher in Mqanduli and Ngqeleni (both 
99,6%).76 
 
Access to sanitation and purified water is consequently equally dire. In 1998, in 
Umtata, only 21,4% of households had access to water-borne sewerage or 
septic tanks; 78,6% of the population made use of bucket or pit latrines, and 
only 22% had access to on-site water.77 Mqanduli (1,3%; 98,7%; 2,8%),78 and 
Nqeleni (3,1%; 96,9%; 5,5%) trailed behind in this area.79 Access to electricity in 
formal housing was much higher: in Umtata, 59.3% of houses were electrified, 
while the figures in Ngqeleni (58,8%) and Mqanduli (58,7%) were similar. In 
informal housing (the predominant housing in these areas) access is much 
lower: in Umtata, only 1,6% of informal houses were electrified and in Ngqeleni, 
this dropped to just 1%, and to 0,5% in Mqanduli.80 Unemployment in those 
regions averaged 70%.81  
 
The high population densities outlined above, combined with the predominance 
of informal housing and the extremely low access to adequate water and 
sanitation, indicate extreme lack of access to infrastructure, as well as extensive 
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economic disempowerment in the Eastern Cape. In addition, the high levels of 
unemployment meant that it would be extremely difficult for the bulk of those 
regions’ populations to remove themselves from those conditions without 
extensive and intensive governmental assistance. It is reasonable to state that 
the inhabitants of the eastern half of the Eastern Cape, and particularly of those 
regions described in detail above, belong to the underclass as defined above, 
and consequently were “underdeveloped”. Conversely, the governmental 
bodies charged with controlling the region, particularly in the case of the cholera 
epidemic that struck between 2000 and 2003, belonged to an elite, “developed” 
group. That “elite”, however, was conspicuously failing to deliver services or 
improve the region’s infrastructure by 2000. 
 
The 2000-2003 Eastern Cape Cholera Outbreak 
The 2000-2003 Eastern Cape cholera outbreak was an offshoot of the cholera 
epidemic in KwaZulu-Natal in 2000. By December 2000, there had been 71 
deaths and 24 090 infections in KwaZulu-Natal.82 Cholera entered the Eastern 
Cape in March 2001, with one person becoming infected at Mzimkulu (see Map 
5, page 78, location 1). By May 2001, cholera had spread as far as Bizana (see 
Map 5, Page 78, location 2), some distance south-southwest of Mzimkulu.83 
Vetebese George, the superintendent of Bizana hospital, blamed the outbreak 
on inadequate sanitation and unprotected water sources in the region.84 At this 
stage, early in the Eastern Cape outbreak, Costa Gazi, the Cecilia Makiwane 
Hospital Head of Public Health, advised that the government should construct a 
large-scale treatment and prevention campaign if it wished to prevent a serious 
epidemic.85  
 
On the 16th of May86, the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry announced 
plans to install 59 water-and-sanitation programmes in cholera-prone areas of 
the Eastern Cape. Minister Ronnie Kasrils, Head of the Department of Water 
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Affairs and Forestry, stated that of the 18 million people in South Africa who did 
not have access to adequate sanitation, 80% had “some sort of rudimentary do-
it-yourself toilets”, which could be improved rather than replaced wholesale.87 
 
Cholera infections in the Eastern Cape all but disappeared until January 2002, 
when ten people died and 41 fell ill at Qingqolo in the Mqanduli district near 
Mthatha (see Map 6, page 79, location 3).88 According to Department of Health 
statistics, these infections must have occurred after 9 January, as there were no 
recorded infections until that date.89 Although the cause of death of the 
Qingqolo victims was initially unknown, it was soon confirmed as cholera.90 
There was no consensus as to the number of infections, with figures ranging 
from eight to 16 given by various members of the Health Department, local 
residents, and local hospital staff.91  
 
A “joint operation committee”92 was set up in late January to oversee the 
Qingqolo/Mqanduli outbreak. It resolved to provide the area with more clean 
water and portable toilets in the short-term, with the provision of a permanent 
purified water supply as in the long-term. In spite of this, the disease spread to 
the village of Orange Grove, also in the Mqanduli area.93 The residents of this 
village were supplied with tanked water in a effort to contain the epidemic. By 
23 January 2002, 66 proven cases of cholera had occurred in the Eastern 
Cape, including five deaths.94 
 
Between 8 January and 1 February 2002, 162 proven cases and eight deaths 
had been recorded. During February, the outbreak spread from Qinqolo and 
Orange Grove to Nqanda, bringing the death toll to 174 since early 2001.95 
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Acting Health MEC Max Mamase blamed this on sewage leaking from the 
Mthatha sewage works. The Eastern Cape government was reported to be 
applying for a R10 million grant from the national government to help combat 
the disease in the region, which stated to be the result of “historical factors like 
poor sanitation, lack of water supply, and lack of infrastructure”.96  
 
The number of proven cholera cases stood at 845 on 21 March 2002 and 
included 22 deaths. The epidemic spread to Ngcansini near Qingqolo;97 shortly 
thereafter several cases were recorded at Coffee Bay.98 The spread of the 
outbreak slowed in the winter of 2002, allowing time for government bodies to 
re-assess both their rhetoric and future plans of action. In October 2002, the 
Oliver Tambo District Municipality's inter-sectoral task team met to “find pro-
active measures and to outline a co-ordinated approach when dealing with the 
spread of diseases in the region”.99 They identified the following factors 
hampering progress: lack of access to clean water or sanitation, poor roads, 
and, rather vaguely, ‘cultural beliefs’.100  
 
Despite a decline in the latter half of 2002, in January 2003 the outbreak spread 
to the Qumbu (see Appendix B, Map 5, Appendix B, location 4) and Port St 
Johns (see Appendix B, Map 6, location 5) districts, with seven deaths and 33 
infections in Buziya, Buhlungwana, Gxulu and Mampabe.101 Between 1 and 24 
January 2003, 483 cases of cholera had been proven, including three deaths.102 
In February 2003, cholera spread to the Tina Falls region, where 267 people 
were treated for cholera, bringing the total number of infections in the Oliver 
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Tambo District Municipality to 650 since December 2002.103 Shortly thereafter, 
the disease spread to Cofimvaba;104 where a further nine deaths and 147 
infections occurred (see Appendix B, Map 6, location 6). 
 
In March 2003, the disease spread to the Majola district, on the Mzimvubu 
River.105 The cholera epidemic declined sharply in the second half of 2003 and 
did not resurface in any strength thereafter. In January 2004 the Eastern Cape 
Department of Health noted that it had successfully kept cholera in check during 
the summer of 2003-2004, with only six deaths and 500 infections, compared to 
13 deaths and 600 infections over the summer of 2002-2003.106 
  
Table 3: Chronology of the 2000-2003 Eastern Cape Cholera Epidemic 
 
DATE LOCATION INCIDENT 
2000 
2 March Umzimkulu 1 ill 
1 May Bizana Unspecified number ill 
2001 
22-Jan Qingqolo, Mqanduli 
District 
Unspecified no. ill 
23-Jan OR Tambo DM and KSD 
LM 
Joint Operation Committee set up to 
combat cholera 
31-Jan Orange Grove, Mqanduli 
District 
Unspecified no. ill 
07-Feb Nqanda, Mqanduli District Health MEC Max Mamase blames 
Umtata sewage leak for outbreak; 174 
confirmed ill 
2002 
06-Jan Qumbu 7 deaths, 33 ill 
06-Jan Port St Johns  Unspecified number ill 
13-Feb Tina Falls  267 ill 
Dec 2002 
– Feb 
2003 
Oliver Tambo DM 650 infected 
2003 
17-Feb Cofimvaba 9 dead, 143 ill 
31-Mar Majola district Unspecified number ill 
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Chapter 4: THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRESS, PRE- AND POST-APARTHEID 
 
It is not possible to divorce the coverage of cholera in the Daily Dispatch and 
Eastern Province Herald from the socio-political contexts in which both 
newspapers grew and operated. In particular, the attitudes these publications 
displayed towards cholera and those affected by it have to be seen in the 
context of the press climate of the time. The relationship between the English-
language South African press and the South African government has, from the 
mid-20th century onwards, has been characterised by mutual suspicion and 
sometimes outright hostility. This antagonism was particularly intense during the 
mid to late apartheid era (1960-1994) and remained a factor in post-apartheid 
South Africa. Obviously, this uneasy co-existence had, and still has, wide-
ranging effects on the news as presented by South African newspapers. 
 
The Apartheid-Era Press 
The National Party (NP) came to power in South Africa in 1948, and set about 
implementing ‘apartheid’, which cemented the existence of a deeply divided 
state. The most obvious division was the legislatively-enforced segregation of 
“black”, “Indian” and “coloured” populations from the economically and politically 
dominant “white” population.1 Further divisions existed within the “white” 
population as well, between English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking 
populations.2  
 
This division, though grounded in difference of language, extended beyond it in 
such a way that “white” South Africa was nearly as divided within itself as South 
Africa in general. “White” Afrikaans-speaking South Africans, the larger of the 
two groups, predominated in the political sphere despite being on average 
generally poorer and less literate.3 English-speaking “white” South Africans 
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dominated the country’s economic sphere, largely due to heavy investment in 
the country’s mining sector, but were significantly fewer in number.4  
 
The South African press was rigidly divided into English and Afrikaans 
publications. Although these two arms of the press seldom saw themselves as 
being in direct competition with each other, the difference in their language (and 
thus in their societal alliances) meant that they had greatly differing 
relationships with the apartheid-era government.  
 
The Afrikaans-speaking press (that is, the segment of the press that was 
published in Afrikaans and aimed at “white” Afrikaans-speaking audience) 
tended to support the NP government, which was seen as working in the 
interests of the “white” Afrikaans-speaking population. In return, the NP  
government supported the Afrikaans press, leading to a symbiotic relationship 
without which, Richard Pollack argues, it is doubtful that the Afrikaans press 
could have survived.5 As mentioned above, although the Afrikaans-speaking 
population was larger than the English-speaking population it was on average 
less wealthy and less literate. As a result, the Afrikaans press could not rival the 
English press in terms of advertising revenue and circulation, and consequently 
was rather poorer than its rival, the English press.6 To combat this, the National 
Party government unofficially subsidised the Afrikaans press, although 
obviously not all publications or news-groups were equally subsidised. In this 
way, large sections of the Afrikaans press were kept financially viable, and the 
National Party government secured their co-operation.7 
 
The English-language press (that is, the segment of the press that was 
published in English and aimed at a “white” English-speaking audience) was 
largely self-supporting: many major shareholders in the English press were also 
deeply involved in the financial and investment bodies connected to the 
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country’s mining industry.8 From the 1950s onward the English-language press 
became extremely critical of the NP government’s actions.9  
 
It is, however, oversimplifying things to state that the English press during the 
apartheid era was wholly and completely opposed to apartheid’s systematic 
programme of segregation and deprivation on racial grounds. Most English 
newspapers were owned by either the Argus Group or South African Associated 
Newspapers,10 both of which were owned by companies already heavily 
invested in the mining industry. The mining industry, of course, relied heavily on 
the racial discrimination of the apartheid industry for access to cheap labour and 
thus for continued profitability.  
 
As the mining industry’s income relied on the very system of “black” deprivation 
fostered by apartheid, it was unlikely that its shareholders would have been in 
favour of doing away with apartheid. As a result, the English press had a 
‘vested interest’ in discouraging anything that would lead to its shareholders 
losing income.11 The bulk of the English press, therefore, tended to object to 
apartheid only within the parameters set by the NP12 - that is, they did not print 
anything likely provoke governmental repression. This led to rather more 
dissembling than outright decrying of apartheid.13 The symbiosis between 
apartheid and the mining industry resulted in the English press effectively filing 
its own teeth blunt, thus limiting their usefulness as an anti-apartheid organ.  
 
That said, the extremely close and mutually complimentary relationship14 
between the NP government and the Afrikaans-language press meant that, as 
far as the South African press went, the role of criticising apartheid fell squarely 
on the shoulders of the English press. This was particularly so once the “black”, 
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“Indian” and “coloured” press, printed in various languages, was legislated out 
of existence by the early 1960s,15 leaving the “white” English press as the only 
possible outlet for anti-apartheid journalism. “Black”, “Indian” and “coloured” 
readers began to read the English press and by 1977, 45% of readers of 
English newspapers and magazines were what was then called “non-white”.16 
 
This increasing “non-white” readership, combined with the English press’s more 
critical approach, led the Afrikaner-dominated NP government to see the 
English press as a hostile voice.17  The limited resistance that it offered was 
therefore met with repression of a severity disproportionate to the rather mild 
threat it posed to the South African status quo.18 Many journalists were 
arrested, intimidated or banned; many more were harassed in a more diffuse 
way by government security forces.  
 
The antipathy between the English-language press and the NP government 
intensified from the 1970s onward.19 The 1970s and 1980s saw the first major 
cracks begin to appear in the apartheid regime. The “Muldergate” scandal of the 
mid-1970s revealed many NP leaders to be dishonest, pointing to a side of the 
National Party regime of which many of its supporters had hitherto been 
unaware.20 The “black” rejection of the Tricameral Parliament, which included 
“whites”, “coloureds” and “Indians” but excluded “blacks caused more unrest 
than the apartheid government, with its falling morale, could adequately 
handle.21 Simultaneously, international and internal opposition to apartheid was 
becoming too widespread to contain and although it was nevertheless met with 
the usual “deaf ear and heavy hand”,22 this constant abrasion began to lessen 
governmental commitment to apartheid.  
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The Apartheid Era Eastern Cape English-Language Press: the Daily Dispatch 
and Eastern Province Herald 
The Daily Dispatch and the Eastern Province Herald were long-established 
English-language daily newspapers in the Eastern Cape and Border regions, 
both having been established in the late 19th century. The Dispatch, an 
independently owned newspaper, focused on the region from Port Alfred, as its 
westernmost point, to Aliwal North on the Northern Cape border and, in the 
east, the Natal border.23 This geographical area included the “homelands” of 
Ciskei and Transkei.24 It had a larger circulation than the Eastern Province 
Herald, averaging 32 000 copies per day in 1980 and 198225 and between 33 
000 and 37 000 copies a day between 1983 and 1994.  
 
The Eastern Province Herald concentrated on the smaller geographical area of 
Port Elizabeth and the western half of the Eastern Cape (as is still the case).26 It 
was owned by the English media conglomerate Times Media Limited.27 The 
Eastern Province Herald averaged a circulation of approximately 27 000 a day 
between 1980 and 1982, increasing to between 28 000 and 30 000 between 
1983 and 1994.28 Readership figures can be many times larger than circulation 
figures due to the likelihood that more than one person will read any individual 
copy.29 The rather discrete geographical focus of each of these newspapers 
meant that not many readers read both the Dispatch and the Herald, largely 
because there were not many towns in which both were available.30  
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The Eastern Province Herald conformed to the abovementioned characteristics 
of English-language newspapers in that it was nominally anti-apartheid but was 
not particularly outspoken. A detailed section of the online history of the 
newspaper31 ends in 1950, with the article being concluded with the words “For 
the next 50 years, until the fall of apartheid and beyond, the Herald kept the 
community informed about happenings in Port Elizabeth,” effectively 
condensing the entire apartheid period as well as the first decade of democracy 
into a single, undetailed sentence.32 Even taking into account that this is but a 
synopsis, the omission of any mention of anti-apartheid actions is curious – 
especially given that the pre-apartheid era is described in some detail. This 
omission suggests that no particular anti-apartheid tradition existed at the 
Eastern Province Herald beyond the assumption that it automatically opposed 
apartheid because it was an English newspaper rather than an Afrikaans one. 
 
The independently-owned Daily Dispatch, on the other hand, saw itself as a 
“crusading” newspaper.33 As it did not belong to any of the national English 
press conglomerates, it exercised a freedom of expression that many other 
newspapers did not. This was particularly the case after the appointment of 
Donald Woods as editor in 1965.34 Described as “staunchly anti-apartheid”,35 
Woods is perhaps best known for his friendship with Black Consciousness 
Movement founder Bantu Steven Biko.  
 
The Dispatch’s anti-apartheid content in the 1960s and 1970s increased 
considerably under Woods’ editorship, largely due to his involvement with 
various anti-apartheid movements and activists. Following his arrest and 
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banning in October 1977,36 the editorship passed on to George Farr. Between 
1977 and 1986, the Dispatch continued to operate under extreme pressure from 
the NP government, which was introduced severe restrictions on the reporting 
of disturbances within the country.37 At this time, the Dispatch toned down its 
anti-apartheid coverage to avoid being banned, which was a real possibility for 
a time following Woods’ arrest, banning and subsequent exile.38 
 
The late 1970s and 1980s saw a sharp increase in opposition to the 
government both within and beyond the borders of the country, in “homelands”, 
townships and neighbouring countries. Increasing dissent in the ‘homelands’ 
lead to increased attention being paid to those areas by “whites” and 
consequently to greater coverage in the English-language press, which had 
until then paid little  attention to conditions in the “homelands”.39 The outbreak of 
cholera in 1980 and its spread throughout 1981 and 1982 drew the eyes of the 
press to the affected regions. For many newspapers, both English and 
Afrikaans, the outbreak of cholera caused strong  responses among “white” 
readers and journalists.40 In the case of the Eastern Province Herald, which was 
based in a city some distance from any “homelands”, the outbreak of cholera 
also led to increased wariness of the threat posed by these areas to its own 
region.  
 
The Daily Dispatch was particularly vexed by the difficulties in reporting on 
“homelands”. This was partly because there was intense discouragement on 
such reporting from the NP government, and partly because the governments of 
the Transkei and Ciskei, did not often co-operate with journalists.41 Lack of co-
operation from Transkei and Ciskei authorities effectively prevented the Daily 
Dispatch from gathering material, at a time when the editor, Glyn Williams, 
emphasized the importance of regional news. The Transkei authorities, in 
particular, blocked any negative reporting on incidents in the Transkei, with 
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several journalists either being ‘escorted out’ of the region, or jailed within it.42 
The newspaper was furthermore banned for several weeks in the region, 
causing Daily Dispatch sales to plummet for that period. While the Ciskei never 
banned the Daily Dispatch outright, the region’s government employees were 
not allowed to read it, which caused the newspaper’s circulation in the region to 
decline.43 
 
These difficulties persisted throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s, with the 
Daily Dispatch remaining as unpopular with the crumbling National Party 
government as it was with the fragmenting “homeland” governments.44 Despite 
this, the Daily Dispatch became the most widely read newspaper in the Eastern 
Cape, reaching 172 000 readers a day by 1993.45 In 1995, the retirement of 
several long-standing shareholders and a subsequent reshuffling of shares led 
to the Daily Dispatch being sold to Times Media Limited, the same company 
which had long owned the Eastern Province Herald.46 This ended more than a 
century of independent ownership of the Daily Dispatch.  
 
The Post-Apartheid Press 
The period 1995 to 2000 did not see any decline in the distribution of 
newspapers in the Eastern Cape, with both the Dispatch and the Herald 
experiencing increases in circulation.47 Times Media Limited was purchased by 
the Black Empowerment Group Johnnic, and became its publishing arm, 
renamed Johnnic Publishing.48 The fact that both newspaper fell under the 
same corporate umbrella did not have many significant effects on the type of 
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coverage each newspaper carried although it did apparently lead to more 
overlap in coverage.49 
 
After 1994, however, the print media operated on a free-market basis50 and the 
previously almost predetermined political and language-based loyalties of the 
apartheid era became less apparent. The “new” print-media market did however 
segment along the same lines as the pre-apartheid market did, presumably 
because the ‘societal polarisations’ created by that area had not yet dissolved.51 
At the same time, the market at which news-based newspapers were aimed 
remained the same: they targeted predominantly urban communities formerly 
made up exclusively of “whites”, which included large numbers of affluent 
“blacks”. Tabloid-form newspapers arose in force after 1994 but were aimed at 
the poorer, less literate end of the market.52 In many ways, the more things had 
changed the more they had stayed the same.  
 
The transition from a minority-led NP-dominated apartheid government to an 
ANC-led democratically-elected government in 1994 did have some wide-
ranging effects on the media. Primary among these were changes in ownership, 
such as the purchased of Times Media Limited by Johnnic and the 
accompanying name-change.53 What did not change was the uneasy 
relationship between the print media and the government.  
 
In the early post-apartheid era, this dislike may have arisen from mutual 
suspicion between the new government and the print media. The media, 
according to Herman Wasserman and Arnold De Beer, was uneasy about the 
possibility of the imposition of authoritarian anti-media laws, a move common to 
new governments.54 Conversely, the new government resented the media’s 
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expectation that it would be authoritarian.55 Mutual expectation of bad behaviour 
on both sides marred the development of a good relationship.  
 
This early ambivalence has continued, particularly in terms of media’s reaction 
to government actions. Merrett argues that some high-level government 
employees did not feel that South Africa needed a dissenting media, particularly 
since that media tended to point out government mistakes at the expense of the 
popular rhetoric of “nation-building”.56 Furthermore, the print media assumed 
the role of defender of public interests, concerning itself with protecting the 
public from the possible abuses of government power.57 This assumed the 
existence of - and possibly created, given the influence of the news media on 
public attitude - a public that was distinct from the government.58  
 
 Anti-apartheid stances, however weak, were succeeded in the press by articles 
decrying the corruption and mistakes of the new ANC-led government, 
particularly as they affected “the public”. “The public” assumed by the press, 
furthermore, is not homogenous – each newspaper divides “the public” into the 
“vocal” public (that sector which consumed and engaged with the news, 
including their readership) and the “voiceless” public (which did not consume or 
engage with the news).59 The role of ‘crusader against evil’ adopted by many 
newspapers, such as the Mail and Guardian or Daily Dispatch consequently 
often clashed with the government’s self-image, which was that of “crusader for 
good”. This often leads to conflict.  
 
A major factor in the ambivalent relationship between the press and the ANC-
led government was the media’s construction of a threat posed to the public by 
the government, namely, that it might become an elite group distanced from the 
people it was meant to represent.60 This fear is common to media systems that 
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do not have major ideological differences with the governments they comment 
on; the media ‘watchdogs’ the government to ensure that it is behaving in 
accordance with its stated values. To provide checks and balances, as well as 
to provide forums for expression of dissatisfaction is an important part of the 
media function. Hence, energetic examination of mismanagement, corruption 
and other problems is often carried out.61 It hardly needs mentioning that this 
constant highlighting of failures and problems does not endear the press to the 
government, which sees them as lacking due deference to the democratically-
elected government, as well as being out-of-step with the majority of the 
population.  
 
For example, the Eastern Cape press – particularly the Daily Dispatch, which is 
the larger of the region’s two major English newspapers - carried extensive and 
detailed coverage of the provincial government’s difficulties in carrying out its 
mandate. It focussed on corruption, lack of service delivery and financial 
ineptitude. It is evident from quotes included in this coverage that the criticised 
government felt that the newspaper did not give credit when credit was due, and 
that it consistently underplayed the government’s successes. On the other 
hand, the newspaper felt that the government was not adequately carrying out 
its stated goals. This is particularly evident in the Daily Dispatch and Eastern 
Province Herald’s coverage of Eastern Cape Health Department actions and 
issues. 
 
The post-apartheid media, then, remained (and remains) uneasy in their 
relationship with the South African government, despite the fact that both the 
media and the government underwent significant changes. During the apartheid 
era, the media was divided into NP-supporting Afrikaans media, which was 
closely allied with the government and tended support rather than criticise its 
actions, and the English media. English media was further divided into 
independent publications, which could become vociferously anti-apartheid, 
albeit at the risk of banning, and conglomerate-owned publications whose ties 
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to the apartheid-reliant mining industry caused them to self-censor their anti-
apartheid content.  
 
In the post-apartheid period, the withdrawal of government legislation controlling 
newspaper content, and the replacement of “white”-owned conglomerates with 
more racially diverse news corporations, led to a media with no particular 
alliance or opposition to government. The continued criticism of government 
actions is especially evident in the deeply antagonistic coverage of ECDOH 
actions by the Daily Dispatch and the Eastern Province Herald in the post-
apartheid era. Like the cholera-related coverage of 2000-2003, the newspapers’ 
coverage of the ECDOH’s cholera-related actions in the first decade of 
democracy evidence a deep distrust of the motivations of the Department’s 
employees, and consequently of the Department’s actions. 
 
The Shape of the News, 1980-2003: The Changing Relationship between 
the South African Print Media and the South African Government 
 
The study of cholera provides a lens through which to examine the relationship 
between the South African media, particularly English daily newspapers in the 
Eastern Cape, and the South African government, particularly those sections of 
it charged with healthcare in the region. Through the examination of cholera-
related articles published in the Daily Dispatch and the Eastern Province Herald 
in 1980-1982 and 2000-2003, it is possible to gain an understanding of the 
shifting relationship between the media and the government over a long period 
of transition, from the oppressive climate of an increasingly fragile late-stage 
apartheid to the end of the first decade of democracy, which proved to be a 
mixed blessing. Cholera as a disease did not change in any way between 1980 
and 2003, but the ways in which it was presented in the coverage underwent 
substantial changes over the twenty-year period covered by this thesis.  
 
The major shift visible over the period 1980 to 2003 concerns changes in the 
content of the articles, particularly in terms of the sources from which 
information was collected and the ways in which the relationship between 
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cholera and South African society was constructed. Inseparable from changes 
in content are changes in what made the cholera epidemic a newsworthy event 
besides for the health threat it posed. Examining both of these changes reveals 
that the newspapers’ coverage of cholera was influenced by the level of tension 
that existed between the newspaper and the government of the time. As the 
government changed, so did cholera-related coverage as the role newspapers 
believed they played vis-à-vis governmental actions changed.  
 
Selecting the News 
The majority of readers of newspapers are not necessarily aware that the news 
they are consuming has been selectively compiled;62 that is, they have no way 
of knowing what has been left out of the news articles included in their daily 
newspapers, and in turn may not be aware that the excluded information even 
exists.63 Furthermore, because newspapers are representations of the dominant 
culture’s norms and values,64 the strategies used in constructing a newspaper 
text - particularly selective inclusion and exclusion of information - leads to the 
presentation of a specific worldview being presented in newspapers, and this 
worldview which may, in turn, influence the attitudes and opinions of the 
readership.65 The news is determined by the values of the actors producing it; 
those values are reflected in the news as it is presented to the public.66 In 
keeping with this, newspapers are nominally aimed at a particular readership,67 
which, although it may not coincide with the newspaper’s actual readership,68 
nevertheless addresses them as though they exist. In addressing the often-
imaginary “typical reader”, newspapers aim to address and influence their 
interests, attitudes and beliefs. 
 
Therefore, examining newspaper articles concerning the 1980-1983 and 2000-
2003 cholera epidemics reveals, at least partly, how the disease’s appearances 
were perceived in each society. What is more easily discerned, however, is how 
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the newspapers constructed the disease outbreaks for their readers – of 
primary interest is where newspaper located the disease within South African 
borders and South African society and whose responsibility it was to contain it; 
these issues will be discussed in the following two chapters. Of secondary 
interest are the occasional disjunctions between headlines, lead paragraphs 
and bodies of articles.  Another interesting aspect of changes in coverage is 
how the nature of newsworthiness shifted over time; that is, shifts occurred in 
the “news values” evident in the articles making up the coverage.  
 
No information is included in a newspaper unless it is in some way 
newsworthy69 – that is, of interest to the newspaper’s readership.70 The aim of a 
newspaper is to inform, but it is also to turn a profit by selling newspapers and 
therefore the process of excluding information which is uninteresting or not 
worthy of notice is fairly ruthless. Newspapers aim to avoid evoking a “who 
cares?” or “so what?” response on the part of their readership.71  
 
News Values: Proximity, Recency, Relevance and Negativity 
There are a number of so-called “news values” which may qualify a story for 
inclusion as an article in a newspaper. These “news values” make any given 
information interesting. The concept is not particularly complex, which is in 
keeping with the general purpose of newspapers, which is to inform readers 
without confusing them.72 Primary among “news values” are negativity (why 
negative events unfailingly interest news consumers is not known, but is 
certainly the case);73 recency (how recently an event occurred; that is, how 
“fresh” it is, with accompanying implications for how new the information will be 
to readers);74 proximity (how physically near to the readership it is);75 and, 
relevance (the effect the information has on the lives and/or experiences of the 
readership).76 Almost all news stories contain at least two of these “news 
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values”, in addition to lesser ones such as unexpectedness (how surprising the 
information is), and eliteness (determined by whether the information is about 
elite members of society, or originates with them). Examining the news values 
implicit in the coverage of cholera in the Dispatch and Herald between 1980-
1983 and 2000-2003 reveals changes in what, exactly, made the coverage 
relevant enough for inclusion in the newspapers concerned. 
 
The Daily Dispatch, 1980-1983 
Of the 20 articles that constitute Daily Dispatch coverage of the 1980-1983 
epidemic, 15 have “proximity” as a central news value. An examination of 
Figure 1 (see Appendix C, Table 3, for data table) reveals that most of these 
articles were concerned with anti-cholera measures “at home” and in the 
Transkei. Of the 10 with “negativity” as a news value, five deal with cholera in 
the Transkei, with the remaining five distributed between cholera in 
Bophuthatswana (1), the probability of cholera entering the Eastern Cape (3), 
and the threat posed to East London by the cholera-prone peri-urban area of 
Duncan Village (1). 13 articles have “relevance” as a news value, most of which 
deal with the Transkei outbreak and East London’s anti-cholera measures. Ten 
include “recency”; all ten deal with cholera’s spread in the Transkei.  
Negativity, 
10
Recency, 
10
Relevance, 
13
Proximity, 
15
 
Figure 1: News Values, Daily Dispatch, 1980-1983 
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Obviously, proximity predominates as the factor making the outbreak 
newsworthy, followed by relevance, with recency and negativity being the least 
prevalent news values. This indicates that the epidemic was mostly of interest 
to the Daily Dispatch because of its situation in the neighbouring Transkei, but 
was not portrayed as an especial threat to the Daily Dispatch’s region. This 
distribution of news values is in keeping with the Dispatch’s concentration on 
the outbreak’s local aspects: more articles appeared when the epidemic moved 
into the Transkei (coverage accelerated sharply in February and March 1982), 
accounting for the predominance of proximity. Relevance is a major factor for 
the same reason.  
 
 
The Eastern Province Herald, 1980-1983 
An examination of Figure 2 (see Appendix C, Table 4, for data table) reveals 
Eastern Province Herald’s distribution of news values was not particularly 
similar to that of the Daily Dispatch, with 28 out of a total 33 articles having 
negativity as a news value. In this case, however, relevance (22) trumps 
proximity (20) as the second most prevalent news value, with recency (19) as 
the least common.  
Negativity, 
28
Proximity, 
20
Relevance, 
22
Recency, 
19
 
Figure 2: News Values, Eastern Province Herald, 1980-1983 
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That proximity and recency should lag behind relevance and negativity is in 
keeping with the fact that the Eastern Province Herald covered the entire span 
of the epidemic between 1980 and 1983, with information reaching the Eastern 
Province Herald after a time-lag of up to several days, via government officials 
and press releases. Much of the information dealt with by the Eastern Province 
Herald was not particularly “fresh”, and dealt with distant locations. 
Furthermore, as will be discussed more fully later in this thesis, the Eastern 
Province Herald constructed cholera as highly threatening to “white” South 
Africans, thus making it extremely relevant and negative. Negativity dominates 
because it is arguably never a good thing to have to worry about cholera, let 
alone have it present, albeit at a distance.  
 
The articles with “relevance” as a primary news value are particularly 
interesting. Relevance occurs mostly in articles dealing with the spread of 
cholera into “white” areas, such as Johannesburg, Natal and Durban (as well as 
by implication into Port Elizabeth and East London). This implies that the 
Eastern Province Herald saw cholera as relevant to its readership only once it 
threatened “white” areas.  
 
The Daily Dispatch, 2000-2003 
As an examination of Figure 3 below (see Appendix C, Table 5, for data table) 
Daily Dispatch coverage of the more recent epidemic, recency (22) 
predominates among the news values, with proximity (13) proving to be rather 
less of an issue in the coverage than in 1980-1983. Negativity (12)  remained 
the least prevalent news factor. The decreased role of proximity may result from 
the fact that post-1994 South Africa was not quite as rigidly divided as it had 
been pre-1994: that is, what counted as ‘close-by’ changed. Possibly, also, the 
disease’s restriction to the OR Tambo (ORT) District Municipality may also have 
led to proximity simply not being an issue a lot of the time. It is notable that the 
articles with proximity as an issue deal with new episodes of spread within the 
already-established infected area of ORT District Municipality.   
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Negativity, 
12
Recency, 
22
Relevance, 
21
Prxomity, 
13
 
Figure 3: News Values, Daily Dispatch, 2000-2003 
 
Likewise, negativity remains a comparatively minor factor in Daily Dispatch 
2000-2003 coverage, due to the shift in emphasis from the medical aspect of 
the outbreak to the political issues it contained. Much space dedicated to the 
spread of the disease in earlier coverage is replaced in 2000-2003 coverage by 
information concerning government actions, commentary and critique.  
 
Recency increases as a news value in 2000-2002 coverage by dint of the 
reductions in “turn-around time”: information, and thus events, are much 
“fresher” in Daily Dispatch coverage. This may be the result of improved 
technology between 1983 and 2000, but is also likely to be at least partly due to 
the Daily Dispatch covering a local outbreak, as opposed to one taking place 
elsewhere in the country. Relevance becomes the second-most important factor 
(after recency) for much the same reason: the readership of the Daily Dispatch 
is resident in the affected areas, and therefore each new development in the 
outbreak’s spread and containment is relevant.  
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 The Eastern Province Herald, 2000-2003 
Although much smaller in extent than the Daily Dispatch coverage, 2000-2003 
Eastern Province Herald coverage also exhibits recency and relevance as its 
primary “news values”, with proximity and negativity being likewise relatively 
minor. As Figure 4 (see Appendix C, Table 6, for data table) indicates, recency 
(10) and relevance (9), outstrip negativity and proximity (both 7). 
Negavity, 
7
Recency, 
10
Relevance, 
9
Proximity, 
7
 
Figure 4: News Values, Eastern Province Herald, 2000-2003 
 
This resemblance may result from the fact that several Eastern Province Herald 
articles were condensed versions of longer articles published in the Daily 
Dispatch. Also, as the 2000-2003 outbreak was located in areas removed from 
the Eastern Province Herald’s usual sphere of concern, proximity and relevance 
ceased to be very important issues. This is supported by the predominance of 
recency as a news value – it is only the “freshness” and therefore the novelty of 
the epidemic that is keeping it in the news at all.  
 
The news values evidenced in articles making up coverage in both the Eastern 
Province Herald and the Daily Dispatch are recency, relevance, proximity and 
negativity. Relevance, proximity and recency predominate in 1980-1983 
coverage. During this time, cholera was seen as a gradually-encroaching threat 
to “white” South Africa – and thus very relevant to the “white” readership of both 
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newspapers under discussion, although they did not both construct it as a major 
threat. Recency, as well as relevance, dominates in 2000-2003 coverage, 
during which time period cholera was not as much of a threat as government 
ineptitude. Proximity and negativity become minor factors. This division of news 
values may be the result of changing beliefs around what kind of a challenge 
the cholera epidemic was. When it was believed to be a medical challenge, its 
spread was the most important factor. Once it came to be seen as a political 
challenge and the form and scope of governmental actions came under 
scrutiny, recency and relevance come to predominate, evidencing an increased 
interest in the relationship of the government to the affected regions. 
 
The changes in news values in the coverage suggest that the 1980-1983 
epidemic was reported in a rather straightforward manner: the spread of the 
disease, rather than reactions to it or its larger ramifications, was the focus of 
coverage. The 2000-2003 coverage of the epidemic, however, was not as 
concerned with the threat posed by the actual disease as it was with the 
disease’s context and of the problems of service delivery and ill-governance 
that cholera foregrounded.77 
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Self-Contradiction: Disjunctions between Headlines, Lead Paragraphs and 
Body-Text 
Headlines are intended to attract the eye of the reader and are not usually 
written by the same person who produced the remainder of the article.78 They 
are intended to pare the story down to its main event or point79 and are thus 
usually representative of what the article’s editors feel to be the story’s main 
point. Lead paragraphs (usually printed in bold text below the headline) are 
likewise intended to be summaries of the stories they front80 and usually 
concentrate on what makes the story newsworthy to begin with.81 Leads and 
headlines are intended to correspond with each other;82 that is, the lead 
expands – just barely – on the information contained in the headline. Leads and 
headlines, being intended to attract readers while presenting the main points of 
interest, are arguably the best indicators of what the newspaper believes to be 
the most important aspects of an article.  
 
 The Daily Dispatch, 1980-1983 
Initially, the articles that constituted the Daily Dispatch’s coverage of the 1980-
1983 epidemic possessed corresponding headlines, lead paragraphs and article 
bodies: that is, the headline, lead and body-text all related to whichever 
particular aspect of the outbreak the article dealt with. For example, in the 
article headlined “Transkei Geared up to Combat Cholera”,83 the lead paragraph 
expands on the headline thus: “From next week travellers passing through the 
Transkei will be given instructions at the country’s borders on precautions to 
take against cholera”.84 The remainder of the article expands on this by outlining 
the Transkei government’s anti-cholera precautions both within the “homeland” 
and on its borders. Likewise, the article “Bid to Check Cholera Spread”85 has as 
its lead the sentence “Transkei’s Deputy Secretary for Health, Dr R.F. Ingle, 
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yesterday outlined plans to halt the spread of the disease.”86 The remainder of 
the article outlines Transkei’s plans, before outlining the anti-cholera 
precautions being taken by areas neighbouring Transkei, thus remaining true to 
the headline. 
 
The congruence between headline, lead and body-text remains intact 
throughout the Daily Dispatch’s coverage of the 1980-1983 epidemic, 
suggesting that neither uncertainty nor dispute over the epidemic reached 
publication stage. The most important aspects of the coverage appear to have 
been agreed upon by the journalists and editors involved in producing the 
articles.  
 
The Eastern Province Herald, 1980-1983 
Like the Daily Dispatch, the Eastern Province Herald published headlines, lead 
paragraphs and body-texts that corresponded to each other with little or no 
disjuncture between what was said to be important by the headline and lead 
and what was portrayed as important by the body-text.  
 
An exception to this, however, is the article “Stanger Gastric Infection Not 
Cholera, Says Health Official”.87 Although the headline states simply that the 
infection is not cholera, the article begins with the much less straightforward 
lead “Doctors are mystified by a water-borne gastric infection raging in Stanger, 
Natal, which has so far killed eight people.” This sentence suggests that doctors 
are not sure exactly what the disease is, which might well raise questions about 
how sure they could be that it was not cholera, especially given the fact that 
cholera was present in the country in fairly nearby locales at the time.  
 
The first few paragraphs of the article are equally ambivalent in comparison to 
the headline, stating the view of the Stanger Medical Officer of Health, who was 
“convinced that the gastric infection raging…in his area was cholera.”88 The 
view of the “Health Official” alluded to in the article’s title is presented prior to 
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the qualifier “however”: “Last Friday, however, the Department of Health 
announced the Stanger outbreak was not identified as cholera."89 This places 
the first half of the article in opposition to the second, and, as only the second is 
congruent with the title and lead paragraph, this suggests that there was some 
disagreement around whether Dr E.C. Bhorat, Stanger’s Medical Officer of 
Health, or Dr H.G. Küstner, the “Health Official” of the title, was to be given 
prominence. This in turn suggests that there was some dispute around whether 
or not Stanger could be considered to be cholera-infected. That this debate was 
presented to the public strongly implies a brief struggle around which 
governmental figure was given prominence.  
 
The remainder of the Eastern Province Herald’s coverage of the 1980-1983 
epidemic does not display much evidence of disputes within or around the 
coverage. As with the Daily Dispatch, this suggests a harmonised view of the 
epidemic and consensus on what views and facts each article was to 
emphasize. Whether this harmony was achieved forcefully or voluntarily cannot, 
unfortunately, be discerned, as there is no way of accessing information that did 
not make it to publication. 
 
The Daily Dispatch, 2000-2003 
As with the 1980-1983 era, the articles making up the Daily Dispatch’s coverage 
of the 2000-2003 cholera outbreak possessed, by and large, corresponding 
headlines, lead paragraphs and article bodies. The few exceptions, furthermore, 
did not contradict themselves so much as to suggest that the headline and lead 
were not “the whole story”. 
 
For example, the article “Tests Confirm Cholera Cause of Deaths”90 has a lead 
paragraph that does no more than expand on the headline by naming the area 
where cholera has been confirmed (Qingqolo). Between them, the title and lead 
paragraph give the impression that, now cholera has been confirmed in the 
region, the first stage of the problem - identifying the disease - has been solved. 
This is especially so as the preceding day’s Daily Dispatch had carried the 
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article “10 Killed By Mystery Disease”.91 Compared to the amorphous threat of a 
potentially new and untreatable disease, the discovery of a known disease like 
cholera might come as a relief. However, the second paragraph of “Tests 
Confirm Cholera Cause of Deaths” introduces doubt by mentioning that the 
death-toll of the outbreak is disputed, with government officials giving a figure 
lower than that presented by residents of the infected community.92 In this way, 
a reassuring headline and its corresponding lead paragraph are cast into doubt 
by a second paragraph that seems to suggest that although cholera has been 
identified, this does not mean that the outbreak will be any less severe.  
 
Another article displaying disjuncture between the headline, lead and article 
body is “Cholera Kills 7 In T’Kei”, which appeared in early 2003.93 The article’s 
headline makes mention of deaths; the lead paragraph, however, puts more 
emphasis on the OR Tambo District Municipality’s anti-cholera measures: 
 
Qumbu – A cholera outbreak has claimed seven lives and prompted 
the provincial Health Department to provide R1 million to the OR 
Tambo District Municipality to fight the disease.94 
 
This paragraph gives equal weight to government actions and cholera’s death-
toll. As has been mentioned, the headline is intended to attract the reader95 and 
present the story’s main point of interest.96 That the headline mentions only the 
death-toll suggests that the Daily Dispatch believed this to be the most salient 
point in the article, with governmental action running second. However, the 
remainder of the article concentrates on governmental actions (as does the bulk 
of the period’s coverage). This suggests that the spreading epidemic was seen 
as a problem to be dealt with by the government, rather than an issue in itself. 
Although the death-toll is the first thing mentioned, it is mentioned not for its 
own sake but rather to attract readers and draw attention to governmental 
actions. 
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Appearing on 21 February 2003, “Still More Cases of Cholera as Govt Tries to 
Curb Disease”97 is the final instance of disagreement between headline, lead 
paragraph, and body text in the Daily Dispatch’s coverage of 2000-2003 
epidemic. The headline stresses the spread of the disease seemingly beyond 
the government’s ability to contain it; the lead paragraph does likewise. 
However, more than half of the article outlines the purposes of various anti-
cholera teams active in the Chris Hani District Municipality; furthermore, it does 
this in a theoretical way, outlining what the teams are intended to achieve 
without making mention of how useful these teams would be.98 More than half 
of the article, therefore, bears no direct relation to the headline or the lead 
paragraph. This implies some disagreement between what is considered to be 
the article’s main point – that cholera is spreading despite government actions – 
and what the article in fact includes, which is a reassuring but essentially 
unnecessary breakdown of the intended purposes of various anti-cholera 
teams.  
 
The Eastern Province Herald, 2000-2003 
As with all previously-discussed coverage, the Eastern Province Herald’s 
coverage of the 2000-2003 epidemic displays, for the most part, agreement 
between headline, lead paragraph and article body text.  
 
One such article is “E Cape Cholera Worries Increase”, published in May 
2001.99 The article’s headline does corresponds to its lead paragraph: “Cholera 
spreading to the Eastern Cape is a major national disaster, says a trade 
union.”100 However, the body of the article and the lead paragraph do not 
correspond, in that the cholera-related concerns of South African Municipal 
Workers Union (SAMWU) dominate the remainder of the article, in which no 
mention is made of the spread of cholera within the region.  
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Similarly, the article “Poor Infrastructure Making Cholera Worse, Says 
Minister”,101 published on 31 January 2002, is not internally consistent. The 
headline and the lead paragraph (“Shocking roads and a lack of electricity was 
exacerbating the cholera outbreak in Mqanduli, Transkei, Health Minister Dr 
Manto Tshabalala-Msimang discovered during a visit there yesterday”)102 
correspond with each other. The remainder of the article does not relate directly 
to either the headline or the lead paragraph – that is, it deals with infrastructural 
improvements rather than continuing about the problems alluded to in the 
headline and lead paragraph. This disjunction suggests that the Eastern 
Province Herald preferred to stress the existence of problems over their 
resolution. 
 
It is to be expected that the majority of the articles covering the cholera 
epidemics should display internal coherence. After all, newspapers are, at least 
theoretically, intended to do not much more than impart information, albeit 
information with a particular ‘spin’ on it as determined by the newspaper’s 
particular politics and place in society. The few articles displaying incoherence – 
that is, splits between what is said in the headline, lead paragraph and body-
text – are significant because they are so few in number. Why, in a genre where 
each piece of writing passes through three separate stages of editing103 to 
ensure that it makes sense in itself and is therefore easily understood by the 
readership,104 are such contradictions allowed to reach publication? Apart from 
human error and varying levels of competence among editorial staff, it is 
reasonable to argue that these contradictions are made public because they 
serve a certain purpose in terms of the general nature of the coverage. In this 
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case, that purpose would be to stress the spread of the epidemic and the 
dangers it poses.  
 
The 1980-1983 coverage of the epidemic in the Daily Dispatch and the Eastern 
Province Herald does not contain many instances where headlines and texts 
are not in agreement with each other. This is in keeping with the generally non-
argumentative nature of that era’s coverage which, as outlined earlier,105 tended 
not to challenge the authorities quoted as sources. Even in the case of the 
Eastern Province Herald report of the Stanger outbreak’s cause,106 it is notable 
that the opposing sides of the argument are given equal weight in the article, 
and are in any case both medical professionals in government employ. Simply 
put, there appears to have been little reason for the newspapers in that time 
period to introduce doubt to the reader; nor did they have any intention of 
contradicting the Health Department’s version of events. The image of the 
1980-1983 epidemic was relatively simple, at least in terms of whose 
responsibility it was, and whose “fault” it was said to be, both of which are 
expanded upon in a subsequent chapter.  
 
The 2000-2003 epidemic is, however, much less homogenous in image. 
Although here, too, there are not many incidences of articles not being internally 
coherent, there are nevertheless more than were evident in the 1980-1983 
period. This may be a side-effect of the epidemic’s disputed nature: the cholera 
outbreak ceased to be merely a medical problem to be dealt with by the 
government and became instead a political issue. Disjunctions between 
headlines, leads and body-paragraphs may be evidence of newspapers’ 
attempts to alert readers, who were possibly more concerned with the possibility 
of contracting cholera, to the political dimensions of the outbreak while still 
prioritising the health risks posed by the spread of cholera. This assumes a 
political stance on the part of the newspapers, but given that even articles with 
congruent headlines, leads and bodies are at least in part concerned with the 
political aspects of the outbreak, this is not unusual.  
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Daily Dispatch and Eastern Province Herald coverage of cholera changed 
significantly over the period 1980-2003. In 1980-1983, coverage consisted of 
fairly simple narration of the spread of the epidemic gleaned from Department of 
Health sources, with the accompanying tropes of a “black” threat to “white” 
health. This stance was, if not actively in favour of the government, at least 
neutral towards it, and did not challenge the South African status quo at the 
time. By 2000-2003, though, the climate of South African society had changed 
from being oppressive and based on legislated racial discrimination to 
becoming substantially more democratic. Newspapers, in keeping with the 
egalitarian mindset of post-1994 South African society, were able to challenge 
the incumbent government – indeed, many post-apartheid newspapers have 
adopted a “watchdog” role. This change is clearly visible in 2000-2003 cholera 
coverage, which is more concerned with the problems within the ECDOH than 
with cholera itself in the articles. The context of the disease supersedes the 
disease as a matter of comment and concern. 
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Chapter 5 – NEWS SOURCES AND AUTHORITY IN THE 1980-1983 AND  
2000-2003 CHOLERA-RELATED NEWSPAPER COVERAGE  
 
In newspaper reports, attribution of sources serves to make it clear to readers 
that certain statements and information originated from particular individuals or 
organisations unconnected to the newspaper in which they appear.1 The 
reliability of received information is theoretically proportionate to the status of its 
source – the more elite a source is, the more seriously the source’s information 
is meant to be taken.2 In the case of the South African cholera epidemic of 
1980-1983 and the Eastern Cape cholera epidemic of 2000-2003, examining 
the types of sources used, as well as the frequency with which they were used, 
reveals who the newspapers believed to be responsible for the control of the 
epidemic. Understanding who was believed to be in authority, furthermore, 
sheds light on what kind of problem - predominantly medical or political - 
cholera was seen to be. 
 
In an examination of the Daily Dispatch and Eastern Province Herald coverage 
of cholera between 1980-1983 and 2000-2003, it is possible to divide sources 
into two approximate groups, with one group predominating in each epidemic. 
The first group, which predominates in coverage of the 1980-1983 national 
epidemic, is made up of medical professionals employed either by the South 
African government or by “homeland” governments.3 The second group, which 
predominates during the 2000-2003 Eastern Cape epidemic, is much more 
diverse, being mostly made up of governmental administrators and civilians 
without medical training; government-employed medical professionals are in the 
minority. Government employees make up the bulk of both of these groups; 
they are the most commonly-quoted sources.4 Their predominance makes it 
                                            
1
 Allan Bell, News Media (Oxford, 1991), pg. 190 
2
 Ibid., pg. 192 
3
 Note that this group therefore excludes medical professionals employed in the private sectors 
of South Africa or “homelands”, as well as those employed by non-governmental organisations. 
It includes doctors, nurses and medical technicians employed at public hospitals in South Africa 
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“homeland” and South African departments of health. 
4
 Bell, News Media, pg. 190. See also: Allan Bell, “Hot News – media, reporting and public 
understanding of the climate-change issue in New Zealand: a Study in the (mis)communication 
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clear that the cholera epidemic and issues surrounding it were always the 
responsibility of the government.  
 
A higher proportion of medical professionals as sources, such as during the 
1980-1983 coverage, would indicate that they were seen as the most 
appropriate source of information concerning the epidemic because of their 
expertise as doctors, medical officers of health and epidemiologists. This 
indicates that medical expertise was believed by the newspapers to be the most 
important factor in dealing with the epidemic because it was a medical, rather 
than overtly political, problem.  
 
Conversely, a higher proportion of sources in 2000-2003 that are not medical 
professionals indicates that medical skills, while remaining necessary, no longer 
held centre-stage in terms of importance. Coverage of the epidemic extended 
beyond the issue of disease-containment and into more general issues around 
healthcare provision, service delivery and governmental priorities – indicating 
that the political aspects of the epidemic were at least as important as its 
medical aspects.  
 
It is not possible to separate the medical and political aspects of an epidemic 
into pure categories. An epidemic, as noted in the introduction, extends far 
beyond the mere infection of a host body by a pathogen. However, it is possible 
for newspapers to give one category prominence over another in their coverage 
by including some sources and excluding others. This selection process results 
in a certain image of authority in the coverage.  
 
Authority and Responsibility in the Eastern Province Herald, 1980-1983 
During the 1980-1983 South African cholera epidemic, the Eastern Province 
Herald carried cholera-related coverage that relied almost exclusively on 
medical professionals employed by the South African Department of Health for 
information. Presumably this meant that, in reproducing government 
                                                                                                                                
of science”, Project Report to the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research and Ministry 
for the Environment (Wellington, 1989), and Leon V Sigal, “Who? Sources Make the News” in 
Robert Karl Manoff and Michael Schudson 9eds.), Reading the News (New York, 1987).  
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information, the Eastern Province Herald’s conception of the epidemic was 
similar to that of the South African Department of Health.  
 
 
Figure 5: News Sources, Eastern Province Herald, 1980-1983 
 
Eastern Province Herald coverage in 1980-1983 consisted of 44 articles 
containing discernable news sources. As seen in Figure 5 above (see Appendix 
D, Table 7, for data table), 29.5% (13) of these featured anonymous Department 
of Health spokespeople; 25% (11) featured senior South African Department of 
Health officials; and, 18% (8) featured city-based Medical Officers of Health. 
The predominance of Department of Health spokespeople can be accounted for 
by the fact that the Eastern Province Herald began covering the epidemic while 
it was still a fairly minor outbreak in the Eastern Transvaal and continued to do 
so until its last phase, in Transkei, had begun to wane. Covering the epidemic in 
various locations distant from the Eastern Cape led to a reliance on statements 
by spokespeople sent in by Eastern Province Herald correspondents at those 
locations. The quotes from senior Department of Health officials appear in 
articles dealing with potential cholera outbreaks in Port Elizabeth and 
Grahamstown as well as in articles mapping the spread of the disease outside 
the Eastern Cape. The Medical Officers of Health are found only in articles 
detailing the potentiality and treatment of an Eastern Cape outbreak.  
 
Of the 44 officials quoted, 72%  (32) were medical professionals; of the 
remaining 12, 8 (Directors of Medical Services in “homelands”, hospital 
superintendents, and the South African Minister of Health) were also medical 
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professionals, leading to a total of 40 medical professionals, 75% of whom were 
senior health-department employees. Their credibility was enhanced by their 
seniority and emphasized by the inclusion of their full titles in the articles. Their 
predominance in the coverage suggests that the Eastern Province Herald 
believed the epidemic to be the responsibility of the bodies controlled by these 
medical professionals. 
 
The first cholera-related article published in the Eastern Province Herald, 
“Doctor Warns of Cholera Risk”, which appeared in January 1971,5 cited the 
Grahamstown Medical Officer of Health, Dr C.J.A. Dreyer as its primary source. 
Dreyer is given his full governmental job-title, placing him within the government 
healthcare system. The title “Doctor” also emphasises his status as a medical 
professional. In the article, Dreyer outlines the precautions that could be 
undertaken individually to prevent cholera, suggesting that he was acting as a 
government-employed medical professional.  
 
Published several years later, once cholera had broken out in South Africa, the 
article “Cholera Has Not Reached ‘Crisis Stage’”,6 placed the epidemic firmly as 
a medical, not political, issue by quoting Professor Margaretha Isaacson, Head 
of Tropical Pathology at the South African Institute for Medical Research 
(SAIMR). As Isaacson is given her considerable full title, as well as the 
academic and medical title of Professor, her eliteness as a news source – and 
thus her version of where the epidemic is placed in society – is strongly 
established. Because Isaacson held a senior position in the SAIMR, a 
government body, her inclusion as a source further indicates that the cholera 
epidemic was seen as a medical problem to be handled by medical 
professionals in government employ.  
 
Until June 1981, the Eastern Cape Herald took as its sources only senior South 
African Health Department employees, establishing their seniority and eliteness 
by giving their full government and medical-professional titles in the articles. 
This served to establish, for the reader, their credibility as sources of 
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6
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information, which in turn establishes as correct their situating of the disease. 
The Eastern Province Herald did not oppose the government’s interpretation of 
the problem: that it had originated with “black” communities and that the 
Department of Health had the situation under control.  
 
Even when two figures within the Health Department disagreed, they disagreed 
about the nature of the disease and the underlying causes of the outbreak, not 
about whether or not it was a medical problem that the government needed to 
deal with. In an article published 7 December 1981,7 Stanger Medical Officer of 
Health, Dr E.C. Bhorat and Dr H.G. Küstner, Deputy Director of the 
Department’s Epidemiology department, differed as to the nature of the disease 
affecting Stanger’s “black” population.8 Both, however, discussed the disease in 
terms of governmental action: Bhorat “blam[ed] it on the slum conditions of the 
affected population”9 while Küstner maintained that whatever the disease was, it 
“was extremely difficult to contain…in the country”.10 Neither doctor questioned 
the assumption that medical intervention, rather than large-scale political 
change, was the primary driving-force of anti-cholera efforts, although Bhorat’s 
reference to slum conditions does introduce a note of political dissatisfaction.  
 
Soon thereafter, the article “Shanty Town Cholera May Hit Durban”11 had as its 
central authority Dr N. Becker, the Medical Officer of Health for Durban. Becker 
issued a warning about potentially cholera-infected “black” workers returning 
from “cholera areas”12 and suggested that employers be alert to the possibility 
that their employees may be ill with cholera. Also quoted in the article is Dr EC 
Bhorat. Becker’s words deal with the need for individual vigilance on the part of 
Durban’s employers (“[e]mployers whose workers have just returned from 
cholera areas should watch the situation carefully”),13 while Bhorat once again 
blames “incredibly filthy living conditions”14 in Stanger’s “shanty-town” for the 
                                            
7
  “Stanger Gastric Infection”. 
8
  Ibid. 
9
  Ibid.  
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  Ibid.  
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 “Shanty Town Cholera May Hit Durban”, Eastern Province Herald, 28 December 1981, pg. 6 
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13
  Ibid. 
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  Ibid. 
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cholera outbreak – a repetition of his earlier statement. His authority comes 
from his position as a government employee in charge of the city’s health.  
 
As the possibility arose that cholera might spread into the Eastern Cape, the 
province’s government needed to begin reassuring its populace that an 
outbreak was unlikely. The article “E Cape Geared for Cholera Danger,” 
published 18 January 1982,15 contained several quotes from the Regional 
Director of the Department of Health, Dr J.D. Krynauw, outlining anti-cholera 
measures to be implemented in the Eastern Cape should cholera appear.16 This 
suggests that managing such an outbreak would be the responsibility of the 
ECDOH, directed by Krynauw, a medical professional. 
 
Cholera’s advent in the Transkei brought in a new level of health authorities in 
the form of “homeland” health officials. Up to this point, only Dr Charles Bikitsha 
had been included in the coverage as a source. The article “T’Kei Hospitals Get 
Set for Fight Against Cholera”17 has the Transkei Deputy-Secretary for Health, 
Dr R.F. Ingle, and a Mount Ayliff hospital spokesman, Dr J.E. Naidsas, as 
sources. Both of these sources are given full job-titles and medical-professional 
status in the article and describe Transkei health authority actions against 
cholera. In this way they remain, like their Eastern Cape and South African 
counterparts, medically significant government employees, reinforcing the 
newspaper's conception of the epidemic as a primarily medical problem.  
 
Authority and Responsibility in the Daily Dispatch, 1980-1983 
Throughout the Daily Dispatch coverage of the 1980-1983 period, the cholera 
outbreak is constructed as the responsibility of the Department of Health, rather 
than the South African, Transkeian or Ciskeian governments as a whole. While 
this reservation prevents the epidemic from becoming a wholesale “political” 
problem, it does imbue the coverage with the sense that the cholera epidemic is 
a government problem, rather than an issue being dealt with by the broader 
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1982, pg. 3 
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medical community, “lay” members of government, or private citizens of any of 
the regions affected. 
 
  
Figure 6: News Sources, Daily Dispatch, 1980-1983.  
 
Figure 9 above (see Appendix D, Table 8, for data table), indicates which 
sources were used by the Daily Dispatch in its coverage of the 1980-1983 
nationwide outbreak. The most widely-used sources were senior directors in the 
Department of Health (featured in 17% of the 35 articles); Directors of Health 
Services in “homelands” (20%); other health officers in “homelands” (14%); and, 
city-based Medical Officers of Health (14%). These sources make up 65% of 
the sources quoted. Their inclusion constructed the epidemic as a medical 
problem best dealt with by the government. The possible political implications of 
the outbreak did not receive much notice or inclusion in the articles. 
 
In the Daily Dispatch article “Cholera: Water Being Checked”, published 20 
November 1980,18 the main source of information as in the Eastern Province 
Herald is Dr JD Krynauw, the Regional Director of Health Services in the 
Eastern Cape. Krynauw’s status as a medical professional dominates the 
article, which contains lengthy quotes from Krynauw concerning anti-cholera 
health precautions.19  
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The next article, published five days later,20 likewise quotes government 
employees, in this case the Director of Health Services in Bophuthatswana, Dr 
E.S. Theron, and an unnamed spokesperson for the Pretoria-based Department 
of Health. Both of these articles, although designating their sources as 
employees of government health departments (whether Bophuthatswanan or 
South African), also firmly identify two of the three as medical professionals in 
their own right – that is, as medical doctors as opposed to merely employees of 
a medical body. It is apparent from this that the Daily Dispatch constructed the 
cholera epidemic as a medical, rather than a political, problem until at least 
early 1981. 
 
A third Daily Dispatch article, “Anti-Cholera Measures Underway on Border”,21 
focused on anti-cholera measures in place in the Ciskei “homeland”, located 40 
kilometres west of East London. The article quotes Dr Charles Bikitsha, Ciskei 
Director of Health Services,22 as well as the East London Medical Officer of 
Health, Dr J.R. van Heerden, and an anonymous spokesperson for the 
Department of Health in Pretoria. In this article, Bikitsha and Van Heerden are 
both given their full titles and are both identified by the title ‘Doctor’, again 
emphasising both their positions as senior government officials and their status 
as medical professionals (interestingly, the government of the Ciskei is given 
equal weight to that of South Africa). This is in keeping with the designations 
given to Krynauw and Theron in earlier articles.23 However, the article deals with 
government actions in the Ciskei rather than making mention of individual 
precautions.24 Likewise, Van Heerden mentions precautions taken by the East 
London municipality. Both sources are clearly government employees carrying 
out government orders, establishing that the Daily Dispatch, like the Eastern 
Province Herald, viewed the cholera epidemic as a medical problem falling 
under the umbrella of government health agencies, both in South Africa and in 
the various “homelands” facing infection.  
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The article “Transkei Geared Up to Combat Cholera”25 appeared in the Daily 
Dispatch in late January 1983. The article continued the trend of using high-
level government health employees as sources, presenting the Director of 
Medical Services in the Transkei, Dr Hector Livingstone, as the article’s major 
authority. As the bulk of the article deals with the Transkei government’s anti-
cholera precautions,26 it is once again evident that Livingstone is a government 
appointee concerned with medical matters.  
 
This trend is maintained in the 30 January 1982 article “Bid to Check Cholera 
Spread”,27 the first report on Transkei cholera-containment  measures following 
the outbreak of the disease in the region. In the article, Dr RF Ingle, the 
Transkei deputy secretary for health, “outline[s] plans to halt the disease”.28 In 
addition to Ingle, the article also quotes Dr J.E. Naidsas (spokesperson for 
Mount Ayliff Hospital), Livingstone, Van Heerden and an anonymous 
spokesperson for the Ciskei Health Department.29 All except the Ciskeian 
spokesperson are given their full job titles and are designated “Doctor”. In this 
way, their status as medical professionals is established in tandem with their 
government positions.  
 
All people named as sources in the Daily Dispatch’s cholera-related coverage 
between 1980 and 1983 were senior employees in government bodies dealing 
with health and medical matters. This served to establish their eliteness, and 
thus their credibility as news sources. The higher up in a hierarchy a source is 
situated, the more seriously the information that they provide is to be taken.30 As 
these sources were constructed as taking medically significant government 
action, and all belong to government medical services, it could be argued that 
the 1980-1983 cholera epidemic as reported in the Daily Dispatch was, until 
early 1982, considered to be a medical, and not political, problem to be dealt 
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with by the government’s medical bodies. This mirrored the Eastern Province 
Herald’s representation of the epidemic.  
 
In March 1982, East London authorities became concerned about the potential 
threat posed to the health of East London by the  “black” area of Duncan 
Village, which did not have adequate sanitational infrastructure.31 Van Heerden, 
the East London Medical Officer of Health, warned that living conditions in the 
area might result in an “uncontrollable” outbreak should cholera appear.32 Van 
Heerden’s role as a medically-significant governmental employee is less clear 
here than elsewhere but is, nevertheless, discernable through the article’s minor 
mention of the installation of more water-points in the area.  
 
An article published on the same day, “Cholera Expected in EL”, had as its 
focus the South African Minister of Health, Dr L. Munnik.33 Munnik constituted 
an extremely elite news source, as the head of the Pretoria-based South African 
Department of Health. “Border, East Cape Geared for Cholera”,34 an article 
written to supplement “Cholera Expected in EL”, places regional authorities 
Krynauw and Van Heerden in the same hierarchy as Munnik, albeit several 
rungs lower on the ladder. In doing so, the articles make it clear that the 
epidemic is conceived of as a medical problem. All sources quoted until then 
originated from within governmental healthcare bodies; all are specifically 
designated as medical professionals; and, none of these sources are 
challenged.  
 
Throughout the Daily Dispatch coverage of the 1980-1983 period, the cholera 
outbreak is constructed as “belonging” to the Department of Health, because it 
was a medical challenge falling under government control. This reservation 
prevents the epidemic from becoming a wholesale “political” problem, and 
imbues the coverage with the sense that the cholera epidemic is a government 
problem. 
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Authority and Responsibility in the Eastern Province Herald, 2000-2003 
The coverage in the Eastern Province Herald consisted of only 15 articles 
featuring specific sources, as opposed to the Daily Dispatch’s 45 (see Figure 6, 
below; see Appendix D, Table 9, for data table). Of these 15, 75% featured 
medical professional sources, while only 25% featured non-medical 
practitioners. This proportion of medical professionals is relatively high 
compared to that of the Daily Dispatch coverage during the same period 
(discussed below), and resembles most closely the 1980-1983 coverage carried 
in the Eastern Province Herald and Daily Dispatch. 
 
 
Figure 7: News Sources, Eastern Province Herald, 2000-2003. 
 
The first cholera-focused article carried in the Eastern Province Herald 
regarding the 2000-2003 outbreak, “Anti-Cholera Alert”, was published on 1 
December 2000.35 Its main source the provincial MEC for Health, Dr Bevan 
Goqwana, focusing on the anti-cholera actions of ECDOH. The article “E Cape 
Hospital Has Cholera Patient”,36 appearing four months after “Anti-Cholera 
Alert”, continues in this vein. Although Goqwana is once again the main source, 
his quoted remarks mainly concern the very small possibility that cholera would 
spread within the Eastern Cape.  
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“Cholera Strikes in Eastern Cape”, published 1 May 2001,37 once again quotes 
Goqwana, but also features as a source the hospital superintendent, Vetebese 
George, of St Patrick’s Hospital at Bizana.38 The remarks of both are limited to 
general comments about the rapidly-improving health of the region’s few 
cholera-infected individuals and speculation around the possibility of boreholes 
in the region being contaminated with cholera. The article’s construction of 
Goqwana is quite straightforward: as the Health MEC for the province, he is 
evidently considered as an extremely elite news source. His credibility is 
suggested by the fact that the article contains neither any views opposing 
Goqwana nor a range of sources. As will be shown, this is not characteristic of 
cholera-related coverage in the period 2000-2003. Both Goqwana and George 
are healthcare administrators, while Goqwana is also a medical professional. 
His point of view, as an administrator as well as a medical professional, 
predominates in the article, suggesting that at this stage the Eastern Province 
Herald constructed the burgeoning cholera epidemic as a medical problem 
being dealt with by government agencies, rather than a problem with political 
overtones.  
 
Two subsequent articles, however, introduced non-medical viewpoints to the 
Eastern Province Herald’s coverage, disrupting the initial construction of the 
epidemic as a medical rather than political issue. The first, “E Cape Cholera 
Worries Increase”,39 carried extensive quotes from a South African Municipal 
Workers Union (SAMWU) official, Thobile Maso. The second, “R300m for 
Sanitation in Cholera Areas”,40 had as its main source the South African Minister 
of Water Affairs and Forestry, Ronnie Kasrils. Neither of these sources were 
medical or healthcare practitioners. Both were concerned with the provision of 
sanitation and potable water to the Eastern Cape, albeit at different ends of the 
spectrum – Kasrils oversaw the entire country as National Minister of Water 
Affairs and Forestry, while Maso was a labour union representative and thus 
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non-governmental official, at least in this context.41 While Kasrils commented on 
the difficulty of supplying “vulnerable areas”42 with water-based infrastructure, 
Maso claimed that all Bizana-area cholera cases could be blamed on the local 
municipality disconnecting houses from the purified water supply. Both of these 
issues were connected to the inability of government bodies to adequately 
provide services to their constituencies.  
 
The inclusion of these two viewpoints into the Eastern Province Herald’s 
coverage complicated the newspaper’s initial construction of the epidemic as a 
medical issue, and suggest that the Eastern Province Herald began to view the 
outbreak as politically significant, and not merely a medical issue.  
 
This is also evident in the next Eastern Province Herald article on the cholera 
outbreak, “Poor Infrastructure Making Cholera Worse, Says Minister”,43 which 
featured the South African Minister of Health, Dr Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, as 
its main source. Tshabalala-Msimang was identified as a medical professional 
by the title “Doctor” and the actions she was quoted as describing in the article 
were health-related infrastructural improvements, such as rebuilding access 
roads to clinics and supplying rehydration centres with generators. Once again, 
no opposing views were presented in this article. 
 
Thus far, then, Eastern Province Herald coverage had concentrated mainly on 
elite medical-professional sources, who were presented as credible and were, 
furthermore, left unopposed in the coverage. The only non-medical sources 
used until early 2002 were the South African Minister of Water Affairs and 
Forestry, and a SAMWU official, both of whom were presented as credible in 
their own right. It is evident that the epidemic was seen as a medical issue 
rather than a political one because of the predominance of medical 
professionals, rather than administrators or other healthcare professionals, in 
the coverage.  
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From 2003, however, there was a distinct drop-off in the Eastern Province 
Herald’s interest in the cholera outbreak, with only two articles appearing. Both 
were condensed versions of articles written by Daily Dispatch reporter Madoda 
Dyonana that appeared simultaneously in the Daily Dispatch and the Eastern 
Province Herald. From January 2003, then, the Eastern Province Herald’s 
coverage contained some of the same sources as the Daily Dispatch. Because 
of this, it is not possible to determine for certain whether the Eastern Province 
Herald’s construction of the outbreak was different to that of the Daily Dispatch, 
although the fact that the Eastern Province Herald merely reproduced Daily 
Dispatch articles militates against the possibility that the constructions were 
different. 
 
Authority and Responsibility in the Daily Dispatch, 2000-2003 
The Daily Dispatch’s coverage of the 2000-2003 coverage of the cholera 
outbreak in the Eastern Cape was much more extensive than that of the 
Eastern Province Herald for the same period. Like both newspaper’s coverage 
of the 1980-1983 epidemic, most of the sources in the coverage were 
government employees.44  
 
As Figure 7 (see below; see Appendix D, Table 10, for data table) shows, of the 
56 sources included in the coverage, 89% were current government employees, 
and one source was a former government employee (former Eastern Cape 
MEC for Health, Dr Trudy Thomas). Only very few of the sources for the Daily 
Dispatch’s 2000-2003 coverage were medical professionals – while Goqwana 
was a medical professional, Max Mamase, the MEC for most of the cholera 
outbreak, was not.  
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Figure 8: News Sources, Daily Dispatch, 2000-2003 
 
Likewise, ECDOH spokespeople were not medical professionals, and neither 
were the ORT District Municipality and King Sabata Dalindyebo (KSD) Local 
Municipality officials quoted. Overwhelmingly the sources quoted in the 
coverage were administrators and politicians with little or no professional 
medical training.45 This suggests that the Daily Dispatch saw the 2000-2003 
epidemic firmly as a politically-significant governmental problem rather than 
primarily medically one. While it is of course not required for a health 
administrator or a spokesperson to have medical qualifications, it is arguably 
preferable that people assigned the responsibility of dealing with a health crisis 
– such as a cholera outbreak – have some medical expertise.  
 
Daily Dispatch coverage of the 2000-2003 Eastern Cape outbreak began in 
January 2002, when the first suspected cholera-related deaths occurred in 
Qingqolo, near Mqanduli. The article, “10 Killed by Mystery Disease”,46 quoted 
five separate sources – a local chief’s councillor, Mthinjeni Sonyana; a cholera 
patient Nobotile Walters; the ORT District Municipality environmental officer, 
Sabelo Mkentane; the KSD Local Muncipality’s disaster committee chairman, 
Lungile Bosiki; and, acting MEC for Health, Max Mamase. These sources range 
from local residents of the infected area to the local government’s environmental 
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officer and the provincial mec for Health. Of these sources, not one was a 
medical professional; the closest equivalent is the area’s environmental officer, 
whose stated action in the article is the taking and testing of water samples.  
 
Although two government employees are used as sources, one (Mamase) was 
an administrator in the Health Department and the other was a municipal 
employee. This suggests a definite political investment in the outbreak, as well 
as a move away from conceiving the cholera epidemic as a non-political 
medical problem. This move is also suggested by Bosiki and Mamase's mention 
of the anti-cholera actions in the region, which were community-based rather 
than aimed at individuals.47 It is possible to argue that the wide range of sources 
quoted in the article represent an attempt by the journalist to be inclusive of a 
range of experiences, evidencing an attempt to break away from the superiority 
of medical professionals as sources prevalent in the 1980-1983 coverage and 
the 2000-2003 coverage of the Eastern Province Herald.  
 
A subsequent article, “Tests Confirm Cholera Cause of Deaths”,48 included two 
different sources: Alice Siphambo, the nursing service manager at Umtata 
General Hospital (a public hospital under the Department of Health’s control), 
and the ORT District Municipality’s chairperson for community services, water 
and sanitation, Nombulelo Mngoma. Siphambo confirmed the presence of 
cholera in the region, while Mngoma commented on the provision of fresh water 
and nursing staff.49 Both Siphambo and Mngoma described government anti-
cholera actions, placing the responsibility for handling the epidemic firmly with 
the government. That handling a public health issue such as the cholera 
epidemic was by definition the responsibility of the South African government, 
specifically its Eastern Cape branch, cannot be disputed. What is interesting is 
the way in which medical professionals are not prioritised over “lay” members of 
the government, or even over civilian commentators.  
 
                                            
47
  Maqhina, “10 Killed.” 
48
  Mayibongwe Maqhina, “Tests Confirm Cholera Cause of Deaths”, Daily Dispatch, 22 
January 2002, pg. 1 
49
  Ibid. 
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The range of people sourced as authorities by the Daily Dispatch during the 
2000-2003 epidemic suggests that their responses, though medical or at least 
health-related in subject, were mainly of political significance. This is evidenced 
by problems surrounding the formation of the anti-cholera Joint Operation 
Committee formed by members of the ORT District Municipality.50 This 
committee was intended to include delegates from KSD Local Municipality, but 
employees of the latter claimed that they were not aware of the committee’s 
formation. The article reporting this, “Cholera Committee Set Up”,51 was 
arguably intended to report on the lack of cohesion among the various 
government bodies fighting the epidemic (rather than the anti-cholera measures 
proposed by the committee, though there are mentioned). This is evidenced by 
the paragraph: 
 
KSD is the only UDM-controlled council  and has been involved in a 
protracted battle with the ANC for control of the municipality.  
[Nombulelo Mngoma, chairman [sic] of OR Tambo District 
Municipality community services, water and sanitation committee] 
claimed that contact with the KSD was lost on Sunday following a 
visit to Qingqolo.52 
 
Elsewhere in the article, this lack of co-operation is emphasised:  
 
KSD disaster chairman Lungile Bosiki said he was unaware of the 
JOC, as he was still scheduled to meet its OR Tambo counterparts 
on how to deal with the disease.  
Bosiki said he had, however, been told by the KSD’s chief of fire 
services that the municipality had been invited to a meeting to be 
held today where Bisho officials would be in attendance. 
He said there was an urgent need to join forces to fight cholera.53 
 
Although this might simply indicate a breakdown in communication, that in itself 
would be symptomatic of problematic relations between the two authorities, 
particularly because the KSD Local Municipality is a subsidiary of the ORT 
District Municipality.54 By having as its sources officials from both the ORT and 
                                            
50
  Mayibongwe Maqhina, “Cholera Committee Set Up”, Daily Dispatch, 23 January 2002, pg. 1 
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  “Cholera Committee”,  
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  Ibid. 
53
  Ibid. 
54
  This tension is evident in a later article, “Cholera Comment Criticised”, Daily Dispatch, 15 
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KSD municipalities, and by giving them equal weight, the article made it clear 
that combating the cholera epidemic was a politically-charged issue and not just 
a simple matter of co-ordinating healthcare services to contain the disease. 
 
The article “Death Lurks in Qingqolo River”55 likewise presented a wide range of 
sources. Of the six people quoted, three were government employees: the 
Assistant Director for the Mqanduli health district, Nowinile Gwazela; the 
Department of Public Works Assistant Director, Thami Vena; and, the KSD 
Local Municipality disaster-management chairperson, Lungile Bosiki.  
 
The article “Mageda Says Cholera Threat Under Control”56 published on 1 
February 2002, had Eastern Cape Health Department spokesman 
Mahlunbandile Mageda as its sole source. Although Mageda was not a medical 
professional, he nevertheless presented the views of the province’s major 
medical authority, the ECDOH:57 that the cholera epidemic was under control. 
This claim was made and repeated several times, at various junctures, by Max 
Mamase, Dr Bevan Goqwana and departmental spokespersons Mahlubandile 
Mageda and Sizwe Kupelo. This indicates that there existed a co-ordinated 
government interpretation of the epidemic. 
 
The politicized nature of the 2000-2003 epidemic was emphasized by the 
inclusion of sources that had apparent authority as government figures but no 
medical expertise. A 7 February 2002 article, “Umtata Sewage Cause of 
Cholera, Says Mamase”,58 features Max Mamase, acting MEC for Health in the 
Eastern Cape, explaining that the cholera epidemic was the result of a leak at 
the Umtata sewerage works. Mamase was in a position of authority in a 
healthcare body but was not a medical professional. Likewise, the article’s other 
main source, Minister for Minerals and Energy, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, was 
                                                                                                                                
February 2002, pg. 2  
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  Mayibongwe Maqhina, “Death Lurks in Qingqolo River”, Daily Dispatch, 24 January 2002, 
pg. 2 
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  Mayibongwe Maqhina, “Mageda Says Cholera Threat Under Control”., Daily Dispatch, 1 
February 2002, pg. 3 
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  Ibid.  
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  “Mphumzi Zuzile and Phumlani Mdolomba, “Umtata Sewage Cause of Cholera Says 
Mamase”, Daily Dispatch, 7 February 2002, pg. 3 
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also not a medical professional.59 Mlambo-Ngcuka makes reference to the role 
played by traditional healers in hindering cholera-control efforts; her authority 
and eliteness as a source comes from her position as a national minister 
holding a very important portfolio, and it is most likely because of this eliteness, 
rather than any expertise she possesses, that she is quoted. It is a recorded 
phenomenon in journalism that certain statements become newsworthy purely 
because they are made by an elite speaker.60 
 
The inclusion of the wide range of commentators in Daily Dispatch coverage 
raises questions around the “credibility” of many of these sources. Although the 
eliteness of a source determines how credible it is theoretically, many of the 
sources in Daily Dispatch coverage of the 2000-2003 epidemic are not what is 
generally accepted as elite at all. They are included nevertheless. This 
particularly applies to quotes by local residents of cholera-infected regions. It 
has been proven by various news-language analysts that non-elites only ever 
make the news when something bad happens to them.61: The local residents 
were neither politically nor economically powerful – indeed, they made up the 
underclass.62 However, their inclusion broadens the scope and appeal of the 
articles they appear in, perhaps because they represent the vox populi, and 
journalists may consider their readers to resemble these people more closely 
than they resemble the government employees also quoted.63  
 
Likewise, the inclusion of many low-level municipal employees is interesting. 
Like the civilian residents of infected areas, these employees were certainly less 
elite sources than the provincial and national authorities are also quoted, 
although they were more elite than the civilians quoted. That is, a hospital 
superintendent was not as ‘elite’ a source as, for example, the Department 
spokesperson Sizwe Kupelo, who in turn was not as ‘elite’ as Dr Bevan 
Goqwana. Ordinarily, the more ‘elite’ a source is the more likely it is to be 
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 Nor is her presence explained by  the Eastern Cape’s role as a major labour reserve for the 
mining industry, as Mining is not the same portfolio as Mineral Affairs and Energy.  
60
  Bell, News Media, pg. 193 
61
  Ibid., pg. 194 
62
 For a lengthier definition of this term, please see the Introduction.  
63
  This is especially likely in view of the press media’s assumption of a “watchdog” role, as put 
forward by Wasserman and De Beer in “Which Public? Whose Interest?”.  
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included in an article. That rule does not appear to fully apply here, in light of 
the fact that ‘civilians’ and low-level government employees were both often 
quoted. Their inclusion, therefore, is indicative of the Daily Dispatch’s focus on 
the epidemic’s wider implications. Coverage focused not only on the health 
implications of the cholera outbreak, but also on the way in which the various 
organs of government related to each other and to the affected communities in 
handling the outbreak. Furthermore, the inclusion of equally weighted 
opponents – for example, the members of the KSD and ORT municipalities 
disagreeing over the make-up of the Joint Operational Committee64 - suggests 
that the Daily Dispatch did not subscribe to the idea that elites are 
unchallengeable, or even uniform in mindset.  
 
This is further evidenced by the article “Cholera Comment Criticised”,65 in which 
the KSD Local Municipality’s mayor, Dowa Mgudla, refuted Health MEC Max 
Mamase’s ascription of the cholera outbreak to a leak at the Umtata sewerage 
treatment plant. Mgudla was quoted as stating that “[Mamase’s] statement [was] 
calculated to incite people in the affected areas against the KSD 
municipality.…[Mgudla added that] the issue of cholera….was too serious to be 
used for political point-scoring.”66 This placed Mgudla in direct opposition to 
Mamase. although the two were neither in the same department nor at the 
same level in the hierarchy, one was the provincial MEC for Health, and the 
other was the mayor of a local municipality. The focus on Mamase and Mgudla 
firmly located the epidemic as a politically significant governmental issue, rather 
than as a medically significant governmental issue. It also spoke to the problem 
of party politics hindering the provision of healthcare in the province. 
 
The return of Dr Bevan Goqwana to office in late 200267 did not disrupt the Daily 
Dispatch’s choice of sources or its depiction of the epidemic as politically 
significant. In fact, it was, if anything, more concerned with the political aspects 
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  “Cholera Comment Criticised.” 
66
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  Dr Bevan Goqwana was suspended while under investigation on fraud charges in 2001. 
During this time, he received full salary.  
115 
of the epidemic than the medical challenges it presented. For example, in the 
article “Cholera Kills 7 in T’Kei”,68 Goqwana is extensively quoted: 
 
“No one can dispute the fact that government is working hard to 
address the apartheid backlogs still hindering rural development.  
I want to assure our people that the ANC-led government is well on 
track in turning things around… 
My visits to all the affected area are about showing residents that the 
government cares about its people wherever they are.”69 
 
This explicitly situated the cholera epidemic as a political challenge with medical 
aspects, rather than vice versa. Although Goqwana was a medical professional, 
he was also – as MEC for Health – a political appointee and concerned with 
administering provincial healthcare delivery that cast his party in a favourable 
light. That the post of MEC was a political position rather than a medical post is 
made clear by the replacement of Goqwana, when on trial for fraud, by 
Agriculture MEC Max Mamase, rather than another medical professional. 
Likewise, many of the municipal and departmental positions mentioned above – 
the disaster committee chairperson, and departmental spokesperson, for 
example – apparently do not specifically require medical qualifications. At any 
rate, the incumbents of those positions are not identified as medical 
professionals in the articles. Also, only a very few medical practitioners and 
healthcare professionals are cited as sources in the coverage.  
 
The remainder of cholera-related coverage in the Daily Dispatch was dominated 
by the MEC, Dr Bevan Goqwana, and departmental spokesperson Sizwe 
Kupelo, usually stating that anti-cholera measures were in place, and that the 
efforts of the Department were effective in combating the disease. The sources 
cited placed less emphasis on the state of cholera in the province than on the 
strides being made against it,70  suggesting that cholera – a medical problem – 
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  For example, Madoda Dyonana, “Goqwana Assesses Progress on Cholera”, Daily Dispatch, 
14 January 2003, pg. 2;  “’No Need to Panic’ Over Cholera”, Daily Dispatch, 16 January 
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ceased to be seen as a health threat and became, rather, a political problem to 
be resolved.  
 
The concentration on medical professional sources in the coverage of the 1980-
1983 may stem from the same repressive socio-political atmosphere that led to 
that period’s highly racialised attributions of blame.71 It is also possible that the 
version of events put forward by the government-employed medical 
professionals, particularly those of the South African Department of Health and 
its subdivisions, fitted in with preconceptions held by the Eastern Province 
Herald and Daily Dispatch concerning the course of action to be taken 
regarding the epidemic. In this case, then, it would be both impolitic and 
unnecessary not to select professional medical government employees as the 
most elite sources. The construction of the 1980-1983 cholera epidemic as a 
medical, rather than political, problem melded with the political climate of the 
decade, as well as with the racist mindset arguably possessed by a fair 
proportion of the newspaper’s readership.  
 
That is not to say, however, that the Eastern Province Herald and Daily Dispatch 
produced coverage identical in mindset and execution. Significantly, the Herald 
began reporting much earlier and much more broadly than the Daily Dispatch, 
which only began carrying coverage once the Eastern Cape was threatened. 
The Eastern Province Herald’s more extensive interest in the epidemic suggests 
that it was more worried about the spread of cholera than the Daily Dispatch 
was, possibly indicating a more racialised and more anxious understanding of 
the epidemic than that held by the Daily Dispatch.  
 
That the Daily Dispatch had a less racialised, more co-operative understanding 
of who was responsible for containing the 1980-1983 epidemic is evidenced by 
the articles containing quotes from “homeland” ministers of health. Their 
inclusion as sources alongside South African authorities suggest a more 
inclusive conception of who was responsible for containing the epidemic, 
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although this possibly also followed the government line of trying to make the 
puppet governments of the “homelands” seem legitimate.  
 
The 2000-2003 Eastern Cape epidemic occurred in a political and societal 
climate vastly different from that of the 1980-1983 national epidemic. Most 
significantly, criticism of the government was allowed (and, nominally, 
encouraged), while  institutionalised racial discrimination, which had allowed for 
a comfortable expression of racialised understandings of disease in 
newspapers, had been made unacceptable, legislatively and constitutionally. 
These profound changes caused shifts in conceptions of who was in authority 
and exactly what authority meant.  
 
As a result, the Daily Dispatch and Eastern Province Herald coverage of the 
2000-2003 Eastern Cape cholera epidemic did not rely on medical 
professionals in government employ for information. Instead, medical 
professionals were only a small proportion of the sources quoted in articles, 
being replaced by government administrators and even, to a small degree, 
civilians with little ‘eliteness’ as sources. These changes suggested that the 
problem was no longer the sole province of medical professionals, but also – 
because of the appearance of civilians – called into question the source 
eliteness of government employees.  
 
The Eastern Province Herald, although carrying only small amounts of cholera-
related coverage during 2000-2003, adheres to this trend throughout  2000 to 
2003, at first by quoting union spokespeople in tandem with medical 
professionals employed by the ECDOH, and later by carrying the same 
coverage as the much more outspoken Daily Dispatch. The Daily Dispatch 
coverage undermined the superiority of medical professionals as sources by 
including a wide range of government-employed administrators, and in turn 
undermined the eliteness of government sources by including civilian sources. 
This is unsurprising in view of the newspaper’s suggestion that it was the 
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government, and not the affected communities that was to blame for the spread 
of the cholera epidemic.72  
 
The period 1980-1983 saw a perception of cholera that remained constant over 
time and between commentators: medical professionals were given the 
responsibility for dealing with the outbreak, and were not questioned once they 
were quoted in that capacity. This suggests an extremely complacent attitudes 
towards government efficiency during the 1980s, a consequently a sheep-like 
adherence to the racially discriminatory mindsets of the time. In the 1980s, 
cholera was not a lens through which to scrutinize the performance of the 
government or criticise its policies. It was rather a medical emergency granted 
importance only because it threatened the health security of “white” populations.  
 
The period 2000-2003, however, is much more democratic in outlook. The wider 
range of sources consulted, incorporating non-medical professionals and even 
civilians, indicates both a wider understanding of the disease’s effects and 
causes. In turn this suggests a reluctance to accept the Health Department as 
the final authority on the epidemic, a distinct departure from the unquestioning 
agreement of the 1980s. Thus cholera, in the 2000s, provided a vehicle for 
challenging existing authority and increasing the input of people most directly 
affected on constructions of the epidemic.  
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CHAPTER 6: APPORTIONING BLAME IN NEWSPAPER COVERAGE OF 
THE 1980-1983 AND 2000-2003 CHOLERA EPIDEMICS 
 
Placing the Blame in the Eastern Province Herald, 1980-1983 
The article “Doctor Warns of the Cholera Risk”, published in the Eastern 
Province Herald in 11 January 1971, located cholera firmly outside South 
African borders while at the same time suggesting that distance did not equal 
safety. Indeed, the article suggested that South Africa was under threat from the 
remainder of the African continent. The article's first three paragraphs 
specifically name infected areas and their links to South Africa: 
 
Anyone returning to Grahamstown from out of South Africa should 
see a doctor as soon as possible if he suspects that he has been in 
contact with cholera, says Dr CJA Dreyer, Medical Officer of Health.... 
“I am not scaremongering, but Grahamstown is in the unique position 
that there is a big traffic of overseas visitors constantly through the 
town...Many schoolchildren and students go on overseas trips...Many 
more pour in from Central and East Africa once the schools and 
university open... 
Official World Health Organisation reports had confirmed cholera in 
Guinea, Ghana, the Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Libya and Tunisia...1 
 
Here, Central and East Africa and anywhere “out of South Africa” - that is, 
everywhere but South Africa - are constructed as threats. In the case of Central 
and East Africa, this is because cholera had been officially identified in those 
regions. Further, the areas designated as “out of South Africa” are established 
as a threat by being mentioned in conjunction with cholera – that is, anyone 
returning from a trip over South African borders may possibly have come into 
contact with cholera. The article continues under the subheading “At Risk”, to 
state that “Doctors had been warned [by the South African Department of 
Health] that South Africa...must be considered at risk.”2 It should be noted that 
the countries mentioned as World Health Organisation (WHO)-certified cholera 
sites are all situated in West or North Africa. 
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The first report of cholera in South Africa was published on 11 October 19803 on 
the front page of the Eastern Province Herald. The article is careful, like the 
“Doctor Warns of Cholera Risk” article, to establish the location of the outbreak 
in relation to “white”-dominated areas that were as yet uninfected. The liminal4 
location of each infected area is mentioned repeatedly: Matsulu, for example, is 
described as being “in” KaNgwane, “east of” Nelspruit, “bordering” the Kruger 
National Park” and “near” the Mozambican border.5 “In” and “bordering” suggest 
much closer proximity than “east of”. The article includes an admission by a 
hospital superintendent that the Department of Health had the area under 
cholera surveillance “because of the possibility of disease coming from over the 
border”.6  
 
Matsulu is, moreover, designated as a “township”, while other infected 
individuals are said to come from “farms in the Malelane district”.7 This functions 
to make these locales distinct from towns and cities by emphasising their non-
urban nature. Neither Nelspruit nor Barberton are specified to be “towns” or 
“cities”, which would suggest that urban areas are considered to be the default 
form of “well” regions.  
 
Sue Denny's feature article, “Death Lurks in the Fields”, presents a less 
straightforward idea of the link between “ruralness” and “sickness” by providing 
a more in-depth, personalised image of the infected area of KaNgwane. In 
doing so, she went against the established grain of Eastern Province Herald 
coverage, which had heretofore taken most of its information from the 
Department of Health’s press releases. Denny travelled to cholera-infected 
KaNgwane and did personal research. Despite being much more humane and 
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detailed than previous constructions of infected areas,8 her conclusions do not 
challenge the “official version” of cholera being essentially a “black” disease 
resulting from the inherently diseased nature of “black” communities.9 
 
Describing the Eastern Transvaal as “hold[ing] a tragic secret of death”, Denny 
ascribes the infection in the region to the influx of “emigrants from Mozambique 
and Swaziland”. She incontrovertibly states that the disease was imported into 
the region from outside South Africa, which returns to the image of “sick” Africa 
threatening to infect well “South Africa”. Unlike the 11 October 1980 article (in 
which it is admitted that the “homeland” of KaNgwane had been under 
surveillance), Denny's article draws infection from “sick” Africa directly into “well” 
South Africa without the “filter” of a “black” and therefore “sick” so-called 
homeland inbetween. 
 
At this point, even though the Eastern Transvaal is officially identified as a 
cholera-infected area by the Department of Health, subsequent outbreaks on 
the East Rand10 are nevertheless not ascribed to emigrants from the Eastern 
Transvaal in the same way that the Transvaal outbreak was blamed on 
“emigrants from Swaziland and Mozambique”. This may be because the “white”-
dominated Eastern Transvaal was not considered “black” - unlike the previously 
mentioned sources of infection such as KaNgwane (a nominal “black 
homeland”), and Mozambique and Swaziland (two independent “black” 
countries). The Eastern Transvaal’s “white” nature may have prevented the 
Eastern Province Herald from labelling it as “sick”. KaNgwane, however, 
because it was already labelled “black”, could easily be called “sick”. The nexus 
of “white” with “well” and “black” with “sick” came into full play. It is nevertheless 
more likely that cholera was introduced to the East Rand by a traveller from the 
Eastern Transvaal than by someone from further away.   
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That the outbreak in the Eastern Transvaal was becoming increasingly severe is 
reported in the Eastern Province Herald on 28 November 1980.11 In this article, 
titled “47 More Cases of Cholera in Transvaal”, the headline suggests that the 
entire Transvaal is now infected with cholera, but the body of the article makes it 
clear that only the Eastern Transvaal is as yet infected. Nevertheless, the origin 
of newly-infected individuals is given as “Louw's Creek settlement”, and the 
“nearby lower portions of the De Kaap River”.   
 
These areas are suggested to be rural: “settlement” is used rather than “village”, 
suggesting a rather more temporary and/or “primitive” setup. Likewise, the 
rather vague “lower portions of the...river” also suggest an absence of formal 
settlement. Taken in conjunction with the article's statement that “between 15 
and 20 of the cases were hospitalised at Shongwe, Temba and Barberton 
hospitals”, these designations suggest that once again the bulk of infection was 
in a rural area. This adds up to an image of the Eastern Transvaal's rural areas 
being particularly prone to cholera, with the rural “black” populations most likely 
to be infected.  
 
The resurgence of the epidemic in December 1981 brought with it a new 
emphasis on locating the precise sites of infection, their proximity to uninfected 
areas, and the route by which they were infected. Cholera germs were 
discovered in Johannesburg sewers at that time, an event sufficiently interesting 
to warrant publication on the front page of the 2 December 1981 edition of the 
Eastern Province Herald.12 The article quotes Johannesburg Health Department 
officials as stating that the infection “may have been carried into the 
Johannesburg area by travellers from the KwaZulu and Bophuthatswana 
homelands, where the dreaded infection has so far killed 14 people and 
hospitalised hundreds.”13 
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Although KwaZulu and Bophututswana had, by December 1981, experienced 
outbreaks of cholera, the epidemic in the Eastern Transvaal was much more 
likely to have been the original source of the bacteria found in Johannesburg’s 
sewers. However, as KwaZulu and Bophuthatswana were both “homelands”, 
like other sites of infection, they were already part of the nexus of “black” and 
“sick” that existed in the Eastern Province Herald's coverage. This is supported 
by a statement later in the article, which warned Johannesburg residents that 
they “[might] still get the infection of [sic] employees [if those employees] do not 
observe proper hygiene when preparing foods”.14 Residents of Johannesburg 
are warned about their “employees”, who are evidently not also considered 
residents; thus, migrants from outside Johannesburg are implied to be the 
vectors of infection. 
 
The infection of Stanger in early December 1981 further illustrates this, as does 
subsequent concern surrounding the spread of cholera into the rest of Natal 
from KwaZulu, and the possible spread into the Eastern Cape from Transkei. 
The article “Stanger Gastric Infection Not Cholera”, published in the Eastern 
Province Herald on 7 December 1981,15 showcases official denials of the 
presence of cholera in the “white”-dominated Natal town of Stanger. Although a 
local health official, the Medical Officer of Health for Stanger, Dr E.C. Bhorat, 
maintained that it was cholera, the official South African Health Department 
stance was that it was not cholera. Although Bhorat is mentioned, it was the 
Health Department’s refutation that was elaborated on in the article. The 
refutation is phrased as “..[the Stanger outbreak was] not caused by the vibrio 
cholerae bacteria which ha[d] swept through some other parts of South 
Africa”16, implying that Stanger was different from those “other parts”.  
 
On 24 December 1981, an article entitled “Cholera at Epidemic Stage in 
KwaZulu” appeared in the Eastern Province Herald. In stark contrast with the 
article denying Stanger's infection, this article locates cholera firmly in 
Maphumulo, a town in the “homeland” of KwaZulu. There is no doubt, according 
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to the article, that the disease in question is cholera.17 KwaZulu, as a 
“homeland” and consequently designated “black”, “sick” and “rural”, is much 
more readily admitted to be cholera-infected than Stanger. Indeed, Stanger is 
more threatened than threatening. In an article printed on 28 December 1981 in 
the Eastern Province Herald, cholera is located in a “shanty-town near 
Stanger”18 inhabited by factory workers living in “slum conditions”, constructed 
as the “sick”, “black” location posing a threat to the “well”, “white” holiday capital 
of Durban.  
 
The position of Natal in the schema of “well” versus “sick” areas was precarious. 
As a “white”-dominated province, it was automatically classed as “well” and 
predominantly “urban”. The infection of Natal with cholera cast doubt on the 
immutability of the divisions between “sick”/“black” and “well”/“white” areas – if 
Natal could become infected, then did “white” necessarily link to “well” in all 
cases? The Eastern Province Herald, from the point at which Natal became 
infected, treated it in much the same way that it had treated the “black”, “sick” 
areas infected by cholera.  
 
From January 1982, in Eastern Province Herald coverage, Natal came to be 
seen as a threat to its nearest “white”-dominated neighbour, the Eastern Cape, 
from which it was separated only by the “homeland” of Transkei. The article 
begins with “The cholera-stricken areas of Transvaal and Natal may seem a 
distance from the Eastern Cape, but this does not mean the area is immune to 
similar outbreaks”.19 This lead paragraph stressed the distance between Natal 
and the Eastern Cape but suggested that this distance was no guarantee of 
safety at all through the use of “may seem” and “but this does not”. The article 
states that a “cholera outbreak in the city [Port Elizabeth] was quite possible”20 - 
presumably due to its similarities to now-infected Natal.  
 
Differences between Natal and the Eastern Cape are, however, clearly indicated 
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by statements such as, “If such an outbreak did occur we [the Eastern Cape] 
would be in a better position to control the spread of the disease than they are 
in the areas where it has broken out, as we have a reticulated water supply.”21 
This of course implies that the areas infected in Natal, Transvaal, KwaZulu and 
so on did not have reticulated water supplies, distancing them from the Eastern 
Cape. The suggestion of a threat posed by Natal in this article is on a par with 
earlier articles’ depictions of Mozambique and Swaziland as threats to South 
Africa, Bophuthatswana and KwaZulu as threats to Johannesburg, and 
KwaZulu as a threat to Natal.  
 
Part of this about-face may have been because Natal's infection brought 
cholera uncomfortably close to the Eastern Cape. Transkei, an independent 
“homeland” between Natal and the Eastern Cape, was a “black”-dominated 
area that was predominantly rural. It was believed to be “sick”, “black” and 
“rural” – and, therefore, by default, to be extremely vulnerable to cholera. Natal 
became a threat in itself, largely because it would likely facilitate cholera in 
Transkei. 
 
The first article dealing with cholera in Transkei appeared on 30 January 1982, 
shortly after the first cholera-related death in the region.22 In the article, the 
infected individual is twice said to have contracted the disease outside Transkei. 
The first statement to this effect - “[cholera killed] a migrant worker shortly after 
his return home from Durban last week”23 - implies this by stating that his death 
occurred “shortly after” his return to Transkei, suggesting that he contracted the 
disease before leaving Natal. The second statement - “[he] had contracted the 
disease outside the Transkei” - is much more straightforward and implicitly 
denies that cholera had been present in Transkei before this man's return, 
despite the area’s vulnerability. In this way, the article makes it clear that the 
disease was imported into Transkei from Natal, which is thus a “sick” space 
presenting a threat to the previously-uninfected Transkei. 
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The spread of cholera within Transkei, like that in Natal and KwaZulu, was 
mapped carefully in space and time by the Eastern Province Herald. On 12 
February, four cases in the Port St Johns area were reported;24 five days later, 
the number of confirmed cholera cases in Transkei was announced to have 
doubled to 22, with another death occurring at Tekwini.25 This report was 
published on the front page of that day's edition. Neither Port St Johns nor 
Tekwini are given the qualifying term “township” or “settlement”. This suggests 
that they were considered to be normal “urban” areas rather than temporary or 
informal settlements. This is unusual in terms of Eastern Province Herald 
coverage. As Transkei is a “homeland” (such as Bophututswana or KwaZulu), it 
is to be expected that it would be conceptualised in the same terms: that is, as 
being “sick”, “black” and “rural”. It is, however, not constructed in these terms: 
its rural nature goes unremarked on, and while the epidemic's spread is 
carefully documented,26 it does not seem to be thought of as a “sick” area in the 
same way as KwaZulu, KaNgwane or indeed Mozambique or Swaziland. 
 
However, this semi-neglectful attitude towards the Transkei changes in March 
1982, when a sizeable article discussing the likelihood of a cholera outbreak in 
the Eastern Cape is published in the Eastern Province Herald on 12 March 
1982.27  The article states that: 
 
Several confirmed cases [of cholera] have already been reported 
from Transkei and population movement between the independent 
homeland and the rest of the Eastern Cape meant carriers would 
“almost definitely” bring the disease, [Dr J Dippenaar] added. 
So far no cases have been reported in Ciskei, but local authorities 
believe it is only a matter of time before cholera occurs there.... 
What made the spread of cholera almost inevitable in areas where 
there was large population movement was that 75 percent of all 
cases were carriers, displaying no overt symptoms of disease 
themselves.”28 
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This extract explicitly states that Transkei presents a threat to the Eastern Cape. 
Transkei is said to be infected, and therefore “sick”, threatening the “wellness” 
of the Eastern Cape by possibly importing cholera into it. In this way, Transkei is 
made to occupy the same position in the coverage Natal, KwaZulu and 
KaNgwane had occupied – that is, as a “sick” area threatening to import cholera 
into a neighbouring “well” area. The Ciskei had not been mentioned in the 
coverage at all thus far, despite being a “homeland” like Transkei. This may 
have been because the epidemic was approaching the Eastern Cape from the 
east, moving through KwaZulu, Natal and Transkei in sequence from east to 
west. Ciskei, being further west than the Eastern Cape, may not even have 
entered into the Eastern Province Herald’s thinking.  
 
Coverage of the 1980-1983 cholera epidemic in the Eastern Province Herald 
deals almost exclusively with the spread of the epidemic: its routes, and modes 
of transmission, as well as, to a lesser degree, its severity. The coverage 
carefully maps the starting-point of the epidemic, based on information supplied 
by the Department of Health or one of its regional subsidiaries, and analyses 
the origins of every new outbreak. The Eastern Province Herald coverage is 
concerned with the danger posed to one region by another, by the other's “sick”, 
“black” and “rural” nature. In its constant evaluation of the degree of this danger 
conceptualises the epidemic as a system of threats posed by one area to 
another and the changes undergone by newly-infected regions. The Eastern 
Province Herald's coverage effectively divides the eastern half of South Africa 
into infected and uninfected regions, and constructs infected regions as 
particular threats to uninfected regions. 
 
This threat goes beyond the simple physical transmission of cholera, as articles 
deal with less tangible qualities such as “sickness”, “wellness”, “blackness” and 
“whiteness”. The link between race and sickness, long established in racist 
thought and therefore at least partially informing the mindset of racially divided 
South Africa, transmuted the threat of cholera into the threat of “black” to 
“white”, and of “rural” to “urban”. Although these binaries are never consciously 
stated in Eastern Province Herald coverage, they inform it, as can be seen by 
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the Eastern Province Herald’s construction of infected areas and their 
interrelationships. That the binaries of “sick”/”black” and “well”/”white” are at play 
in the coverage is discernible through the newspaper’s descriptions and 
constructions of infected versus uninfected areas. 
 
Placing the Blame in the Daily Dispatch, 1980-1983 
The Daily Dispatch covered the cholera epidemic from 20 November 1980 until 
11 May 1983, beginning and ending later than the Eastern Province Herald. The 
first article concerning cholera in South Africa was published on 20 November 
1980, entitled “Cholera: Water Being Checked”.29 It dealt with the East London 
Department of Health's monitoring of the city's harbour and main sewerage 
drains and gave advice on anti-cholera precautions. The articles situated the 
disease in “areas of the Transvaal”30, but in the same sentence noted that the 
local Department of Health had recently begun to monitor the city's main 
sewerage lines in addition to its harbour.31 Given that cholera was present in 
many port cities worldwide at the time,32 as well as in other African states,33 
monitoring the harbour for cholera imported by cargo ships was an unsurprising 
precaution.  
 
However, although sewerage lines often open into harbours, the reverse does 
not happen – if cholera were to enter the city's sewerage system, it would have 
to enter via toilets and drains on land. The article's mention that sewerage lines 
were now also under surveillance “following the outbreak of cholera in parts of 
the Transvaal”,34 therefore, suggests that there was now the expectation that 
cholera would be imported into the city by infected travellers from that region. In 
this way, the Transvaal is constructed as a threat to East London and 
presumably the Eastern Cape as a whole. 
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The main part of the threat outlined in “Cholera: Water Being Checked” consists 
of people already resident in East London. The Eastern Cape Regional Director 
of Health Services, Dr J.D. Krynauw, stated: 
 
Under no circumstances should people use unpurified water. This 
applies particularly to those who use rivers or pools for their water 
supply. Drinking water must be boiled and even after washing clothes 
these people must wash their hands. 
Otherwise they could contaminate food they're preparing should the 
water have carried the infection... 
A pitfall in preventing cholera spreading once it strikes is that some 
people are asymptomatic, which means that if they are infected they 
don't exhibit symptoms and there's no way of detecting the disease in 
them.35 
 
This article clearly identifies a certain group of people (“those who use rivers or 
pools for their water supply”)36 as being most likely to contract cholera. 
Furthermore, this “risk-group” of potentially infected individuals is constructed as 
a threat to uninfected individuals through the possibility that they “could 
contaminate food they're preparing”.37 The pinpointing of groups using open-air 
water sources suggests a suspicion of their hygiene, which is highlighted by the 
injunction that “these people must wash their hands”38.  
 
These two factors – importation of cholera from outside East London,  and the 
at-risk status of groups using unpurified water – locate the article's conception 
of threat in a very particular space: “black”, “sick” communities living and 
working in close proximity to the communities they threaten, which are by 
implication “well”, “white” communities. In this way, the Daily Dispatch locates 
threats to the safety of its readership as close-by rather than distant. Local 
communities, rather than the distant and amorphous Transvaal, are the real 
threat to the “wellness” of “white” East Londoners in this article. While this threat 
is certainly constructed as existing, it is done in a way that is less antagonistic to 
the “threatening” party: the close inter-relationship between “black”, “sick” and 
“well”, “white” communities in and around East London is acknowledged. This 
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acceptance of inter-relationship comes to characterise the Daily Dispatch 
coverage of the epidemic, and perhaps accounts for that publication’s lack of 
interest in the more distant outbreaks in the epidemic.  
 
The article “Anti-Cholera Measures Underway on Border”39 begins with an 
assurance that although no infection was yet present in the Eastern Cape area, 
it was prepared for: “Although no cases of cholera have been reported in the 
Ciskei and East London, precautions against the spread of the disease in the 
areas are being undertaken.”40 This paragraph firmly locates the disease 
outside the area, declaring the Ciskei and East London “well”, but also 
suggesting – through the emphasis on being prepared – that it is under threat 
from infected regions elsewhere. This effectively places Ciskei and East London 
in one camp, and infected regions in another. That is, Ciskei is not constructed 
as “foreign” to East London:  
 
One cannot...just urbanise health [said Dr Charles Bikitsha, Ciskei 
Director of Health Services]. If I do not look after my neighbour and 
he gets into problems, he may spread some of his health problems to 
me and my family.41 
 
This statement explicitly points out that the threat of cholera can be neutralised 
by exercising “good neighbourliness” in the form of some kind of control, or co-
operation, over the health of other regions in order to prevent health problems 
from spreading. If, as Bikitsha says, health is “just urbanised”, it is implied that 
non-urban regions go without healthcare and come to pose a threat to other 
regions. Given that the article consists mainly of quotes with the Health Director 
of a “black” state who is presented in a positive light as pro-active and well-
informed, it may be assumed that only “sick communities are presented as 
threatening “well” communities. “Black” is not implied to be threatening “white”; 
indeed, the article makes a particular point that “the spread of disease had 
nothing to do with colour”,42 a conscious refutation of the subconscious link 
between “sickness” and “blackness”. 
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The Daily Dispatch was sold in Ciskei, Transkei and the Eastern Cape, and 
despite problematic relationships with the “homeland” governments, was 
nevertheless concerned with conditions in those regions. Its approach to 
covering the cholera epidemic was less concerned with what was going on in 
distant areas than with what could be done in the Transkei, Ciskei and East 
London area to prevent outbreaks there. This explains the attention paid to 
Charles Bikitsha and Ciskei’s anti-cholera precautions. Evidently, the Daily 
Dispatch was also working on Bikitsha’s assumption that “looking after my 
neighbour”43 prevented problems. This is not to say that the Dispatch’s 
coverage entirely disregarded the idea that the Ciskei and Transkei, as well as 
“black” communities within the Eastern Cape, presented a threat – the coverage 
does suggest that some wariness existed. In fact, the existence of the 
coverage, as well as its content, suggests this. Rather, the coverage included in 
the newspaper tended towards sympathy rather than fear.  
 
Thus far, the coverage in the Daily Dispatch focused mainly on the existence of 
a threat from outside the Transkei, Ciskei and Eastern Cape. Cholera was not 
explicitly situated in any particular region or type of region – it is only 
“elsewhere”, although both “Anti-Cholera Measures Underway on Border” and 
“Cholera: Water Being Checked” suggest that potential problem areas are 
“rural” communities in close proximity to, in particular, East London. The racial 
makeup of these communities, strongly implied in the Eastern Province Herald 
through various repeated mentions of “homeland” infections and the specific 
mention of “white” infections (implying that all other infections were “black”), 
goes almost unmentioned in Daily Dispatch coverage. This is possibly a 
function of the newspaper's concern with the local, rather than national, cholera 
situation, as well as its more liberal stance regarding racial politics. 
 
The movement of cholera into the “homeland” of Transkei, situated between the 
Eastern Cape and Natal, saw a continued focus on anti-cholera measures from 
the beginning. The article “Transkei Geared Up to Combat Cholera”, published 
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on the front page of the 23 January 1982 Daily Dispatch,44 outlines anti-cholera 
measures implemented in Transkei. The article mentions that “travellers through 
the Transkei [would] be given [anti-cholera] instructions at the country's 
borders”.45 Later in the article, the region's Director of Medical Services is 
quoted as being concerned mainly with the “spread of disease by travellers”. 
The context of both these references to “travellers” suggests that they are not 
residents of Transkei, but rather immigrants into the region from infected 
areas.46  
 
The first cholera-related death in Transkei was reported in “Bid to Check 
Cholera Spread”, published as the main headline on the front page of the 30 
January 1982 Daily Dispatch.47 Like previous articles, this one deals with anti-
cholera measures but extends its scope to include Ciskei and the Eastern 
Cape's measures in addition to those of Transkei. The article is careful to make 
it clear that the deceased individual contracted cholera in Natal, not Transkei, 
and that plans are in place to “halt” the spread of the disease. In this respect, 
early coverage of the Transkei epidemic in the Daily Dispatch is similar to that in 
the Eastern Province Herald in that it situated the threat outside the Transkei.  
 
From February 1982 onward, the Daily Dispatch began to map cholera carefully 
in space and time, giving precise locations of infections. On 17 February 1982, 
“Seven Cholera Cases Proved” locates the disease in the “Port St Johns area” 
and the “Ngqeleni area”: both rather imprecise, but the most particular situating 
of the disease in Daily Dispatch coverage that far.48 The source of infection is 
once again stated to be Natal, and some of the reported cases are described as 
“not serious”; this mild description was in keeping with the Daily Dispatch’s 
image of Transkei as a neighbour rather than an enemy. Furthermore, this may 
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be an attempt by the Daily Dispatch to reassure its readership that even though 
the threat was now on their doorstep, it was not serious. Nevertheless, two 
articles published within a week of “Seven Cholera Cases Proved”, list fatalities 
at Tekwini, Port St Johns and Canzibi,49 and new infections at Mqanduli, 
Flagstaff and Butterworth.50  
 
The comparatively gentle cholera-related coverage of the Daily Dispatch did 
not, despite its sympathy, deny that since cholera was present it might spread 
and therefore presented a problem. This problem, however, was not addressed 
in terms of neutralising the “black” threat to “white” health, but rather in terms of 
improving conditions in such a way that the spread would not occur. On 3 March 
1982 a Daily Dispatch article, entitled “Duncan Village Cholera Threat”, 
appeared. The article constructs Duncan Village, a peri-urban settlement in East 
London, as an area extremely vulnerable to cholera, even though cholera had 
not yet entered the Eastern Cape or Ciskei. The East London Medical Officer of 
Health is quoted as stating that living conditions in Duncan Village 
“[are]...extremely undesirable”,51 but attributes them to overcrowding without in 
any way blaming this on the residents of Duncan Village. The installation of 
better water and sanitation infrastructure in the Village is presented as being a 
move to prevent cholera breaking out at all, since cholera in the area would be 
“extremely difficult to control”, especially since “[although] there is a pure water 
supply...with slops being thrown into the street [cholera] might find its way into 
stormwater channels and rivers”. In this way, the Daily Dispatch presented anti-
cholera measures in Duncan Village as benefiting Duncan Village as well as the 
greater East London area: the sanitation improvements are not solely intended 
to protect “white” East London. Two subsequent articles on the Duncan Village 
improvements, “Preventive Measures as Cholera Spreads”52 and “Anti-Cholera 
Measures”53, continue this theme of improving Duncan Village infrastructure to 
prevent cholera in the region.  
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Although the Daily Dispatch constructs the improvements to Duncan Village as 
benefiting the Village itself as well as surrounding East London, it is significant 
that three separate articles are dedicated to these improvements. As constant 
attention paid to an issue suggests that it is a cause of concern, it can be 
assumed that Duncan Village had not been selected at random as a site for 
improvements – something must have made it a candidate for the changes as 
well as for inclusion in the coverage. It is most likely that the area’s “densely-
populated shanty area”54 had already been a cause of concern for the area’s 
health authorities, as the link between overcrowding, informal housing, and 
water-borne diseases was well-known.55 The continued focus on the area 
suggests that the Dispatch, although more sympathetic towards communities 
affected by cholera, was not immune to assumptions surrounding “sickness” 
and “blackness”. 
 
The final large-scale coverage of the cholera epidemic in the Daily Dispatch 
appeared in two articles, published in December 1982 and April 1983. “53 
Cholera Cases in Transkei”, published 29 December 1982 on the front page of 
the Daily Dispatch, once again enumerates the location of new cholera 
infections in Libode, Mqanduli and Lusikisiki, although the article states that 
most of the infected people had in fact contracted the disease in Natal.56 This 
article forms part of the post-March 1982 coverage, which replaces the image of 
the Transkei as a “well” region with the more threatening image of being “sick” 
and “black”. As it was published at the height of the summer holiday season, 
and concerned an area that was a popular holiday destination, it can be 
assumed that it being published at all meant that there was still widespread 
concern about the possibility of its infection spreading to the Eastern Cape. 
Ironically, its most likely importers would have been “white”, “well” 
holidaymakers returning home to East London. 
 
The Daily Dispatch coverage of the 1980-1983 epidemic ends in mid-1983, at a 
point distant from the relatively laconic, local-emphasis articles that 
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characterised its 1980 and 1981 coverage. Entitled, “Unite to Survive”, the 
editorial opinion piece appeared in the 11 April 1983 edition of the Daily 
Dispatch. This piece is not concerned with locating cholera's origin in any 
particular region. Instead, it is most concerned with the dangers posed by “rural” 
areas to “urban” areas, and as it names these “rural” areas specifically as being 
located in Transkei, Ciskei and KwaZulu (all “homelands”), it may be assumed 
that the real threat the article is concerned with that of “black”, “rural” areas to 
“white”, “urban” areas. This is in fact baldly stated: 
 
Advancing relentlessly with hunger, thirst and famine are deadly 
diseases. 
Nor are the town and the cities in any better position to withstand the 
threat, despite all their sophisticated means. People and animals are 
already fleeing the country to seek shelter and sustenance in urban 
areas. Soon there could be new problems of overcrowding and a 
serious deterioration in urban standards could follow...57 
 
Here, rural areas are effectively – and prematurely – blamed for the collapse of 
urban infrastructure and the importation of sickness. Although cholera is not the 
central point, it is unlikely that this image of the “rural”, “black” threat to “urban”, 
“well” areas could have arisen in such a developed form without the foregoing 
anti-”black”, anti-”sick” and anti-”rural” sentiments expressed after the infection 
of the Transkei. 
 
By late 1982, Daily Dispatch coverage of the cholera epidemic had moved from 
being concerned with local precautions (rather than distant outbreaks), to 
mapping a local outbreak, to once again concentrating on local precautions. 
Throughout the period, outbreaks in Natal, KwaZulu, KaNgwane and the 
Transvaal received only passing mention. Only once Transkei became infected 
did the newspaper begin to carefully keep track of the disease, as only then was 
it believed that it might spread into the Eastern Cape. Proximity and racial 
makeup, rather than racial makeup alone, made up the threat as constructed in 
Daily Dispatch coverage. Initially, infected areas were believed to be threatening 
because of the possibility that they might export their infection; uninfected areas 
were not considered threats, as is evidenced by the “ally” status of pre-February 
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1982 Transkei.  
 
The vast majority of cholera-related articles carried by the Daily Dispatch and 
the Eastern Province Herald in the period 1980-1983 did not in any way 
challenge the “white”-dominated58 South African government’s assertion that 
cholera was introduced into South Africa from a neighbouring country. Nor did 
the coverage challenge the Department of Health’s accompanying assertion 
that cholera was spread by and among “black”59 communities. That is, the 
Health Department constructed the disease as something alien to “white” South 
Africa, disallowing the possibility that its systematic denial of infrastructure and 
health facilities to “black” communities was in fact more likely to be a catalyst for 
a severe cholera epidemic than any innate properties the “white” hegemony 
ascribed to the “black” population. Throughout the coverage, then, the Daily 
Dispatch and the Eastern Province Herald failed to challenge statements 
released by the South African Department of Health. The coverage carried in 
these two publications in the period 1980-1983 included Health Department 
statements without any accompanying independent research or critique. This 
similarity of opinion was made almost inevitable by both the ingrained racism of 
“white” South African society represented by the Daily Dispatch and Eastern 
Province Herald. Although these publications were nominally anti-apartheid, it is 
nevertheless likely that there was not a wide gulf between the South African 
government’s conception of the epidemic and that of the newspapers.   
 
The net result of this was a remarkably un-argumentative period of coverage. 
Department of Health spokespeople and press releases noted the extent and 
locations to which the epidemic had spread, as well as noting who was thought 
to be responsible for that spread. At the same time, it monopolized authority 
over containing and treating the epidemic. The combination of this monopoly 
and the muzzled press climate of the time, as well as, to a lesser degree, the 
racism ingrained in South African society (particularly with regard to sickness), 
led to cholera being constructed as the fault and affliction of the country’s 
“black” communities, rather than the result of apartheid-era maladministration. 
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Cholera resulted from the lack of healthcare provision for “black” communities 
under apartheid, particularly the lack of infrastructure, disorganisation and 
absence of basic treatment facilities. Coverage of the 1980-1983 epidemic, 
however, made no mention of the culpability of apartheid in the appearance and 
spread of cholera in South Africa. Instead, it concentrated on toeing the 
government line, partly out of fear, partly out of necessity and partly because the 
newspapers were in agreement with the government’s interpretation of the 
epidemic. The coverage located cholera in the “black”, “sick” communities of 
South Africa, which were constructed as separate from the country’s “white” 
population. 
 
Daily Dispatch and Eastern Province Herald coverage of the 2000-2003 cholera 
epidemic did not resemble that of 1980-1983. These changes were the result of 
changes in South Africa’s socio-political situation between 1983 and 2000. After 
1994, a relatively amicable relationship developed between the press and 
government; in this relationship, the government, though obviously not 
welcoming criticism, was at least open to receiving it. At the same time, the 
change to democratic rule brought with it a new conception of the relationship 
between the South African government and the citizens of that country: the 
government, voted into power by the citizens, was now obliged to act in their 
best interests. The outbreak of cholera in the impoverished eastern half of the 
Eastern Cape in 2000 – a full presidential term into the democratic era – cast 
doubt on the extent to which the government could be said to be acting to 
improve the lives of South African citizens. More specifically, the Eastern 
Province Herald and Daily Dispatch paid increasing attention to service delivery 
failures within the Eastern Cape, with the provincial Health Department’s 
apparent inability to co-ordinate and implement its healthcare services attracting 
a good percentage of the coverage. When cholera broke out, the newspapers’ 
already-existing dissatisfaction with the Eastern Cape Department of Health led 
to the publication of cholera-related articles that did not share governmental 
constructions of the epidemic. As a result, the newspaper coverage of the 2000-
2003 cholera outbreak, particularly that of the Daily Dispatch, presents a view of 
the epidemic opposing the view put forward by the ECDOH. 
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Placing the Blame in the Eastern Province Herald, 2000-2003 
The first Eastern Province Herald article about the probability of an Eastern 
Cape cholera outbreak appeared in the 1 December 2000 edition. Entitled “Anti-
Cholera Alert”,60 it situated cholera in KwaZulu-Natal, which the article therefore 
constructed as a threat to the Eastern Cape by outlining the anti-cholera 
precautions the Eastern Cape was taking to prevent cholera spreading from 
KwaZulu-Natal.  
 
Several months later an article entitled “E Cape Hospital Has Cholera Patient” 
reported that an individual infected with cholera had been hospitalised in the 
Eastern Cape.61 The Eastern Cape’s as-yet uninfected status was alluded to in 
the second paragraph, which noted the victim’s origins as “Harding, in southern 
KwaZulu-Natal”.62 The lead paragraph stated, however, that the individual was 
the “first Eastern Cape cholera case.”63 This ambiguity is interesting; the lead 
paragraph and headline suggest that cholera had entered the province, but the 
second paragraph refuted this by identifying the patient as a resident of the 
infected KwaZulu-Natal. That the Eastern Cape remains uninfected was 
stressed in the article: 
 
There is no reason to panic. This was a lone carrier and we are 
satisfied that the disease itself has not yet spread into the Eastern 
Cape,’ [Goqwana] said. 
Health authorities have, however, been instructed to step up 
emergency measures…64 
 
The uninfected nature of the Eastern Cape in the face of encroaching infection 
from KwaZulu Natal was the main preoccupation of early Eastern Province 
Herald coverage of the 2000-2003 outbreak. Between the advent of the threat 
from KwaZulu-Natal in late 2000 to the infection of the Eastern Cape in May 
2001, KwaZulu-Natal was constructed as the locale where all Eastern Cape 
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cholera victims became infected. For all that, the region was not categorised in 
any particular ways – it was merely “not the Eastern Cape”. That is, KwaZulu-
Natal was not considered to be infected because it is inherently “black”, “sick” or 
“underdeveloped”. Indeed, these artificial states are not present in the early 
coverage at all.  
 
This changed with the advent of cholera in the Eastern Cape in May 2001. In an 
article entitled “Cholera Strikes in Eastern Cape”, published in the 1 May 2001 
Eastern Province Herald, the Eastern Cape residents that were infected are 
located very firmly in “the Mampisi area, and shacks around Bizana”.65 These 
locales, particularly the “shacks around Bizana”,66 were constructed as 
“underdeveloped” in the article. This image of the infected area was reinforced 
by a quote from a hospital superintendent included later in the article, who 
noted that “the areas had a lack of toilets and that people drank from 
unprotected boreholes”.67 This indicates a lack of infrastructure in the region, a 
very definite argument in favour of its classification as “underdeveloped”. That 
cholera should have broken out among residents of this area leads to a linkage 
of “underdeveloped” to “sick”.  
 
The “sickness” of “underdeveloped” areas was stressed in “Cholera Named as 
Killer in Remote Area”, published in the 22 January 2002 Eastern Province 
Herald. The area in which cholera had arisen was described as “the remote 
Qingqolo village near Mqanduli”.68 This description constructed the region as 
extremely underdeveloped. As well as being “remote”, it is also only “near” 
Mqanduli – that is, not likely to be “developed” in the least. In this way, 
“underdeveloped” was linked to “sick”. This linkage was strengthened by the 
description of potentially infected people in the region as “villagers”, who “have 
received treatment from medical practitioners in Mqanduli”,69 suggesting that 
Qingqolo had no medical practitioners of its own. This, to many of the Eastern 
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Province Herald’s readers, would have signified a serious lack of health 
infrastructure in Qingqolo, which in addition to the lack of sanitation already 
established by the existence of cholera in the region added up to a 
comprehensive image of the area being “underdeveloped” and “sick”.  
 
On 31 January 2002, an article titled “Poor Infrastructure Making Cholera 
Worse, Says Minister” appeared on the third page of the Eastern Province 
Herald. The article explicitly linked the lack of infrastructure in “underdeveloped” 
areas to the spread of cholera: 
 
Shocking roads and a lack of electricity were exacerbating the 
cholera outbreak in Mqanduli, Health Minister Dr Manto Tshabalala-
Msimang discovered during a visit there yesterday.70 
 
Once again the article presented the cholera outbreak as contained, or rather, 
in no danger of spreading to a larger area. It was described as being “in 
Mqanduli”, located with precision and specificity. No mention was made of the 
possibility that Mqanduli threatened any neighbouring areas. The article did, 
however, make it clear that this cholera outbreak was the Eastern Cape’s 
“baby”: “The Eastern Cape health department would lead the campaign against 
cholera…while the national department would offer some ‘technical support’.”71 
Clearly, there was little fear that cholera in the Mqanduli area would present a 
threat to the Eastern Cape as a whole, and there was certainly no concern 
about the possibility of a national outbreak is evident anywhere in the coverage 
up to that point.  
 
This continued to be the case in Eastern Province Herald coverage as the 
epidemic in the Eastern Cape progressed into its third year. The lack of concern 
about a nationwide outbreak led to a decrease in the amount of space the 
Eastern Province Herald dedicated to citing the disease in particular areas. 
Consequently, there was no construction of certain areas as threats and others 
as threatened in the coverage. However, the spread of the disease within 
already-infected areas was carefully followed.  
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An article entitled “New Cholera Outbreak in Transkei Claims Seven Lives”, 
published in the 6 January 2003 Eastern Province Herald,72 located the disease 
firmly within the ORT District Municipality. The article mapped the spread of the 
disease within that region quite specifically: 
 
…the affected areas…include Baziya and Buhlungwana village, both 
near [Qumbu], Gxulu village in Libode and Mampube village in Port 
St Johns. 
…The first case was recorded at Ngcongane village near Umtata on 
December 23 [2002] when a group returned from a traditional feast in 
port St Johns…Investigations showed that water in the Ndwalane 
River in Port St Johns was carrying the bacteria that causes the 
disease.73 
 
The article therefore sites cholera firmly within the ORT District Municipality, 
and also gives a potted history of the outbreak’s spread by suggesting the 
probable source of the infection (the Ndwalane River, in Port St Johns); the 
location of the first infections (Ngcongane village, near Umtata); and, the route 
by which infection was carried from Port St Johns to Umtata and thence to the 
other infected regions.  
 
The 2000-2003 cholera outbreak in the Eastern Cape was not of great concern 
to the Eastern Province Herald, located as it was in the western half of the 
province; this region was likewise not the Eastern Province Herald’s primary 
focus area. The fairly small scope of the epidemic fell within the province’s 
eastern regions, traditionally the concern of the Daily Dispatch, which indeed 
produced a great deal more coverage of the outbreak. The coverage that does 
exist, however, is interesting in that it evidences a new way of constructing the 
threat.  
 
In the early coverage, the threat is not said to be posed by “sick”, “black” or 
“underdeveloped” communities, but rather by the large and unanalysed region 
of KwaZulu-Natal. Once the threat is realised, however – that is, once cholera 
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has moved into the Eastern Cape – there is no further comment on the 
possibility of its spread, and therefore no concern over who might be threatened 
by the infection. The link between cholera, “sickness” and “underdevelopment” 
established in the article “Cholera Named as Killer in Remote Area” pervades 
the remainder of the coverage. The lack of concern surrounding spread 
suggests that it was taken for granted in the Eastern Province Herald that only 
“underdeveloped” people would be affected, effectively removing the need to 
worry about the possibility of spread into a region that considered itself 
“developed”. 
 
Placing Blame in the Daily Dispatch, 2000-2003  
The first Daily Dispatch article dealing with the 2000-2003 outbreak of cholera in 
the Eastern Cape appeared in the 21 January 2002 edition. Entitled “10 Killed 
By Mystery Disease”,74 it mapped the spread of the disease in the Mqanduli 
area of the KSD Local Municipality, a subdivision of the OR Tambo District 
Municipality. The disease was not officially identified as cholera; in fact, a 
quoted government official stated that the illness was not cholera: “The results 
show…no trace of typhoid bacilli, cholera bacilli, or shigella bacilli.”75 Later in 
the article, however, the likelihood that it was cholera was admitted: “…the 
residents are drinking from stagnant pools, which means that it is most probably 
cholera.”76 On this point, the newspaper and government officials are in 
agreement.   
 
The article located the disease – even before it is suggested to be cholera – in 
the Eastern Cape, and did not suggest that it was imported from KwaZulu Natal, 
or that it might spread to the remainder of the Eastern Cape. The various 
locations at which cholera was found are named as Qingqolo “near [Mqanduli]”, 
Mqambule and “nearby villages”. The area’s “underdeveloped” nature was 
constructed by the description of settlements as “villages”;77 the mention of 
problematic water-sources later in the article cements this construction. 
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Throughout the coverage, the Daily Dispatch takes care to emphasize the 
infrastructure-poor nature of the infected communities and contrast this – the 
actual cause of the cholera outbreak – with the explanations put forward by the 
government officials quoted in the articles.  
 
In the article “10 Killed by Mystery Disease”, representatives of the two 
municipalities involved were described as “officials” who found 
“locals…confused”.78 It is clear from this that in the newspaper’s estimation, a 
division existed between the infected “underdeveloped” area and the area from 
which the “officials” were sent, which might arguably be described as 
“developed”. Alternatively, it is possible that the division between the two groups 
as described by the newspapers arose not from physical location (though it is 
not likely that municipal employees were living in rural villages) but rather from a 
difference in mindset. That is, it is possible that the “officials” considered 
themselves, or were considered by the Daily Dispatch, to be more “developed” 
than the “locals”.   
 
 The next day, an article entitled “Tests Confirm Cholera Cause of Deaths” 
appeared on the front page of the Daily Dispatch.79  The article’s lead 
paragraph situated the infection in “the remote Qingqolo village near 
Mqanduli”,80a description which placed the disease very firmly in an 
“underdeveloped” context and linking that location to “sickness”. In doing so, it 
created a nexus between the imagined qualities of “underdeveloped” and “sick”. 
It is implied there that “underdevelopment” leads to “sickness”, and thus that 
“developed” areas are “well“.  
 
The article mentioned neither the possibility of cholera spreading out of the 
Qingqolo area, nor speculated about the route by which cholera entered the 
region. The coverage constructed “underdeveloped” as very different to 
“developed”81 – but rather than constructing this difference as a threat, it 
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constructed it as a difference between two particular “lifestyles” or “mindsets”. If 
anything, “developed” areas and/or groups were a threat to “underdeveloped” 
areas and groups because they consistently failed to combat existing problems 
or forestall potential ones, concentrating instead on protecting their reputations 
and maintaining positive public images. Cholera as constructed by the Daily 
Dispatch did not threaten “developed” areas with physical infection from 
“underdeveloped” areas, but rather brought to the fore the differences between 
the province’s “developed” and “underdeveloped” groups – notably the 
government and the rural underclass - which highlighted the social and class-
based inequalities being left uncorrected by government. 
 
This may account for why cholera continued to be covered and receive 
prominent placement in the Daily Dispatch even after the concern about a large-
scale outbreak fell away. This bears a direct relation to the great volume of 
space the Daily Dispatch devoted to the various problems within the ECDOH 
over the same time period. the continued difficulties that the Department faced 
in establishing its own credibility and providing accessible health-services was 
evidence of the same set of conflicts between being “developed” and 
“underdeveloped”. That is, the ECDOH’s attempts to develop the province’s 
health services were met with frequent Daily Dispatch articles seemingly 
intended to indicate that the ECDOH was failing in this mandate, and thus 
leaving the province as “underdeveloped” as it had been before. This suggests 
that the Daily Dispatch placed much of the blame for the cholera epidemic on 
the “developed” government bodies and representatives who were failing to 
improve the living conditions of communities for which they were responsible.  
 
The article “Death Lurks in Qingqolo River”, published in the 24 January 2002 
Daily Dispatch,82 reverted to a more ‘traditional’ form of covering the epidemic 
by locating the disease and attempting to account for its presence in the region. 
First stating that cholera “has now moved into the poverty-stricken Eastern 
Cape rural areas”, it went on to describe the infected villages as “remote and 
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inaccessible”, as well as “unprotected”.83 This “underdevelopment” was 
emphasized by the article’s listing of the area’s various infrastructural problems: 
 
The village is reached via two rough tracks down steep 
hills…Residents must walk several kilometres to catch a taxi, or pay 
R100 to hire a vehicle. 
There’s no electricity, no toilets, no piped water, no cellphone 
reception and the closest phone is some distance away at the 
nearest school.84 
 
The article furthermore constructed this “underdevelopment” as threatening to 
the village itself. This was suggested by the description of the infected villages 
as “unprotected”.85 Exactly what they were unprotected from is not explicitly 
stated. However, elsewhere in the article it was noted that “locals [were] 
learning how to treat the disease and not spread it”.86 Taken in combination with 
the infrastructural problems enumerated above, this suggested that what the 
villages were unprotected from is cholera, presumably because of their lack of 
clean water, sanitation and health services.  
 
In late January 2002, the epidemic spread from the confines of Qingqolo to 
Orange Grove, located “just eight kilometres from [Umtata]”.87 The article, 
entitled “Cholera Hits Second Village”, appeared in the 31 January 2002 Daily 
Dispatch. Its second paragraph, after locating the newly-infected village as 
being within walking distance of Umtata, narrowed down the location of the new 
infection by placing it “en route to Mqanduli…along the Umtata River”.88 
Although relatively close to a “developed” area, Orange Grove was established 
in the coverage as “underdeveloped” by the mention of its lack of piped water 
supply: “Some Orange Grove villagers usually fetch ‘chocolate brown’ water 
from the Umtata River, while others depend on rain…as there is no piped water 
there.”89  
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It was at this point that Daily Dispatch coverage of the cholera epidemic 
returned to a more ‘traditional’ form. It began once again to be concerned with 
the possibility of infection spreading from already-infected areas into uninfected 
areas, and to reassure as yet uninfected areas that there was little danger 
posed to them by infected areas. It did this without abandoning the theme of 
earlier articles, which was that the regional authorities were constructing 
“underdevelopment” among rural communities as a threat to the provincial 
government’s attempts to “develop” the province. The Daily Dispatch’s 
construction of the problem, as mentioned above, was the converse of this.  
 
The first article that evidenced this was “Mageda Says Cholera Threat Under 
Control”, published in the 1 February 2002 Daily Dispatch. The lead paragraph 
established the existence of a physical threat: “The outbreak of cholera at 
Orange Grove near [Umtata] and at Qingqolo near Mqanduli was still 
manageable, and attempts were being made to prevent it from spreading to 
other areas.”90 The likelihood that this threat would spread was also stated: “It 
was expected that the disease would spread to certain areas due to the 
movement of people, as was the case in KwaZulu-Natal.”91 At the same time, 
the article includes quotes from Department of Health employees stating that 
the epidemic in the area was still manageable, and was in fact being managed 
at that very moment: “attempts were being made to prevent it from spreading to 
other areas”.92 Although this mention of anti-cholera measures does not cancel 
out the threat that cholera posed to the region, it does to some degree allay it.  
 
This raises the question of why this issue remained of enough interest to the 
Daily Dispatch to continue reporting on the spread of cholera through the 
“underdeveloped” areas of the Eastern Cape’s eastern half. That government 
actions and officials are often mentioned in the articles provides a clue to this 
continued attention.  
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The Daily Dispatch was deeply concerned with the successes and failures of 
the ECDOH throughout the period 2000-2003. Many of the articles dealing with 
the cholera outbreak detailed the latest government action taken regarding 
cholera. Therefore, the Daily Dispatch may well have been concerned with the 
threat cholera, as a “rural” disease of “underdeveloped” areas, posed to the 
credibility of the “development”-oriented government, which already HAD 
trouble maintaining its equilibrium.  
 
This is evidenced by a pair of articles appearing on 7 February 2002 and 15 
February 2002 respectively in the Daily Dispatch. The first, “Umtata Sewage 
Cause of Cholera Says Mamase”,93 quoted the Acting MEC for Health, Max 
Mamase, as blaming the cholera outbreak on overflow from the sewerage 
treatment plant at Umtata. Directly after threat of disease had been situated in 
badly maintained Umtata infrastructure, the infected areas were specifically 
identified as “Qinqolo in Mqanduli, and Orange Grove near Umtata, [as well as] 
Nqanda near Ngeleni”.94 Infected areas were established as “underdeveloped” 
in the article by making reference to “historical factors like poor sanitation, lack 
of water supply and lack of infrastructure” as well as referencing the 
“inaccessib[ility of] Qingqolo village”.95 Furthermore, the infected communities 
were suggested, by quoted government officials, to believe in witchcraft. In 
commenting on this belief, the National Minister of Minerals and Energy – a 
representative of the “developed” South African government – stated that: 
 
This is not a disease caused by witches and you must stop going to 
traditional healers for a cure. This is a bacteria found in water and in 
order to fight it you have to boil your drinking water before you drink 
it. 
Those traditional healers who say they can cure this and claim that 
the disease is being caused by witches are lying.96 
 
This statement indicates that the speaker, a representative of the South African 
government, directly links belief in witchcraft to “underdevelopment” and 
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“sickness”, by accusing the traditional healers of lying and consequently 
promoting the spread of cholera. The juxtaposition of the article’s original image 
of infrastructure-poor infected communities and the government’s quoted 
suggestion that traditional healing was aiding the spread of the disease 
suggests a distinct disjuncture between the newspaper’s views on the causes of 
the epidemic and those of the government.  
 
Published as a reply to “Umtata Sewage Cause of Cholera Says Mamase”, 
“Cholera Comment Criticised” appeared on the second page of the 15 February 
2002 Daily Dispatch.97 In the article, the mayor of the KSD Local Municipality 
refuted Mamase’s claim that sewerage in the Umtata River had caused cholera 
downstream: “None of the people who died of the illness later diagnosed as 
cholera drank water from the Umtata River.”98 He also suggested that 
Mamase’s statement was “calculated to incite people against the KSD 
municipality”.99 Publishing this evidence of internal disagreements leading to 
service delivery problems within the provincial government suggests that the 
Daily Dispatch was certainly not siding with them, but rather with the 
communities adversely affected by the infighting.  
 
Evidence that “underdevelopment” was said by the Daily Dispatch to present a 
massive threat to the government’s attempts to “develop” the province is 
provided by the article “Report Highlights Cholera Risk Profile”, which appeared 
in the 30 January 2003 Daily Dispatch.100 The article identified cholera risk 
factors as “lack of sanitation, lack of a potable water supply, lack of personal 
hygiene, and funeral gatherings.”101 A subsequent article, “’Sanitation, culture 
impacting on fight against cholera’”, published on page five of the 7 February 
2003 Daily Dispatch,102 contains explicit evidence of the government’s 
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construction of the epidemic as the result of the “underdeveloped” nature of 
rural communities. Bevan Goqwana, the Eastern Cape Health MEC, is quoted 
as saying: 
 
 I wish to appeal to our people to understand that witchcraft doesn’t 
cause the disease and I urge everyone to seek professional medical 
attention whenever feeling sick.103  
 
Once again, the newspaper suggests that the government authorities were 
linking “underdevelopment” to “sickness” by suggesting that seeking treatment 
from traditional healers – anathema to the “developed” government – was 
contributing to the spread of cholera in “underdeveloped” communities. A later 
article “Still More Cases of Cholera as Government Tries to Curb Disease”104, 
makes this link even clearer by extensively quoting a government spokesperson 
who noted that a health-and-hygiene promotion team was “[evaluating] the 
attitude and practices of the community on health and hygiene”.105 That these 
attitudes are believed to need evaluating suggests that they were considered to 
be a problem by the “developed” officials that dispatched the team.  
 
Daily Dispatch cholera-related coverage between 2000 and 2003 struck a 
careful balance between the “official” government version of the epidemic – that 
it resulted from historical disadvantages in the Eastern Cape and was spread 
due to problematic behaviour among “underdeveloped” groups – and their own - 
which was that government inaction and the gap between the government and 
the citizenry were the main driving forces behind the epidemic’s spread.  
 
Between the end of the cholera outbreak of 1980-1983 and the beginning of the 
severe Eastern Cape outbreak of 2000-2003, South Africa underwent a 
profound change. The race-based socio-political oppression and deprivation of 
the apartheid era was discarded. The democratic system which replaced it in 
1994 was built around ideas of universal equality and an egalitarian distribution 
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of resources. These changes released the National Party government’s hold 
over the English-language South African press, and created a press climate 
much more welcoming to government-related debate and contestation than that 
of the preceding 50-odd years. 
 
Despite the apparently open forum in which the post-apartheid press operated, 
tension arose between the newly-elected ANC-led government and the South 
African print media, largely because of the “watchdog” role the press assumed 
early on in the democratic era. The new democratic government experienced a  
myriad of problems as it attempted to implement transformation in government 
departments while simultaneously delivering services to the country’s vast 
number of previously disadvantaged communities. While these wide-reaching 
changes were taking place, lack of skills and widespread corruption among 
government employees hampered the quality and speed of service delivery. 
Given that the press had cast itself as “defender of the public interest”,106 it 
concentrated on reporting around issues of corruption and poor-governance, 
and tended to highlight government failures rather than successes.107 This 
caused tension to arise between the new government and the print media.  
 
The Eastern Cape’s two major daily newspapers, the Daily Dispatch and the 
Eastern Province Herald, both English-language, devoted extensive space to 
covering these failures, particularly those of ECDOH. Unsurprisingly this led to a 
strained relationship between the Eastern Cape English-language press and the 
ECDOH. The Eastern Province Herald’s coverage during the period 2000-2003 
was not quite as extensive as that carried by the Daily Dispatch. Although the 
articles in both newspapers contain a fairly straightforward thread of information 
on the spread and extent of the epidemic, they make use of a wide variety of 
sources, not all of which are medical professionals or even Department of 
Health employees. This inclusion of non-medical sources and sources outside 
both the healthcare authorities and the government meant that the newspapers 
were not reliant on the Health Department for information. The coverage, 
                                            
106
  Discussed in Chapter 4.  
107
  It should also be remembered that “negativity” is one of the cardinal news values! 
151 
therefore, does not “toe the line” in the same way that the 1980-1983 coverage 
did, but rather is much more independent. 
 
This independence extended to the point where the government ceased to be 
only a source of information and itself became a subject of scrutiny in the 
coverage. In the 2000-2003 coverage, cholera-related articles are spaces in 
which the Health Department is as much the point of the article as is cholera. 
This is symptomatic of the much more permissive media society, the 
“watchdog” role of the media and also of increasing public impatience with 
government ‘s failure to deliver. 
 
The reaction of the Eastern Cape media to groups and areas infected by 
cholera underwent profound changes between 1980 and 2003. In the 1980s, 
cholera-infected groups were viewed as threats to the “white” population, and 
the appearance of cholera among “black” communities was depicted as a result 
of their inherent predisposition to sickness. Reactions to cholera were therefore 
focused on placing the blame on the victim rather than examining the root 
causes of the epidemic. In the 2000s, however, the government was blamed for 
the outbreak of cholera, which was depicted as a result of poor service delivery 
and lack of infrastructure development rather than of any inchoate deficiencies 
on the part of infected groups.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
It is impossible to understand the significance of cholera within, and to, South 
Africa without an understanding of its spread and extent during the two major 
epidemics of the late 20th century. Cholera broke out in isolated areas but 
spread easily and quickly to affect wider regions. Beginning in the far northeast 
of South Africa in the early 1980s, cholera spread to the eastern and 
southeastern regions of the country, an area including all of the so-called 
“homelands” as well as three major “white” provinces (Transvaal, Natal and the 
Eastern Cape). By the early 2000s, although the disease no longer infected 
large tracts of South Africa, its re-appearance in the Eastern Cape indicated 
that the conditions originally conducive to its spread had not been adequately 
dealt with in the two decades seperating the outbreaks.  
 
The explanation for cholera’s appearance and tenacity in South Africa is simple. 
Even in two vastly different socio-political contexts, separated by 20 years and 
massive political changes, the underlying causes remain the same. Lack of  
infrastructure and adequate healthcare, the result of government neglect, left 
South African communities vulnerable to cholera outbreaks. This vulnerability 
was not explained so much as explained away, first by long-standing 
stereotypes around race and illness embedded in South African society, and 
then by more recent but equally tenuous nexuses between “underdevelopment” 
and illness. The net result of this denial was a death toll in the thousands and 
unquantifiable human misery.  
 
Cholera in South Africa first broke out in a country under a brutal totalitarian 
regime that preached racial difference, brooked no disagreement and 
consigned millions of people to appalling living conditions that rendered them 
vulnerable to poverty-related diseases. The fall of this regime and the 
subsequent adoption of democracy was expected to improve these living 
conditions and in doing so reduce the prevalence of poverty-related diseases. 
These improvements did not come quickly enough, or at all, and 10 years into 
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the new democratic period, cholera once again broke out, affecting the same 
regions and the same people that it had during the apartheid era. Until the 
“underdevelopment” fostered by apartheid and left uncorrected by the 
democratic regime, is reversed, cholera will continue to threaten South Africa’s 
health.  
 
Charles E. Rosenberg, in his analysis of cholera in the 19th century,1 notes that 
epidemics were once assumed by commentators to be “alien visitations”2 to the 
societies they affected, rather than the effects of the societal inequalities of 
those societies. That is, cholera was assumed to have arisen almost 
spontaneously, the result of innate failings on the part of those communities and 
groups affected by it. Although Rosenberg’s work focuses on moral judgements 
made against cholera sufferers in North American and European epidemics, the 
same holds true of explanations given for the infection of “blacks” during the 
South African epidemic. In the case of local epidemics, however, such “blame 
the victim” racist explanations were so ingrained in “white” South African 
mindsets that they appeared unchallenged in the newspaper coverage of the 
1980-1983 epidemic. The press’s capacity to inform and educate is dependent 
on the political climate in which it operates. 
 
The 1980-1983 epidemic occurred in the midst of apartheid’s most repressive 
era, making the publication of anti-governmental opinions in English 
newspapers difficult if not impossible. At the same time, it is likely that the staff 
and readers of the Daily Dispatch and Eastern Province Herald shared many of 
the same opinions and preconceptions held by the Department of Health 
sources from which the newspapers received information.  
 
The Eastern Province Herald and the Daily Dispatch thus reported on the 1980-
1983 cholera epidemic without mentioning the government’s role in creating that 
epidemic. The result of this muteness was a body of coverage that presented 
only the official version of the cholera epidemic, including no alternative 
opinions or criticism of the government. This form of cholera-related coverage 
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reflected the larger relationship between the press and the government: one in 
which the government’s authority was generally accepted, leaving neither room 
nor indeed much willingness to introduce news coverage critical of 
governmental actions. The South African Department of Health was treated as 
the chief authority on the epidemic and constructed as the most qualified to 
explain and combat it. The epidemic was constructed as a problem resulting 
from the appalling conditions created by “black” communities, who thus threaten 
“white” communities. The “sick”, not the government that made them “sick”, are 
the problem.  
 
The 2000-2003 epidemic, however, took place in a political climate much more 
open to criticism, though not so open that the press did not become personae 
non grata with the government following the publication of large numbers of 
articles critical of the new ANC-led government. The Eastern Province Herald 
and the Daily Dispatch were no longer subject to governmental repression, and 
this freedom of expression is evident in the highly critical attitudes towards the 
government, particularly the ECDOH, apparent in cholera-related coverage. At 
the same time, the racially discriminatory explanations the newspapers 
reproduced so effortlessly during the apartheid era were now socially, culturally 
and politically anathema. The post-1994 Eastern Cape English press did not 
automatically assume the Health Department’s authority in representing the 
cholera epidemic. Instead, they took in a wide variety of sources within and 
outside the government, in fact going some way to eroding the credibility of the 
Department and the government it represented. As a result, the coverage 
situated the blame for cholera with the government and its sluggish 
implementation of service delivery, rather than with the “sick”. The victims of 
cholera, rather than being held responsible for their own predicament, were 
instead portrayed as having been betrayed by a government which was both 
divorced from the reality of the province’s health situation and actively engaged 
in maintaining a false image of the Eastern Cape as a healthy and well-
developed province.3 
 
                                            
3
 For an extended discussion of this point, please see Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 6.  
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Between 1980 and 2003, cholera struck South Africa two major blows. In each 
case, the human cost was vast, and the same sector of society paid it each 
time. In 1980-1983, the appalling racism that allowed this to happen was left 
unchallenged even by the Eastern Cape English-language press, which was 
supposed to be opposed to apartheid. The reverse occurred in 2000-2003, with 
every government move being examined and critiqued by the free press, which 
did not see itself as obliged to curry favour or avoid giving offense. This 
fearlessness is encouraging: it may be that in subsequent cholera epidemics, 
press – and public – pressure may result in the implementation of adequate and 
widespread anti-cholera measures.  
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Appendix A: GENERAL MAPS 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Map of South African Provinces before 1994.1  
 
 
 
                                            
1
    Taken from http://www.geographicsguide.com/pictures/maps/provinces-1994.jpg, accessed 1 
September 2009. 
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Figure 10:  Map of South African Provinces after 1994.2 taken from  
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
2
 A.J. Christopher, The Atlas of Changing South Africa (London, 2001), pg. 200 
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Figure 11: South African Homelands.3 
                                            
3
 http://www.africancrisis.org/images/Apartheid_South_Africa_Map_of_Black_Homelands.jpg, 
accessed 2 September 2009. Note that all “homelands” were situated in the eastern half of 
the country. 
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1 
2 
Map 1: KaNgwane and Eastern Transvaal, c. 1980-83 
Appendix B: MAPS OF CHOLERA-INFECTED AREAS, 1980-83 AND 2000-03 
Please note, all maps in this Appendix are taken from Automobile Association of South Africa, 2009 Automobile Association Road Atlas of South Africa 
(Johannesburg, 2009) 
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Map 2: KwaZulu and Natal, c. 1980-83 
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Map 3: Transkei/Natal border area, 1980-83 
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Map 4: north-eastern Transkei, c. 1980-83 
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Map 5: Eastern Cape/KwaZulu-Natal border area 2000-2003 
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Map 6: north-eastern Eastern Cape 2000-2003 
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Appendix C: NEWS VALUES 
 
Table 3: Daily Dispatch News Values, 1980-1983 
ARTICLE TITLE DATE NEGATIV RECEN RELEV. PROX. 
Cholera: Water Being Checked 20/11/80   X X 
Cholera Case in Bophuthatswana 25/11/80 X X X  
Bid to Check Cholera Spread 30/01/82   X X 
Seven Cholera Cases Proved 17/02/82 X X  X 
Another Transkei Cholera Death 19/02/82 X X  X 
Third Cholera Death 23/02/82 X X  X 
Duncan Village Cholera Threat 03/03/82 X   X 
Cholera: Penalty of White Neglect 03/03/82   X X 
Cholera Expected in EL 03/03/82 X X  X 
53 Confirmed Transkei Cases 04/03/82 X X X X 
Border, East Cape Geared for Cholera 04/03/82 X X X  
Border Ready to Fight Cholera 04/03/82   X X 
Preventive Measures as Cholera 
Spreads 05/03/82 X X  X 
Anti-Cholera Measures 06/03/82   X X 
Cholera: Borehole Advice to Farmers 
 
09/03/82   
 
X  
EL Sewage: Weekly Test for Cholera 11/03/82   X X 
Cholera: Wages of Poverty… 06/04/82  X X  
Health System Facing Breakdown 20/11/82   X  
Cholera Warning for E Cape 30/11/82 X X  X 
53 Cholera Cases in Transkei 29/12/82   X X 
  
 TOTAL 10 10 13 15 
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Table 4: Eastern Province Herald News Values, 1980-1983 
ARTICLE TITLE DATE NEGATIV RECEN RELEV. PROX 
Doctor Warns of Cholera Risk 11/01/71 X X X  
Cholera Claims Four, 31 Others in 
Hospital 11/01/80 X X  X 
New Cases of Cholera Reported 13/10/80 X X X X 
Cholera Has Not Reached 'Crisis 
Stage' 03/11/80   X X 
Death Lurks in the Fields 07/11/80  X   
Cholera Outbreak: Nine Now Isolated 17/11/80 X X X  
14 Whites Display Cholera Symptoms 20/11/80 X X X  
47 More Cases of Cholera in Tvl 28/11/80 X X   
Cholera Cases Rise to 125 in SA 09/01/81 X X X  
15 New Cases 01/12/81 X X X  
More Cholera 15/12/81 X X X  
Cholera Deaths 17/02/81 X X   
Cholera Germs in Jo'Burg Sewers 02/12/81 X X X X 
Stanger Gastric Infection … 07/12/81 X X X  
Cholera at Epidemic Stage in KwaZulu 24/12/81 X X   
Shanty-Town Cholera May Hit Durban 28/12/81 X  X X 
Killer Epidemic Spreads in Natal 29/12/81 X X  X 
Further 275 Cholera Cases 30/12/81 X X  X 
Killer Disease Sweeps Across Natal 04/01/82 X  X X 
E Cape Check for Cholera 05/01/82 X   X 
Natal Cholera Still Not Contained 08/01/82 X  X X 
First Tests on PE Man Point to Cholera 16/01/82 X  X X 
E Cape Geared for Cholera Danger 18/01/82   X X 
T'Kei Hospitals Get Set for Fight 
Against Cholera 30/01/82 X  X X 
Cholera: Crash Course in PE 10/02/82   X X 
Transkei Cholera 'In Control' 12/01/82 X X  X 
Man Dies of Cholera 19/02/82 X X X X 
Oysters, Mussels Cholera Warning 01/03/82 X  X X 
PE, EL Shellfish: No Threat of Cholera 02/01/82   X X 
Cholera's Toll Now 90 06/03/82 X   X 
Four More Cholera Clinics Opened 08/03/82 X X   
Possibility of Cholera in East Cape 
Says MOH 12/03/82 X  X X 
188 Killed by Cholera 05/06/82 X  X  
  
 TOTAL 28 19 22 20 
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Table 5: Daily Dispatch News Values, 2000-2003 
TITLE DATE NEGATIV RECEN. RELEVAN. PROXIM. 
10 Killed by Mystery Disease 21/01/02 X X  X 
Tests Confirm Cholera Cause of 
Deaths 22/01/02 X X  X 
Cholera Committee Set Up 23/01/02  X X  
Death Lurks in Qingqolo River 24/01/02 X  X X 
Cholera Hits Second Village 31/01/02 X X X X 
Mageda Says Cholera Threat 
Under Control 01/02/02  X X  
Umtata Sewage Cause of 
Cholera, Says Mamase 07/02/02 X X X X 
Cholera Comment Criticised 15/02/02  X X  
Cholera Kills 7 in T'Kei 06/01/03 X X X X 
Plea for United Effort as Cholera 
Worsens in T'Kei 07/01/03 X X X X 
Goqwana Assesses Progress on 
Cholera 14/01/03  X X  
Locals Urged to Fight Cholera 15/01/03  X X X 
No Need to Panic' Over Cholera 16/01/03  X X  
Health Dept Winning Cholera War 18/01/03  X X  
Ministers Assess Cholera Impact 29/01/03 X X X  
Report Highlights Cholera Risk 
Profile 30/01/03 X X X X 
Sanitation, Culture Impacting on 
Fight Against Cholera' 07/02/03 X X X  
Cholera Under Control Says 
Health Dept 13/02/03  X X X 
Medical Services on Cholera Alert 17/02/03  X X X 
Govt Acts to Beat Cholera 18/02/03  X X  
Still More Cases of Cholera as 
Govt Tries to Curb Disease 21/02/03 X X X X 
Another Cholera Outbreak 31/03/03 X X X X 
EC Health Department Keeping 
Cholera in Check  13/01/04  X X  
  
 TOTAL 12 22 21 13 
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Table 6: Eastern Province Herald News Values, 2000-2003 
TITLE DATE NEGATIV RECENC. RELEV. PROX. 
Anti-Cholera Alert 01/12/00  X X X 
E Cape Hospital Has Cholera Patient 02/03/01 X X X X 
Cholera Strikes in Eastern Cape 01/05/01 X X X X 
E Cape Cholera Worries Increase 04/05/01 X X   
R300m for Sanitation in Cholera Areas 16/05/01  X X  
Mystery Disease in Transkei Kills 10 21/01/02 X X X X 
Cholera Named as Killer in Remote 
Area 22/01/02 X X X  
Poor Infrastructure Making Cholera 
Worse, Says Minister 31/01/02 X X X X 
New Cholera Outbreak in Transkei 
Claims Seven Lives 06/01/03 X X X X 
Cholera 'Under Control' 29/01/03  X X X 
  
 TOTAL 7 10 9 7 
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Appendix D: NEWSPAPER SOURCES 
 
Table 7: News Sources, Eastern Province Herald, 1980-1983 
Total Quoted 44 
Anonymous Spokesperson: ECDOH and SADOH 13 
Senior DOH Director 11 
Medical Officer of Health 8 
Hospital Superintendent 4 
Director of Medical Services (Homeland) 3 
Other 2 
Anonymous Spokesperson: Hospital 2 
South African Minister of Healtj 1 
 
 
Table 8: News Sources, Daily Dispatch, 1980-1983 
Total Quoted 35 
Homeland Director of Medical Services 7 
Senior DOH Director 6 
Medical Officer of Health 5 
Homeland Health Officer 5 
Other 4 
South African Minister of Health 3 
Anonymous DOH Spokesperson 3 
South African Opposition Health Secretary 2 
 
Table 9: News Sources, Eastern Province Herald, 2000-2003 
Total Quoted 15 
Health MEC (Bevan Goqwana/Max Mamase) 4 
Hospital Superintendent 3 
SA Minister of Health (Manto Tshabalala-Msimang) 3 
SA Minister of WAF (Ronnie Kasrils) 1 
SAMWU Official  1 
ORT Officials 2 
Residents 1 
 
 
Table 10: News Sources, Daily Dispatch, 2000-2003 
Total Quoted 56 
Health MEC (Bevan Goqwana/Max Mamase) 13 
ECDOH Spokesperson (Mahlubandile Mageda/Sizwe Kupelo) 12 
Other Govt Spokes. 8 
OR Tambo Municipality Officials 5 
Residents 5 
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Hospital Superintendent 3 
King Sabata Dalindyebo Local Municipality Officials 3 
SA Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry (Ronnie Kasrils)_ 2 
OR Tambo Spokespersons 2 
Former Health MEC (Trudy Thomas) 1 
SA Minister of Health (Manto Tshabalala-Msimang) 1 
Miscellaneous Officials 1 
Head of ECDOH 1 
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